Plan for a Political Defence of Napoleon ;
sketched by himself.

TUESDAY, Aug. 27th, 1816.—About four o’clock I joined the Emperor in the garden :  he had been engaged in dictating during the whole of the morning.  The wind was very rough, and the Emperor declined riding out in the calash :  he therefore walked about for a considerable time in the great path of the wood, attended by all the individuals of his suite.  He jokingly teased one of the party, by observing that he was sulky, and accusing him of being very often discontented and ill-humoured, &c.

The Emperor, on rising from the dinner-table, adverted to his recent protestation against the treaty of the 2d of August.  He expatiated with warmth on the subject, and remarked, while he walked rapidly about the apartment, that he intended to draw up another protest, on a more extended and important scale, against the bill that had been passed in the British parliament.  He would prove, he said, that the bill was not a law, but a violation of every existing law.  Napoleon was proscribed, and not judged by it.  The English parliament had done, not what was just, but what was deemed to be expedient ;  it had imitated Themistocles, without hearing Aristides.  The Emperor then arraigned himself before all the nations in Europe, and proved that each would successively acquit him.  He took a review of the different acts of his reign, and justified them all.  “The French and the Italians,” said he, “lament my absence ;  I carry with me the gratitude of the Poles, and even the late and bitter regrets of the Spaniards.

“ Europe will soon deplore the loss of the equilibrium, to the maintenance of which my French empire was absolutely necessary.  The Continent is now in the most perilous situation, being continually exposed to the risk of being overrun by Cossacks and Tartars.  And the English,” said he in conclusion, “the English will deplore their victory of Waterloo !  Things will be carried to such a length, that posterity, together with every well-informed and well-disposed person among our contemporaries, will regret that I did not succeed in all my enterprises.”

In course of his remarks, the Emperor occasionally rose to a pitch of sublimity.  I shall not follow him into all his details.  He promised to dictate the observations he had made, and said he had already sketched out a plan for his political defence, in fourteen paragraphs.

Catinat ;  Turenne ;  Coné—Questions respecting the greatest Battle fought by the Emperor ;  the best Troops, &c.

28th.—The Emperor did not go out until four o’clock ;  he had spent three hours in the bath.  The weather was very unpleasant, and in consequence he merely took a few turns in the garden.  He had just written to inform the Governor, that henceforth he would receive no strangers, unless they were admitted to Longwood by passes from the Grand Marshal, as in the time of Admiral Cockburn.

The Emperor proposed playing a game at chess ;  but before he sat down to do so, he took up a volume of Fenelon.  It was La Direction de Conscience d’un Roi.  He read to us several articles, criticising them with considerable spirit and gaiety.  At length he threw down the volume, saying, that the name of an author had never influenced him in forming an opinion of his writings ;  that he always judged of works according to the sentiments with which they inspired him ;  being always equally willing to praise or to censure.  He added, that in spite of the name of Fenelon, he had no hesitation in declaring, that the work he had just looked through, was a mere string of rhapsodies ;  and truly it would be difficult to refute this assertion.

After dinner, the Emperor conversed about the old marine establishment, and alluded to M. de Grasse, and his defeat on the 12th of April.  He wished to learn some particulars on this subject ;  and he asked for the Dictionary of Sieges and Battles.  He looked over it, and it afforded him matter for a multitude of observations.  Catinat came under his consideration, and the remarks he made on that commander lowered him infinitely in our estimation.  Napoleon said, that he thought him very inferior to the reputation he enjoyed, after viewing the scenes of his operations in Italy, and reading his correspondence with Louvois.  “Having risen from the tiers-état,” said he, “and being educated for the law, distinguished for urbanity of manners and moral integrity, affecting the practice of equality, residing at St. Gratien, at the gates of Paris, Catinat, became the favourite of the litterati of the capital, and the philosophers of the day, who exalted him beyond his real merits.  He was in no way comparable to Vendôme.”

