BEFORE THE PAPAL interlude in favor of world peace had even been set in motion, Russia had already made her first overtures to Germany for an accord.  On April 17, 1939, Merekalov, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, paid a visit to the German Foreign Office and frankly informed Weizsäcker, State Secretary, that he saw no reason why relations between Germany and Russia should not be on a "normal footing."  Indeed, from this normal footing they might become "better and better."⁽¹⁾

On this same day, as the Germans and the Russians were putting out cautious feelers for a possible understanding, Prime Minister Chamberlain had a talk with Ambassador Kennedy and remarked with easy confidence that he felt he could "make a deal with Russia at any time now."  He would delay action, however, until he had gotten the "Balkan situation straightened away."⁽²⁾

It is evident that he feared that any intimate understanding between Britain and Russia might "divide the Balkan resistance to Germany and that, if it drove Spain over to the Axis, we might thereby lose more in the West than we should gain in the East."  There was also the constant factor of Chamberlain's deep-seated suspicion of Russia and her aims:  "I can't believe that she has the same aims and objects as we have, or any sympathy with Democracy as such.  She is afraid of Germany and Japan, and would be delighted to see other people fight them."  He would postpone as long as possible any negotiations with Russia which looked towards a close political connection.⁽³⁾

The American Ambassador in Brussels (Davies) thought this policy of delay in dealing with Russia was a mistake and he made an appeal to Secretary Hull for immediate action.  He was convinced that the

decisive factor in Hitler's determination will be whether or not Russia will support Britain and France wholeheartedly.  From personal knowledge I know that the Soviets did mistrust Britain and France;  both their purposes and their performances.  They do trust you [Secretary Hull].  They also believe in me.  I am impelled, therefore, to suggest that if you considered it advisable I could go to Moscow on the pretext of cleaning up personal affairs for a few days ... and can personally, and if need be unofficially, see Litvinov, Kalinin and Molotov, and I am quite sure, Stalin also, with the object of aiding in securing a quick and speedy agreement with Britain against aggression.  Neither the French nor the British, in my opinion, can personally reach the highest authorities there.... I am confident that I not only can see the proper people, otherwise unreachable, but that they have confidence in my good judgment and sincerity.... Speed is vital.⁽⁴⁾

The Department of State was not ready to authorize this special mission to Moscow, so the British and French governments continued in their own confused way to seek some basis for an accord.  But the Soviet Government was not making this task an easy one.  On April 20, London and Paris received from Moscow a proposal that the "three countries guarantee not only to fight at once in case of direct attack on any one of the three, but also that all three countries should guarantee to go to war in case of an aggression against any other country in Europe."  Bonnet at once objected that guarantees of this kind would not carry "conviction."  It would be "totally impossible" to get "French soldiers to march in case of a German attack on Estonia unless such an attack should first involve Poland."⁽⁵⁾

While Britain and France were trying to find some alternative formula that would be agreeable to Moscow, the Baltic countries were showing a definite suspicion of Russian proposals to defend their integrity.  In the third week in April 1939, Estonia and Latvia sent notes to the Russian Foreign Office which emphatically stated that they were in no danger of war and therefore did not need any Russian assistance.  Two weeks later they announced their readiness to "sign a non-aggression pact with Germany."⁽⁶⁾

Romania was also deeply suspicious of Russia.  On April 25, Gafencu, the Romanian Foreign Minister, had a talk with Ambassador Kennedy in London.  He confided to him that he had strongly urged the British Foreign Office "not to have anything to do with Russia ... because Russia does not think the same way and is not really interested in peace as the rest of the world understands it."  He was convinced that Hitler did not want war but would seek to win "Danzig and the colonies with a battle of words."  But nevertheless, as a former soldier, he had stressed to Chamberlain the importance of immediate conscription in case his prophecy went wrong.⁽⁷⁾  It was apparent to him that the "policy of the Soviet Union was to become involved as little as possible in any European war in the hope that at the end of such a war ... the Red army might sweep the Continent in the interest of Bolshevism."⁽⁸⁾

The British Foreign Office shared some of Gafencu's suspicions of Russia and could not be hurried into any close relationship with the Soviet Government.  On April 24, Halifax sent instructions to the British Ambassador in Moscow directing him to ask the "Soviet Government immediately to issue a [unilateral] guarantee of Rumania and Poland on all fours with the British guarantees.... The French Government ... considered this new British démarche extremely stupid and refused to order the French Ambassador in Moscow to join his British colleague in the démarche." If the Soviet Government would issue the statement the only result "would be to enrage the Poles and the Rumanians."  As an alternative the French Foreign Office proposed that the Soviet Union be requested "to guarantee to give support to France and England in case either one should become involved in war due to promises to protect States in Eastern Europe.  Similarly, France and England should agree to give support to the Soviet Union in case the Soviet Union should become involved in war due to assistance to France and England."⁽⁹⁾