The Emperor said, he had endeavoured, in the same manner, to study the characters of Turenne and Condé, suspecting that they were also the objects of exaggerated eulogy ;  but that he was convinced those two men were fully entitled to all the commendation that has been bestowed on them.  With regard to Turenne, he remarked, that his intrepidity encreased in proportion as he acquired experience :  as he grew old he evinced greater courage than he seemed to possess in early life.  The contrary was observable in Condé, who displayed so much dauntless valour at the commencement of his career.

Now that I am alluding to Turenne, Condé, and other distinguished men, I may mention, as a curious fact, that I never, by any chance, heard Napoleon utter the name of Frederick the Great.  Yet many circumstances prove that Frederick held a high rank in Napoleon’s regard.  The large silver watch, or kind of morning-bell, which hangs by the fire-place in the Emperor’s apartment at Saint-Helena ;— the eagerness with which Napoleon, on his entrance into Potzdam, seized the sword of the Prussian hero, exclaiming, “Let those who will seek other spoil ;  I value this beyond millions !”—finally, his long and silent contemplation of the tomb of Frederick—sufficiently attest the deep interest which Napoleon attached to every thing connected with that prince.

In the Dictionary of Sieges and Battles, which the Emperor was looking over to-day, he found his name mentioned in every page ;  but connected with anecdotes either totally false, or at least misstated.  This led him to exclaim against the whole swarm of inferior writers, and their unworthy abuse of the pen.  “Literature,” he said, “had became the food of the vulgar, while it ought to have been reserved exclusively for people of refined taste.

“ For example,” said the Emperor, “it is affirmed that when at Arcola, I one night took the post of a sentinel who had fallen asleep.  This idea was doubtless conceived by a citizen, by a lawyer perhaps ;  but certainly not by a soldier.  The author evidently wishes to represent me in a favourable point of view ;  and he of course imagined that nothing could reflect greater credit on me than the story he has invented.  He certainly wrote it with the view of doing me honour ;  but he knew not that I was totally incapable of the action he describes.  I was much too fatigued for any such thing ;  and it is very probable that I should myself have fallen asleep before the sentinel.”

We then enumerated about fifty or sixty great battles that had been fought by the Emperor.  Some one present having asked which was the greatest, the Emperor replied that it was difficult to answer that question, since it was first necessary to inquire what was meant by the greatest battle.  “Mine,” continued he, “can not be judged of detachedly.  They had no unity of place, action, or design.  They formed merely a portion of extensive plans.  They can therefore only be judged by their results.  The battle of Marengo, which was so long undecided, procured for us the dominion of all Italy ;  Ulm annihilated a whole army ;  Jena threw the whole Prussian monarchy into our hands ;  Friedland opened to us the Russian empire ;  and Eckmuhl decided the fate of a war.  The battle of Moscow was one in which the greatest talent was displayed, and in which the fewest results were obtained.  Waterloo, where every thing failed, would, had every thing succeeded, have saved France, and re-established Europe,” &c.

Madame de Montholon having asked what troops might be accounted the best ;  “Those who gain victories, Madam,” replied the Emperor.  “But,” added he, “soldiers are capricious and inconstant, like you ladies.  The best troops were the Carthaginians under Hannibal ;  the Romans under the Scipios ;  the Macedonians under Alexander ;  and the Prussians under Frederick.”  He thought, however, he might safely affirm that the French troops were, of all others, those who could most easily be rendered the best, and preserved so.

“ With my complete guard of forty or fifty thousand men, I would have pledged myself to march through all Europe.  It may, perhaps, be possible to produce troops as good as those who composed my army of Italy and Austerlitz ;  but certainly nothing can ever surpass them.”

The Emperor, who had dwelt for a considerable time on this subject, which was so interesting to him, suddenly recollecting himself, asked what it was o’clock.  He was informed it was eleven. —“Well,” said he, rising, “we at least have the merit of having got through our evening without the help of either tragedy or comedy.”

Madame de Cottin’s Mathilde, &c.—All Frenchmen interested in Napoleon.—Desaix and Napoleon at Marengo.—Sir Sidney Smith.—Cause of General Bonaparte’s return to France.—Account of his voyage.—Instances of the caprice of Fortune.

29th.—About two o’clock the Emperor desired me to attend him in his chamber, and he gave me some private orders. ..................

At four o’clock I rejoined him.  I found him sitting under the tent, surrounded by all his suite ;  he was swinging backward and forward on his chair, laughing, talking, and making every effort to be cheerful, while, at the same time, he continually repeated that he felt dull and languid.  He rose and took a drive in the calash.

After dinner the conversation turned on romance writing.  Some one mentioned Madame Cottin’s Mathilde, the scene of which is laid in Syria.  The Emperor asked the individual who had alluded to the work, whether he had ever seen Madame Cottin, whether she liked him (Napoleon), whether her work was favourable to him, &c.;  but as he did not receive a ready answer he thus continued :  “But every body has loved me and hated me :  every one has been for me and against me by turns.  I may truly say there is not a single Frenchman in whom I have not excited interest.  All must have loved me, from Collot d’Herbois (had he lived) to the Prince de Condé ;  only not all at the same time, but at different intervals and periods.  I was like the sun crossing the equator in his course through the ecliptic.  According as my influence was felt in each different climate, all hopes expanded, and I was blessed and adored ;  but when I had departed, when I was no longer understood, unfavourable sentiments arose.”

Egypt next became the subject of conversation ;  and the Emperor again sketched the characters of Kleber and Desaix.  The latter joined the First Consul on the eve of the battle of Marengo.  Napoleon asked him how he could have thought of signing the capitulation of Egypt ;  since the army was sufficiently numerous to maintain possession of it.  “We ought not to have lost Egypt,” he observed.— “That’s very true,” replied Desaix, “and the army was certainly numerous enough to enable us to retain possession of the country.  But the General-in-chief left us ;  and at that distance from home, the General-in-chief is not a single man in the army ;  he is the half, the three-fourths, the five-sixths of it.  I had no alternative but to resign the possession of the country.  I doubt whether I could have succeeded had I acted otherwise :  besides, it would have been criminal to make the attempt, for in such a case it is a soldier’s duty to obey, and I did so.”

Desaix, immediately after his arrival at Marengo, obtained the command of the reserve.  Towards the end of the battle, and amidst the greatest apparent disorder, Napoleon came up to him :— “Well,” said Desaix, “affairs are going on very badly, the battle is lost.  I can only secure the retreat.  Is it not so ?”— “Quite the contrary,” said the First Consul ;  “to me the result of the battle was never for a moment doubtful.  Those masses which you see in disorder on the right and left, are marching to form themselves in your rear.  The battle is gained.  Order your column to advance :  you have but to reap the glory of the victory.”

The Emperor afterwards spoke of Sir Sidney Smith.  He had, he said, just read in the Moniteur, the documents relating to the convention of El-Arish, in which he remarked that Sir Sidney had evinced a great share of intelligence and integrity.  The Emperor said he bewildered Kleber by the stories which he made him believe.  But when Sir Sidney received intelligence of the refusal of the English Government to ratify the treaty, he was very much dissatisfied, and behaved very honourably to the French army.  “After all,” said the Emperor, “Sir Sidney Smith is not a bad man.  I now entertain a better opinion of him than I did ;  particularly after what I daily witness in the conduct of his confederates.”

It was Sir Sidney Smith, who, by communicating the European journals to Napoleon, brought about the departure of the General-in-chief, and consequently the dénouement of Brumaire.  The French, on their return from St. Jean d’Acre, were totally ignorant of all that had taken place in Europe for several months.  Napoleon, eager to obtain intelligence, sent a flag of truce on board the Turkish admiral’s ship, under the pretence of treating for the ransom of the prisoners whom he had taken at Abookir, not doubting but the envoy would be stopped by Sir Sidney Smith, who carefully prevented all direct communication between the French and the Turks.  Accordingly the French flag of truce received directions from Sir Sidney to go on board his ship.  He experienced the handsomest treatment ;  and the English commander having among other things ascertained that the disasters of Italy were quite unknown to Napoleon, he indulged in the malicious pleasure of sending him a file of newspapers.