While this matter was being discussed, Daladier was "increasing to the greatest possible extent French military preparations." An imposing armament would have far more effect upon Hitler than fair words.  The British Ambassador at Paris had expressed the belief that Hitler's speech of April 28 had "left the way open for fruitful negotiations."  This viewpoint was regarded by Daladier as "dangerous nonsense."  There should be no pressure upon Poland to accept German proposals for an understanding.⁽¹⁰⁾

In many other respects the British attitude of mind disturbed Daladier.  Lord Halifax was showing definite reluctance to accept the latest French proposals to Russia.⁽¹¹⁾  The British Foreign Office was most anxious not to provoke the "susceptibilities of Poland and Rumania where Russia was concerned."  Moreover, it did not wish to forfeit the "sympathy of the world at large by giving a handle to German anti-Comintern propaganda," nor did it wish to "jeopardize the cause of peace by provoking violent action by Germany."

After giving this situation mature consideration, Lord Halifax sent to France this alternative proposal:  the Soviet Government should make a public declaration on its own initiative which should make some reference to the new obligations assumed by Britain and France relative to certain eastern European countries.  It should then state that in the event that Britain or France became involved in hostilities in fulfillment of these obligations, the assistance of the Soviet Government would be available if desired and would be afforded in such manner as might be most convenient. This cautious language, it was believed, would not offend in any way the susceptibilities of either Poland or Romania.⁽¹²⁾

It is apparent that the wary attitude of the British Foreign Office gave offence to Stalin.  Payart, the French charge d'affaires in Moscow, said that Halifax's proposals had "enraged Stalin" who regarded them as an effort to relegate Russia to the role of a third-rate power.  At any rate, on May 3, Litvinov suddenly resigned his office as Foreign Commissar and was succeeded by Molotov.  In London, Sir Robert Vansittart, the chief diplomatic adviser to the Government, expressed to Bullitt his fears that the dismissal of Litvinov meant the adoption by the Soviet Government of a policy of isolation.  If this were true it soon led to the "collapse of resistance to Hitler in Western Europe and the Balkans."  When Bullitt inquired if Litvinov's resignation had been occasioned by the "dilatory and almost insulting policy which the British Government had pursued vis-à-vis the Soviet Union since Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia," Vansittart answered that he "feared that British policy might have contributed to Stalin's attitude."

Bullitt pursued his conversation with Vansittart and suddenly received the surprise of his diplomatic career.  To his question as to why the British Government had refused to accept the French proposals relative to action in concert with Russia, Vansittart frankly replied that "no French proposals had yet reached the British Government."  Sir Eric Phipps, in Paris, had apparently not considered them important enough to rush to the Foreign Office.  After recovering from his astonishment, Bullitt gave to Vansittart an outline of the French proposals which the British diplomat at once pronounced to be "far superior" to the ones sponsored by Lord Halifax.  Without wasting any time, Bullitt now hurried to Paris and persuaded Daladier to telephone to Ambassador Corbin, in London, and direct him to present the French proposals to the British Foreign Office.⁽¹³⁾

But the British Foreign Office paid little attention to this pressure.  On May 8 the British reply to the Soviet proposals of April 17 was delivered to Molotov by the British Ambassador in Moscow.  In substance, the new British proposal contained the following items:  (1) the Soviet Government should announce its willingness to assist Poland and Romania should those countries become the victims of aggression;  (2) this assistance should be given in suitable form only if requested and only if Britain and France, in pursuance o f the guarantee which they have given to Poland and Romania, had already moved to implement these guarantees.⁽¹⁴⁾

On May 11, in the columns of Izvestia, the Russian attitude towards these proposals was clearly expressed:

Great Britain's suggestions avoid the subject of a pact of mutual assistance between France, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. and consider that the Soviet Government should come to the immediate aid of Great Britain and France should they be involved in hostilities as a result of the obligations they have assumed in guaranteeing Poland and Roumania.

Great Britain says nothing about the aid which the U.S.S.R. should naturally receive on the principle of reciprocity from France and Great Britain should it be involved in hostilities owing to the fulfilment of the obligations it may assume in guaranteeing any of the States of Eastern Europe.