Napoleon spent the whole night in his tent, perusing the papers ;  and he came to the determination of immediately proceeding to Europe, to repair the disasters of France, and, if possible, to save her from destruction.

Admiral Ganthaume, who brought Napoleon from Egypt in the frigate Le Muiron, frequently related to me the details of his voyage.  The Admiral remained at head-quarters after the destruction of the fleet at Abookir.

Shortly after the return from Syria, and immediately after a communication with the English squadron, the General-in-chief directed Ganthaume to proceed forthwith to Alexandria, to fit out secretly, and with all possible speed, one of the Venetian frigates that were lying off that port, and to let him know when the vessel was ready to sail.

These orders were executed.  The General-in-chief, who was making a tour of inspection, proceeded to an unfrequented part of the coast, with a party of his guides.  Boats were in readiness to receive them, and they were conveyed to the frigate without going near Alexandria.

The frigate sailed that very evening, in order to get out of sight of the English cruisers, and the fleet that was anchored at Abookir, before daylight.  Unfortunately a calm ensued while the vessel was still within sight of the coast, and from the mast-tops the English ships at Abookir were still discernible.

The utmost alarm prevailed on board the frigate.  It was proposed to return by Alexandria ;  but Napoleon opposed this suggestion.  The die was cast ;  and happily they soon got beyond the reach of observation.

The voyage was very long and very unfavourable.  The idea of being overtaken by the English frequently occasioned alarm.  Though no one knew the intentions of the General, each formed his own conjectures, and the utmost anxiety prevailed.  Napoleon alone was calm and undisturbed.  During the greater part of the day he used to shut himself up in his cabin, where, as Ganthaume informed me, he employed himself in reading sometimes the Bible, and sometimes the Koran.  Whenever he appeared on deck he displayed the most cheerful and easy air, and conversed on the most indifferent subjects.

General Menou was the last person to whom Napoleon spoke on shore.  He said to him, “My dear General, you must take care of yourselves here.  If I have the happiness to reach France, the reign of ranting shall be at an end.”

On a perusal of the papers furnished by Sir Sidney Smith, Napoleon formed such an idea of the disasters of France, that he concluded the enemy had crossed the Alps, and was already in possession of several of our Southern Departments.  Thus when the frigate approached the shores of Europe, Napoleon directed the Admiral to make for Collioure and Port-Vendre, situated at the extremity of the Gulf of Lyons.  A gale of wind drove them upon the coast of Corsica.  They then entered Ajaccio, where they obtained intelligence of the state of affairs in France.

Ganthaume informed me, that he saw at Ajaccio, the house that was occupied by Napoleon’s family, the patrimonial abode.  The arrival of their celebrated countryman immediately set all the inhabitants of the island in motion.  A crowd of cousins came to welcome him, and the streets were thronged with people.

Napoleon again set sail, and the frigate now steered towards Marseilles and Toulon.  However, just as they were on the point of reaching the place of their destination, a new source of alarm arose.  At sunset, on the larboard of the frigate, and precisely in the sun’s rays, they observed thirty sail making towards them with the wind abaft.  Ganthaume proposed that the long boat of the frigate should be manned with the best sailors, and that the General should get on board, and, by favour of the night, endeavour to gain the shore.  But Napoleon declined this proposition, observing that there would always be time enough for that mode of escape ;  and he directed the captain to continue his course as though nothing had occurred.  Meanwhile night set in, and the enemy’s signals were heard, at a distance, and right astern :  thus it appeared that the frigate had not been observed.  Next day they anchored at Frejus.  The rest is well known.

The Emperor concluded the evening’s conversation, by relating to us three curious instances of the caprice of fortune, which took place in the same quarter of the world, and about the same period.

A corporal, who deserted from one of the regiments of the army of Egypt, joined the Mamelukes, and was made a Bey.  After his elevation, he wrote a letter to his former General.

A fat suttler’s wife who had followed the French army, became the favourite of the Pasha of Jerusalem.  She could not write, but she sent a messenger with her compliments to her old friends, assuring them, that she would never forget her country, but would always afford protection to the French and the Christians.  “She was,” said the Emperor, “the Zaira of the day.”

A young peasant-girl of Cape Corso, being seized in a fishing-boat by corsairs, was conveyed to Barbary, and subsequently became the ruling favourite of the King of Morocco.  The Emperor, after some diplomatic communications, caused the brother of this young girl to be brought from Corsica to Paris, and, after having him suitably fitted out, sent him to his sister ;  but he never afterwards heard of them.

It was late when the Emperor retired to rest ;  he had spent upwards of three hours in conversation.

30th.—I attended the Emperor at four o’clock.  He had been engaged in dictating under the tent.  The Governor had returned answers to the letters which M. de Montholon addressed to him by the Emperor’s orders.

To the first communication, containing the protest against the treaty of the 2d of August, and various other complaints, no answer was returned, except that the Governor wished to be informed what letter he had kept back.  This we could not tell him, since we had not seen the letters.  We had asked him that question ;  and he was the only person capable of answering it.  To the second letter, which stated that the Emperor would not receive strangers at Longwood unless they were admitted by the Grand Marshal’s passes, as was usual in the time of Admiral Cockburn, the Governor replied, that he had been sorry to see General Bonaparte troubled by intrusive visitors at Longwood, and that he wished to prevent such importunity for the future.  This was a most revolting piece of irony, considering the situation in which the Emperor was placed, and the tenor of M. de Montholon’s letter.

After dinner the Emperor retired to the drawing-room, and desired us all to seat ourselves round the table, to form, as he said, an academic sitting.  He began to dictate to us on some subjects ;  but when the parts that had been written were read over to him, he resolved to cancel them.  Conversation was then resumed, and was kept up for a considerable time, partly in a serious, and partly in a lively strain.  It was near one o’clock when the Emperor retired.  For some time past we have sat up later than we used to do.  This is a good sign :  the Emperor feels better, and he is more cheerful and talkative than he lately was.

Historical Doubts.—The Regency of the Duke of Orleans.—Madame de Maintenon.—Her marriage with Louis XIV.

31.—The Emperor rose very early, and took a turn round the park alone.  On his return, not wishing to have any one disturbed, he desired my son, who had risen, to sit down under the tent, and write to his dictation :  in this manner he employed himself for two hours.  We all breakfasted with him.

We took an airing in the calash.  The conversation turned on the doubts that were attached to various points of history.  The Emperor made some very curious remarks on this subject, and concluded by alluding to the period of the Regency.  “If,” said he, “Louis XV, had died in his childhood, and nothing was more possible, who would have doubted but that the Duke of Orleans had poisoned the whole royal family ?  Who would have ventured to defend him ?  Had not one child survived, that prince could not have had justice rendered to him.”

The Emperor then alluded to the character of the Duke of Orleans, and particularly to his errors in the affair of the legitimated princes.  “There he degraded himself,” said Napoleon ;  “not to say, however, that their cause was good.  Louis XIV. usurped a right in nominating them to the succession.  On the extinction of the Royal House, the choice of a sovereign is unquestionably the prerogative of the nation.  The act of Louis XIV. was, doubtless, an error into which that monarch was betrayed by his own greatness.  He conceived, that every thing emanating from him must necessarily be great.  Yet he seemed to entertain a suspicion that the world might not be exactly of his opinion ;  for he took precautions to consolidate his work by giving his natural children in marriage to the legitimate princes and princesses of the royal family.  As to the regency, it is very certain that it devolved by right on the Duke of Orleans.  Louis XIV.’s will was a piece of downright absurdity :  it was a violation of our fundamental laws.  France was a monarchy, and he gave us a republic for a regency.”