It thus follows that under this arrangement, the U.S.S.R. must find itself in a position of inequality.⁽¹⁵⁾

Daladier sympathized with this Russian criticism of the attitude of the British Foreign Office and he did not blame the Soviet Government for its rejection of the British proposals.  In commenting upon the existing diplomatic deadlock he confided to Bullitt that he would insist that the French proposals be made the basis of any further negotiations with Russia.  All that the British had accomplished by their "dilatory and half-hearted proposals was to make the Russian terms stiffer."  He had "few illusions" about the Soviet Union but he believed that it was "essential" to have Russia in the concert of nations against Hitler.⁽¹⁶⁾

Under strong pressure from France, the British Foreign Office receded from its uncompromising attitude towards Russia.  On May 24, Lord Halifax instructed Sir Ronald Lindsay, in Washington, to the effect that the Soviet Government had been informed that Britain was "now disposed to agree that effective co-operation between the Soviet, French and British Governments against aggression in Europe might be based on a system of mutual guarantees in general conformity with the principles of the League of Nations."  This co-operation would cover direct attacks on any of the three governments by a European state and cases where any of them was engaged in hostility with such a state "in consequence of aggression by the latter upon another European country."⁽¹⁷⁾

But these British proposals made no reference to any assistance that might be given to Estonia, Latvia, or Finland in case these Baltic countries should become the victims of aggression.  In a speech on May 31, Molotov called attention to the dangers of German infiltration into the states bordering upon Soviet Russia, and he expressed the opinion that the British Government had not as yet envisaged a system of real reciprocity in its proposed concert of powers.  On June 3 the Russian reply to the latest British proposals was received in London.  It emphasized the necessity of a definite guarantee of Estonia and Latvia even though those states were opposed to such an arrangement.  On June 7, Prime Minister Chamberlain informed the House of Commons of the strong distaste of the Baltic countries for any guarantee of their status.  On this very day Estonia and Latvia gave expression to their suspicions of Russia by signing nonaggression treaties with Germany.⁽¹⁸⁾

In the Morning Post, June 8, Winston Churchill made an attack upon the attitude of the Chamberlain Government towards Russia and attempted to justify the demands of the Soviet Government for the inclusions of the Baltic states in the proposed system of guarantees.  In order to meet this criticism and to quiet public sentiment in this regard, Chamberlain announced that William Strang, chief of the European Department of the Foreign Office, would be sent on a special mission to Moscow.  But he felt that his hand had been forced in this whole Russian matter and he poured out his feelings in a conversation with Ambassador Kennedy:

He [Chamberlain] said that he does not regard the situation in a favorable light at all.... He regards the most important thing that could be done would be for the French to make some gesture to the Italians on the question of their demands.... The Russian situation is most annoying to him.  He is not at all sure that the Russians have the slightest idea of concluding the pact and if they do not accept the latest proposition, he is not at all sure that he will not call the whole thing off.⁽¹⁹⁾

It is obvious that Chamberlain was dragging his feet along the unwelcome path to a possible accord with Russia.  Under the impact of the pressure of public opinion he had arranged for Strang to go to Moscow but this special mission would amount to nothing because Strang's instructions were so uncompromising that they could not lead to an understanding with the Soviet Government.  With reference to the Baltic states and to Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Switzerland he held out strongly against the "imposition of a guarantee on Powers unwilling to receive it."  Inasmuch as His Majesty's Government had no intention of proposing a guarantee of Poland against Russia, "they feel that Great Britain should not guarantee or be guaranteed by Russia against a Polish attack."  In conclusion, His Majesty's Government was not ready to make a "tripartite agreement not to conclude a separate peace ... before objectives of peace had been decided upon."⁽²⁰⁾

Armed with these instructions, Strang began his diplomatic conversations with Molotov on June 15.  Apparently, the Russian Foreign Commissar was willing "temporarily to shelve" proposals relative to a guarantee of the Baltic states if British objections were "insuperable."  According to his prescription the proposed tripartite pact would be a "guarantee against direct aggression" and would exclude the contingency "of an attack upon one of the signatories resulting from assistance given by the latter to a third Power."  This suggestion did not please Mr. Strang who pointed out that Britain was anxious to have Russian help in the event she became involved in hostilities arising out of assistance to Poland.  Molotov, however, held his position strongly and also insisted upon the inclusion of a "no separate peace" clause in the proposed arrangement.⁽²¹⁾

Molotov seemed particularly concerned about the possibility of German infiltration of the Baltic states and a subsequent coup d'état which would install officials friendly to German designs.  For this reason he stressed the importance of an "undertaking to give assistance in the case of indirect as well as of direct aggression."  He also demanded that the proposed political agreement should go hand in hand with a military convention of a detailed nature.  His demands were strongly contested by the British and French delegations at Moscow.⁽²²⁾

British opposition to Russian demands became weaker as the European situation grew more grave.  By the last of June the British Foreign Office was ready to go to great lengths to appease Russia.  This story was told very frankly by Daladier to Ambassador Bullitt:

Daladier said that the British were now falling over themselves to accede to the Russian demands.  Two texts for submission to the Soviet Government had been prepared today.  The first contained no specific mention of the Baltic States, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, but would be accompanied by a secret memorandum covering them.  The second contained a complete acceptance of the Russian demands.  Strang in Moscow would be instructed tonight or tomorrow to present these two texts to the Soviet Government and to state that the British and French preferred the first text but were ready to accept the second if the Russians should insist.