The Emperor then mentioned Madame de Maintenon, whose career, he said, was most extraordinary.  She was, he observed, the Bianca Capello^[1] of her age ;  but less romantic, and not quite so amusing.  Pursuing his historical doubts, he said a great deal on the subject of Madame de Maintenon’s marriage with Louis XIV.  He declared that he was sometimes inclined to regard the circumstance as very problematical, in spite of all that was said about it in the memoirs of the time.

“ The fact is,” observed he, “that there does not, and never did, exist any official and authentic proof of the marriage.  What could be Louis XIV.’s object in keeping the measure so strictly secret, both from his contemporaries and posterity ? and how happened it that the Noailles family, to whom Madame de Maintenon was related, suffered nothing to transpire on the subject ?  This was the more singular, considering that Madame de Maintenon survived Louis XIV.”

The Emperor, feeling somewhat fatigued this evening, retired to rest early.  He seemed indisposed and low-spirited.

The French Ministers, &c.—Anecdote of M. Daru.—Faded finery at Saint-Helena.

Sunday, September 1st.—The Emperor went out about three o’clock :  he said he had felt feeble, languid, and dull throughout the whole of the day.  We all felt indisposed in the same way :  it was the effect of the weather.  We strolled out to the great path of the wood, while the calash was preparing ;  but we had no sooner reached the extremity of the path, than a shower of rain came on.  It was so heavy that the Emperor was obliged to take refuge at the foot of a gum-tree, the scanty foliage of which, however, afforded but little shelter.  The calash soon arrived to take us up ;  and we were returning home with all speed, when we perceived the Governor at some distance, making towards us.  The Emperor immediately ordered the coachman to turn, observing, that of two evils he would choose the least ;  and we took a circuitous route homewards, in spite of the wind and rain.  We, however, escaped Sir Hudson Lowe :  that was an advantage.

Before dinner, the Emperor, in his chamber, took a review of the individuals who had been attached to his household, the council of state, and the different ministerial departments.  Alluding to M. Daru, he observed, that he was a man distinguished for probity, and for his indefatigable application to business.  At the retreat from Moscow, M. Daru’s firmness and presence of mind were remarkable, and the Emperor often afterwards said, that he laboured like an ox, while he displayed the courage of a lion.

Business seemed to be M. Daru’s element ;  he was incessantly occupied.  Soon after he was appointed Secretary of State, one of his friends was expressing a fear that the immense business in which he would thenceforth be absorbed might prove too much for him ;  “On the contrary,” replied Daru, “I assure you that since I have entered upon my new functions, I seem to have absolutely nothing to do.”  On one occasion only was his vigour ever known to relax.  The Emperor called him up, after midnight, to write to his dictation :  M. Daru was so completely overcome by fatigue, that he scarcely knew what he was writing ;  at length he could hold out no longer, and he fell asleep over his paper.  After enjoying a sound nap, he awoke, and, to his astonishment, perceived the Emperor by his side quietly engaged in writing.  The of the candles informed him that his slumber had been of tolerable duration.  While he sat for a few moments overwhelmed with confusion, his eyes met those of the Emperor, who said to him :  “Well, Sir, you see I have been doing your work, since you would not do it yourself.  I suppose you have eaten a hearty supper, and passed a pleasant evening ;  but business must not be neglected.”— “I pass a pleasant evening, Sire !” said M. Daru.  “I have been for several nights without sleep, and closely engaged.  Of this your Majesty now sees the consequence, and I am exceedingly sorry for it.”— “Why did you not inform me of this ?” said the Emperor, “I do not want to kill you.  Go to bed.  Good night, M. Daru.”  This was certainly a characteristic trait, and one that was well calculated to remove the false notions which were generally entertained respecting Napoleon’s harshness of temper.  But I know not by what fatality facts of this kind were concealed from our knowledge while any absurd inventions unfavourable to the Emperor, were so actively circulated.  Was it because the courtiers reserved their flattery for the interior of the palace, and sought to create a sort of counterpoise, by assuming elsewhere an air of opposition and independence ?  Be this as it may, had any individual related traits of the above kind in the saloons of Paris, he would probably have been told that he had invented them, or would have been looked upon as a fool for giving credit to them.