I asked Daladier if he believed that this would conclude the negotiations or if he believed the Russians would insist upon subjecting this political accord to the conclusion of a future military agreement.  He said that he had urged the British to take up the question of a military agreement with the Russians before taking up the matter of the political agreement but the British had refused to do this.  He was by no means certain that the Russians would surrender this demand and feared that the negotiations might be dragged out indefinitely.... He added that the Soviet Government had repeatedly assured the French and British Governments that it was not negotiating in any way with the German Government.⁽²³⁾

These assurances were only partly true.  The basis for a German-Russian accord had already been laid.  On May 30 the German State Secretary in the Foreign Office wrote to the German Ambassador in Moscow an instruction which contained a revealing paragraph:  "Contrary to the policy previously planned, we have now decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union."  Astakhov, the Russian charge d'affaires in Berlin, was called to the Foreign Office for a conversation with Weizsäcker who referred to the remarks of the Russian Ambassador in April relative to an "improvement of Russo-German political relations."  He then stated that he did not know "whether there was still room for a gradual normalization [of relations] after Moscow had, perhaps, already given ear to the enticements of London."  Astakhov cautiously replied that he would await instructions from Moscow before discussing the matter any further.⁽²⁴⁾

Russia made the next move through the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin.  On June 15 he called at the Foreign Office and had a talk with Dr. Woermann, head of the Political Division.  He stated emphatically to Woermann that if "Germany would declare that she would not attack the Soviet Union or that she would conclude a non-aggression pact with her, the Soviet Union would probably refrain from concluding a treaty with England."⁽²⁵⁾

On the basis of this intimation, Schulenberg called at the Russian Foreign Office on June 29 and had a long conversation with Molotov.  He gave an assurance that "we would welcome a normalization of the relations between Germany and Soviet Russia.... For this we had furnished a number of proofs, such as reserve in the German press, conclusion of the non-aggression treaties with the Baltic countries and desire for resumption of economic negotiations.... We ... would continue to take advantage of any opportunity to prove our good will."  Molotov replied that the foreign policy of the Soviet Government was "aimed at the cultivation of good relations with all countries and this of course applied, providing there was reciprocity, to Germany too."  He finally remarked that "normalization of relations with Germany was desirable and possible."⁽²⁶⁾

The Western democracies were ignorant of the secret negotiations that were being carried on between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.  Daladier had some doubts about Russian assurances, but he had no idea that the Nazi-Soviet accord was really moving towards an early conclusion.  Léger expressed to Bullitt the opinion that "there were eighty chances in a hundred" that the Anglo-French conversations with Molotov in Moscow "would be concluded successfully in the near future."  But there were other difficulties:

Relations between Poland and France had again become extraordinarily unpleasant.  At a moment when it was absolutely essential for the French Government to know the exact thoughts of the Polish Government with regard to Danzig, the Polish Ambassador in Paris was so nervous and irritable that it was impossible to have any really intimate conversation with him.  He had insulted both Daladier and Bonnet so grossly that Daladier would no longer see him and Bonnet could get nothing out of him.  Similarly, Beck in Warsaw had no relations of an intimate nature with the French Ambassador.  As a result, all the French Ministers from Daladier down were reluctant to do anything of a concrete nature for Poland.  He [Léger] believes that both France and England should give loans to Poland and send airplanes to Poland at once in order to convince the Germans that France and England are determined to support Poland if Poland should become involved in war with Germany.  The Polish Ambassador was entirely right in his demands for such assistance; but his manner of presentation ... was such that he killed his own case.⁽²⁷⁾

Leger's optimism concerning the satisfactory progress of the Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Government was distinctly premature.  The matter of guarantees caused serious concern because some of the states that would be covered by these proposed pledges were openly against them.  Finland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland strongly voiced their objections in the first week in July,⁽²⁸⁾ and this fact forced Britain and France to seek desperately for some formula that would be generally satisfactory.  On June 30 the British Ambassador was directed to submit to the Soviet Government a proposal which placed "all States who might receive assistance on the same footing."  It also gave to the Soviet Government the right to "decide upon the need" for giving assistance to one of the guaranteed states.  Assurances would also be given to Moscow of "Anglo-French aid once hostilities had started."  The British Ambassador in Moscow was also instructed to indicate the "prejudicial effect on the peace front (in view of public or private objection by Baltic States and Rumania and the unknown attitude of Holland to a Soviet or tripartite guarantee) of Russian demands for publication in treaty of a list of States guaranteed against aggression."  He should express British preference for the enumeration of these guaranteed states in a secret supplementary agreement.  It was also important to include the Netherlands, Switzerland, and possibly Luxemburg in the list of states whose protection would be guaranteed.⁽²⁹⁾