The Grand Marshal and his lady came to dine at Longwood, which they were accustomed to do every Sunday.

During dinner the Emperor jokingly alluded to the faded finery of the ladies.  He said, their dresses would soon resemble the gay trappings of those old misers who purchase their wardrobes from the dealers in second-hand clothes ;  they no longer displayed the freshness and elegance that characterized the millinery of Leroi, Despeaux, Herbault, &c.  The ladies craved indulgence for Saint-Helena ;  and their husbands reminded the Emperor of his fastidiousness with regard to female dress at the Tuileries, which, it was remarked, had proved the ruin of some families.  At this the Emperor laughed, and said that the idea of his scrupulous taste in dress was a mere invention of the ladies of the Court, who made it a pretence, or an excuse, for their extravagance.  The conversation then turned on our splendour at Saint-Helena.  The Emperor said that he had told Marchand he would wear every day the hunting-coat which he then had on, until it should be past the possibility of being worn any longer :  it was already very far gone.

Both before and after dinner the Emperor played a few games at chess :  he felt low-spirited and nervous, and retired to bed early.

The Campaign of Saxony in 1813.—Reflections.—Analysis.—Battles of Lutzen and Wurchen.—Negotiations.—Battles of Dresden, Leipsick, Hanau, &c.

2nd.—To-day there was some horse-racing at the camp, at which one of the Emperor’s suite was present.

The Emperor did not go out until late, and he walked to the calash.  The wind blew very hard, and he renounced his intention of taking a drive.  He sat down beneath the tent ;  but finding it not very pleasant without doors, he retired to his library, where he took up the Letters of Madame de Chateauroux, looked through the Expedition to Bohemia, and analysed the Life of Marshal de Belle-Isle.  He again went out to take a walk in the garden ;  but he returned almost immediately, and directed me to follow him.

He took up a book relating to our last campaigns, and after perusing it for some time, he threw it down, saying, “It is a downright rhapsody—a mere tissue of contradictions and absurdities.”  He conversed for a considerable time on the too celebrated campaign of Saxony :  his observations were principally moral, and few or none military ;  I noted down the following as the most remarkable :—

“ That memorable campaign,” said he, “will be regarded as the triumph of courage in the youth of France ;  of intrigue and cunning in English diplomacy ;  of intelligence on the part of the Russians ;  and of effrontery in the Austrian Cabinet.  It will mark the period of the disorganization of political societies—the great separation of subjects from their sovereigns :  finally, the decay of the first military virtues ;  viz. fidelity, loyalty, and honour.  It will be in vain to write and comment, to invent falsehoods and suppositions ;  we must always arrive at this odious and mortifying result :  time will develope both its truth and its consequences.

“ But it is a remarkable circumstance, in this case, that all discredit is equally removed from sovereigns, soldiers, and people.  It was entirely the work of a few military intriguers and headlong politicians, who, under the specious pretext of shaking off the foreign yoke and recovering the national independence, purposely sold their own rulers to envious rival Cabinets.  The results soon became manifest :  the King of Saxony forfeited half his possessions, and the King of Bavaria was compelled to make valuable restitutions.  What did the traitors care for that ?  They enjoyed their rewards and their wealth, and those who had proved themselves most upright and innocent, were visited with the severest punishment.  The King of Saxony, the most honest man who ever wielded a sceptre, was stripped of half his provinces ;  and the King of Denmark, so faithful to all his engagements, was deprived of his crown !  This, however, was affirmed to be the restoration and the triumph of morality !..... Such is the distributive justice of this world !...