Molotov was willing to have the list of guaranteed states extended so as to include Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Turkey, but he strongly objected to the addition of the Netherlands and Switzerland unless pacts of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and Poland and Turkey be immediately concluded.  He also wished the term "indirect aggression" to be defined as "an internal coup d'état or a reversal of policy in the interest of an aggressor."⁽³⁰⁾  There were several alternative formulas dealing with "indirect aggression," but none of them was satisfactory and conversations continued.  Agreement upon the matter of a military convention was also difficult.  On July 7, Lord Halifax was ready to make further concessions to the Soviet Government.  He would accept the following definition of indirect aggression:  "Action accepted by State in question under threat of force by another Power and involving abandonment of its independence or neutrality."  The British Ambassador in Moscow was directed to endeavor to include "consultation in case of aggression against Holland, Switzerland or Luxemburg."  If agreement was impossible on this suggestion then he was to try to secure a "limited tripartite agreement susceptible of extension and providing for consultation in the event of aggression against another Power."  It was made clear that the Foreign Office would not "agree to make entry into force of agreement depend on conclusion of military conversations.⁽³¹⁾

On the same day that Lord Halifax sent these instructions to Moscow, Ambassador Bullitt had a conversation with the French Foreign Minister.  The difficulty of finding some acceptable definition of "indirect aggression" once more came to the front:

This afternoon Bonnet said to me that instructions had now been sent to the British and French Ambassadors in Moscow ordering them to say to the Soviet Government that the Soviet definition of "indirect aggression" was totally inacceptable to the French and British Governments.  He said that the portion of the Soviet note which had especially shocked the French and British was the phrase that "any change in the makeup of the Government of any of the Baltic States which tended to favor an aggressor must lead to immediate military action by the Soviet Union, France and England."  Bonnet added that this phrase, if accepted, would make it possible for the Soviet Union to invade any of the Baltic States at any minute on any flimsy pretext with the armed support of France and England.  It was obvious that neither France nor England could accept such a proposal.

Bonnet added that the French and British Ambassadors in Moscow had been given a large number of alternative definitions of aggression which they would propose to Molotov.... They had also been ordered to inform the Soviet Union that France and England were ready to adjourn immediate signature of an agreement with regard to Switzerland and Holland provided the Russians would agree to discuss the matter later.

I [Bullitt] asked Bonnet if he still thought the negotiations with the Soviet Union could be brought to a successful conclusion.  He replied that he really had no idea.  The Russian demands had been so extraordinary that he was no longer certain that the Soviet Government really desired to reach an agreement.⁽³²⁾

Some two weeks later [July 19], the British Foreign Office made another concession but would not accept the entire Russian program.  The situation was tersely described to Ambassador Kennedy by Lord Halifax:

Halifax said that their final words to the Russians now is that they will accept the military pact but will not accept the Russians' definition of indirect aggression and if the Russians insist on it the English are going to call the whole deal off.⁽³³⁾

The following day Kennedy had a talk with Prime Minister Chamberlain.  Although he was fairly optimistic about the general outlook for the next thirty days, he was

sick and disgusted with the Russians and while he believes that the Russians are willing to continue talking without accomplishing anything, his patience is exhausted.  He told me he had a conversation with Prince Paul, of Jugoslavia, and Prince Paul was definitely of the opinion that if England did not consummate a deal with the Russians, Germany would.  The Prime Minister said he does not feel there is any danger of that.⁽³⁴⁾

On August 5, Lord Halifax sent to Sir Ronald Lindsay, in Washington, a brief notation:  "At interview on August 2nd, Molotov again refused to accept our definition of indirect aggression."⁽³⁵⁾  The game was just about up and Molotov was almost ready to show his hand.  The farce of further conversations continued on August 12 when the British and French military missions arrived in Moscow.  Voroshilov promptly asked the highly embarrassing question whether Poland and Romania would permit the passage of Russian troops through their territories in the event of German aggression.  General Doumenc telegraphed to Paris and urged the Daladier Government to accept the Soviet viewpoint and exert pressure upon Poland in favor of concessions to Russia.⁽³⁶⁾

While the British and French governments were anxiously seeking some formula of accommodation with Russia, the German Government was making successful efforts to establish a rapprochement with its eastern neighbor.  On the evening of July 26, Dr. Carl Schnurre, head of the Eastern European Division of the Foreign Office, invited to dinner Astakhov, the Soviet charge d'affaires, and Barbarin, the chief of the Soviet Trade Mission to Germany.  Astakhov referred to the close community of interests in foreign policy that had formerly existed between Germany and Russia.  Dr. Schnurre quickly took up this theme and indicated that the old friendly relations could be restored by adopting the following program:  (1) the re-establishment of collaboration in economic affairs;  (2) the normalization and improvement of political relations;  (3) a new arrangement which would take account of the vital political interests of both parties.  Astakhov concurred with this view but cautiously advised that the movement towards this accord should be "very slow and gradual."⁽³⁷⁾

But Germany was in a hurry to push to completion this understanding with Soviet Russia.  On August 2, Ribbentrop had an important conversation with Astakhov during which he stressed the opinion that the German Government was "favorably disposed toward Russia."  If Moscow had a similar disposition there was "no problem from the Baltic to the Black Sea that could not be solved between the two of us."⁽³⁸⁾

In Moscow, Schulenburg discussed the situation with Molotov who frankly admitted that his government "desired normalization and improvement" of relations with Germany.  But this admission was guarded and Molotov was so cautious in his admissions that it seemed evident to the German Ambassador that it would take "considerable effort on our part to cause the Soviet Government to swing about."⁽³⁹⁾  It was soon evident that Ribbentrop was ready to make this effort.  On August 14, Schulenburg was instructed to see Molotov and emphasize the opinion that the period of opposition between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany could be "brought to an end once and for all" by a frank appraisal of mutual interests.  There were no "real conflicts of interest between Germany and the U.S.S.R."  Indeed, there was distinctly lacking any "cause for an aggressive attitude on the part of one country against the other."  It should be obvious that "German-Soviet policy today has come to an historic turning point."  The situation in Europe called for German-Soviet co-operation, not conflict.  It would be fatal "if through mutual lack of views and intentions, our peoples should be finally driven asunder."  The existing crisis was of so grave a nature that von Ribbentrop himself was ready to visit Moscow to present the German viewpoint to both Molotov and Stalin.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Molotov assured Schulenburg that he "warmly welcomed German intentions of improving relations with the Soviet Union" but he insisted that "adequate preparation" for a discussion of outstanding problems in German-Soviet relations was "indispensable." During the conversation Molotov seemed so "unusually compliant" that Schulenburg was of the opinion that the Soviet Foreign Office regarded the suggestion of a German visit to Moscow a "very flattering" testimonial of an ardent desire for Nazi co-operation with Russia.  The situation was improving so rapidly that it appeared as though the Reich would "achieve the desired results" in the pending negotiations.⁽⁴¹⁾

With negotiations moving rapidly towards a favorable conclusion, the German Foreign Office accelerated the tempo of its efforts.  Schulenburg was instructed to assure Molotov that Germany was ready for the signature of a nonaggression pact.  Moreover, the Reich would guarantee the Baltic states jointly with the Soviet Union and would exercise her influence "for an improvement of Russian-Japanese relations."  In order to speed the signature of a treaty covering these points, von Ribbentrop indicated that he was prepared to take a plane to Moscow any time after August 18.⁽⁴²⁾

Molotov welcomed the proposed visit of von Ribbentrop to Moscow as an indication that the German Government valued more highly cooperation with Russia than did the Chamberlain Government of Britain which had sent to Moscow merely a chief of one of the divisions of the Foreign Office (Strang).  But he wished to make it clear that Russia desired the conclusion of an economic agreement before the establishment of a political understanding.⁽⁴³⁾  This wish was easily fulfilled by the signature, at Berlin, of a convention that dealt exclusively with economic matters.  On August 20, Hitler himself sent a telegram to Stalin in which he expressly accepted the draft of a nonaggression treaty which Molotov had prepared.  He then requested that Stalin receive Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on August 22 or 23.⁽⁴⁴⁾  Stalin made a favorable reply and the stage was prepared for a German-Soviet accord that ushered in World War II.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Meanwhile, conversations continued between Voroshilov and the members of the Anglo-French military mission.  The demands of Voroshilov were purposely inacceptable.  Not only did Russia insist upon the right of Russian troops to enter Polish and Romanian territory but also to occupy the principal ports of the Baltic states and the main islands near their coasts if she thought such measures were necessary to forestall German aggression.  These demands made a very unfavorable impression upon Polish statesmen who were fearful of Russian good faith.  When the French Ambassador asked for acquiescence in the Russian request for the right to send troops across Polish soil, Foreign Minister Beck replied: "We concede to no one, under any form, the right to discuss the use of any part of our territory by foreign troops."⁽⁴⁶⁾  On August 21, according to Daladier, he overcame Polish objections in this regard and authorized General Doumenc to sign with Russia the proposed military convention.  M. Bonnet and M. Lukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador in Paris, gave different versions,⁽⁴⁷⁾ but the matter is of no great importance because the announcement of the Ribbentrop mission to Moscow sounded the death knell of any rapprochement between Russia and the Western democracies.

On the afternoon of August 23, Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow.  That evening he had a long conference with Stalin who burst out into bitter criticisms of Britain.  Ribbentrop sounded the same note and acidly complained that Britain had always sought to "disrupt the development of good relations between Germany and the Soviet Union."  She was obviously weak and "wanted to let others fight for her presumptuous claim to world domination."  Stalin agreed with this indictment.  He had not liked the attitude of the British military mission which "had never told the Soviet Government what it really wanted." There was no doubt in his mind that Britain, in a military sense, was distinctly weak.  Her domination of the world in spite of this fact was "due to the stupidity of the other countries that always let themselves be bluffed."  After appropriate toasts, the signature of the German-Soviet nonaggression treaty was hailed as the dawn of a new political day in world politics.⁽⁴⁸⁾  To millions of fearful persons in panic-stricken lands from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, it was the beginning of night over Europe.

During the fateful month of August, Mussolini tried desperately to maintain a dignified position on a very slippery diplomatic fence.  As early as July 7 he had told the British Ambassador (Loraine) that "if England is ready to fight in defense of Poland, Italy will take up arms with her ally Germany."  But he became exceedingly vacillating as the crisis deepened.  On August 10 he instructed Ciano frankly to "inform the Germans that we must avoid a conflict with Poland since it will be impossible to localize it and a general war would be disastrous for everybody."⁽⁴⁹⁾  Ribbentrop resented this policy of caution:  "The decision to fight is implacable."  After talking to Hitler, Ciano realized that there was "no longer anything that can be done.  He [Hitler] has decided to strike, and strike he will."⁽⁵⁰⁾

Ciano returned to Rome "completely disgusted with the Germans, with their leader, with their way of doing things.  They have betrayed us and lied to us."  Mussolini, after considering the reports of Ciano, decided (August 15 ) that Italy should "not march blindly with Germany.... He wants time to prepare the break with Germany."⁽⁵¹⁾  On the eighteenth, however, the Duce's doubts reappeared and he remarked to Ciano that "Germany might do good business cheaply."  Moreover, he feared "Hitler's rage." On the twenty-first the Duce announced to Ciano that he had decided to go along with the Germans, but after much argument he consented to a conference between Ciano and Ribbentrop.  He agreed that Ribbentrop should be informed that Italy would "not intervene if the conflict is provoked by an attack on Poland."⁽⁵²⁾  But the Nazi-Soviet Agreement of August 23 upset Ciano's calculations and the proposed meeting with the German Foreign Minister was abandoned.

While the Duce was endeavoring to squirm into a favorable position on a precarious perch, Chamberlain was still trying to reason with Hitler.  On August 22 he sent to Berlin a warning that, despite the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Agreement, Britain would still carry out her obligation to defend Polish independence.⁽⁵³⁾  When Nevile Henderson went to Berchtesgaden to deliver this communication he found Hitler in a mood of "extreme excitability."  During a second interview the Führer was more composed although sharply critical of British policy.  No longer did he "trust Mr. Chamberlain" who had given a "blank check to Poland."⁽⁵⁴⁾  In a letter to the British Prime Minister he strongly asserted his constant desire for peace with Britain and he complained that his pacific advances had always been rejected.  With reference to the questions of Danzig and the Corridor he observed that he had been ready to settle them "on the basis of a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity."  But Poland, acting upon assurance of armed assistance from Britain in case of conflict with Germany, had refused to accede to a German request for the return of Danzig to the Reich and for a railway and a motor road across the Corridor.  Also, Britain and France were mobilizing their armed forces as a threat to compel Germany to recede from her firm stand with reference to Poland.  This action would force Germany to answer mobilization with mobilization.⁽⁵⁵⁾

This diplomatic impasse made European statesmen realize that World War II was just around the corner of tomorrow.  In order to avert such a dread contingency, King Leopold of Belgium, speaking for the so-called "Oslo Powers" (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg,

1. Memorandum by Weizsäcker, April 17, 1939.  Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (Washington, 1948), pp. 1-2.

2. Ambassador Kennedy to Secretary Hull, London, April 17, 1939.  740.00/908, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

3. Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (New York, 1946), pp. 408-9.

4. Ambassador Joseph Davies to Secretary Hull, Brussels, April 18, 1939. 740.00/934, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

5. Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary Hull, Paris, April 21, 1939.  740.00/1068, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

6. David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942 (New Haven, 1942), p. 23; Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary Hull, Paris, April 21, 1939.  740.00/1072, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

7. Ambassador Kennedy to Secretary Hull, London, April 25, 1939.  740.00/1160, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

8. Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary Hull, Paris, April 28, 1939.  740.00/1218, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

9. Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary Hull, Paris, April 25, 1939.  740.00/1154, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

10. Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary Hull, Paris, April 28, 1939.  740.00/1230, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

11. These proposals included the following points: (1) if France should become involved in war because of military assistance given to Poland or Rumania, the Soviet Union would support France immediately with all her military forces; (2) if the Soviet Union should become involved in war because of assistance given to Poland or Rumania, France would support the Soviet Union immediately with all her military forces; (3) conversations should take place at once "for the purpose of concerting measures to make the assistances envisaged effective." Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary Hull, Paris, April 29, 1939.  740.00/1235, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

12. Ambassador Kennedy to Secretary Hull, London, May 1, 1939.  740.00/1256, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

13. Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary Hull, Paris, May 5, 1939.  740.00/1351, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

14. Chargé d'Affaires Grummon to Secretary Hull, Moscow, May 9, 1939.  740-00/ 1385, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.  The italics are the author's.

15. Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941 (New York, 1947), II, 244-45.

16. Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary Hull, Paris, May 16, 1939.  740.00/1500, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

17. Lord Halifax to Sir Ronald Lindsay, May 24, 1939.  740.00/1670, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

18. Dallin, op, cit., pp. 41-42;  German White Book, pp. 367-69.

19. Ambassador Kennedy to Secretary Hull, London, June 9, 1939.  740.00/1684, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

20. Lord Halifax to Sir Ronald Lindsay June 12, 1939.  740.00/1797 Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

21. Lord Halifax to Sir Ronald Lindsay, June 17, 1939.  740.00/1799, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

22. Beloff, op. cit., II, 254;  L.B. Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-1939 (New York, 1948), pp. 186-89.

23. Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary Hull, Paris, June 28, 1939.  740.00/1822, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

24. Weizsäcker to Schulenberg, Berlin, May 30, 1939.  Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, pp. 15-17.

25. Foreign Office memorandum by Dr. Woermann, June 15, 1939. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

26. German Ambassador in Moscow (Schulenberg) to the German Foreign Office, June 29, 1939. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

27. Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary Hull, Paris, June 30, 1939.  740.00/1840, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

28. Bulletin of International News, XVI, pp. 721, 736-37, 741.

29. Lord Halifax to Sir Ronald Lindsay, June 30, 1939.  740.00/1895, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

30. Lord Halifax to Sir Ronald Lindsay, July 4, 1939.  740.00/1897, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.  See also, Georges Bonnet, Defense de la Paix: De Washington au Quai d'Orsay (Geneva, 1946), p. 193; G. Gafencu, Derniers Jours de l'Europe (Paris, 1946), pp. 217-23.

31. Lord Halifax to Sir Ronald Lindsay, July 7, 1939.  740.00/1958, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

32. Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary Hull, Paris, July 7, 1939.  740.00/1887, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

33. Ambassador Kennedy to Secretary Hull, London, July 19, 1939.  740.00/193 1, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

34. Ambassador Kennedy to Secretary Hull, London, July 20, 1939.  740.00/1936, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

35. Lord Halifax to Sir Ronald Lindsay, August 5, 1939.  740.00/2044, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.  The British viewpoint on indirect aggression was clearly set forth by Lord Halifax on July 24.  "The State in question must be acting under threat of force and its action must involve abandonment of its independence and neutrality."  740.00/2018, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

36. Namier, op. cit., pp. 206-8;  Georges Bonnet, Fin d'une Europe, pp. 275-94.

37. German Foreign Office memorandum, July 27, 1939.  Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, pp. 32-36.

38. Ribbentrop to Ambassador Schulenburg, August 3, 1939.  Ibid., pp. 37-38.

39. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Moscow, August 4, 1939.  Ibid., pp. 39-41.

40. Ribbentrop to Schulenburg August 14, 1939.  Ibid., pp. 50-52

41. Schulenburg to the German Foreign Office, Moscow, August 16, 1939;  Schulenberg to the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office, Moscow, August 16, 1939.  Ibid., pp. 52-57.

42. Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, August 16, 1939.  Ibid., pp. 58-59.

43. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Moscow, August 18, 1939.  Ibid., p. 58.

44. Hitler to Stalin, August 20, 1939.  Ibid., pp. 66-67.

45. Stalin to Hitler, August 21, 1939.  Ibid., p. 69.

46. Namier, op. cit., pp. 207-9;  Leon Noel, L'Aggression Allemande contre la Pologne (Paris, 1946), p. 423.

47. Édouard Daladier, "Le Procès de Nuremberg et le Pacte Germano-Russo," Minerve, April 5, 1946;  General Maurice Gamelin, Servir (Paris, 1936), II, 444, contends that Daladier first telegraphed to General Doumenc and then secured Polish consent.

48. Memorandum of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Stalin, August 23-24, 1939.  Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, pp. 72-78.

49. The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943, ed. Hugh Gibson (Garden City, 1947), pp. 109, 118.

50. Ibid., p. 119.

51. Ibid., p 120-21.

52. Ibid., pp. 123-25.

53. British Blue Book, p. 97.

54. Sir Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission (New York, 1940), pp. 269-70.

55. Chancellor Hitler to Prime Minister Chamberlain, August 23, 1939.  British White Paper, p. 10.