“ To the honour of human nature, and even to the honour of Kings, I must once more declare that never was more virtue manifested than amidst the baseness which marked this period.  I never for a moment had cause to complain individually of the Princes our allies.  The good King of Saxony continued faithful to the last ;  the King of Bavaria loyally avowed to me, that he was no longer his own master ;  the generosity of the King of Wurtemberg was particularly remarkable ;  the Prince of Baden yielded only to force, and at the very last extremity.  All, I must render them this justice, gave me due notice of the storm that was gathering, in order that I might adopt the necessary precautions.  But, on the other hand, how odious was the conduct of subaltern agents !  Can military parade obliterate the infamy of the Saxons, who returned to our ranks for the purpose of destroying us ?  Their treachery became proverbial among the troops, who still use the term Saxonner to designate a soldier who assassinates another.  To crown all, it was a Frenchman, a man for whom French blood purchased a crown, a nurseling of France, who gave the finishing stroke to our disasters !

“ But in the situation in which I was placed, the circumstance which served to fill up the measure of my distress, was, that I beheld the decisive hour gradually approach.  The star grew dim ;  I felt the reins slip from my hands, and yet I could do nothing.  Only a sudden turn of fortune could save us :  to treat for, or to conclude any compact, would have been to yield like a fool to the enemy.  I was convinced of this, and the event sufficiently proved that I was not mistaken.  We had, therefore, no alternative but to fight ;  and every day by some fatality or other our chances diminished.  Treason began to penetrate our ranks.  Great numbers of our troops sank under the effects of fatigue and discouragement.  My lieutenants became disspirited, and consequently unfortunate.  They were no longer the same men, who figured at the commencement of the Revolution, or who had distinguished themselves in the brilliant moments of my success.  I have been informed, that some presumed to allege in their defence, that at first they fought for the Republic, and for their country ;  while afterwards they fought only for a single man, for his individual interests and his ambition.

“ Base subterfuge !—Ask the young and brave soldiers, and the officers of intermediate rank in the French army, whether such a calculation ever entered their thoughts ;—whether they ever saw before them any thing but the enemy, or behind them any thing, save the honour, glory, and triumph of France !  These men never fought better than at the period alluded to.  Why dissemble ?  Why not make a candid avowal ?  The truth is, that, generally speaking, the officers of high rank had gained every object of their ambition.  They were sated with wealth and honours.  They had drunk of the cup of pleasure, and they henceforth wished for repose, which they would have purchased at any price.  The sacred flame was extinguished ;  they were willing to sink to the level of Louis XV.’s marshals.”

If the words above quoted require any comment ;  if the sense here, or in other similar passages of my journal, should be found to be incomplete, I must not be held responsible.  I have literally noted down what Napoleon uttered, and I am accountable for nothing more.  I have already several times mentioned that when the Emperor spoke, I never ventured to interrupt him by questions or remarks.  On the subject of the celebrated campaign of 1313, I may mention, that, from various detached conversations of Napoleon, which I have not noted down at the time when they occurred, he was far from being deceived as to the crisis which threatened France, and he correctly estimated the full extent of the risk by which he was surrounded in the opening of the campaign.  On his return from Moscow, he saw the danger, and endeavoured to avert it.  From that moment he resolved on making the greatest sacrifices ;  but the choice of the proper moment for proclaiming these sacrifices was the difficult point, and that which chiefly occupied his consideration.  If the influence of material power be great, he said, the power of opinion is still greater ;  it is magical in its effects.  His object was to preserve it ;  and a false step, a word inadvertently uttered, might for ever have destroyed the illusion.  He found it indispensable to exert the greatest circumspection, and to manifest the utmost apparent confidence in his own strength.  It was, above all, necessary to look forward to the future.

His great fault, his fundamental error, was in supposing that his adversaries always had as much judgment and knowledge of their own interests as he himself possessed.  From the first, he said, he suspected that Austria would avail herself of the difficulties in which he was placed, in order to secure great advantages to herself ;  but he never could have believed that the monarch was so blind, or his advisers so treacherous, as to wish to bring about his (Napoleon’s) downfall, and thereby leave their own country henceforth at the mercy of the uncontrolled power of Russia.  The Emperor pursued the same train of reasoning with regard to the Confederation of the Rhine, which, he admitted, might, perhaps, have cause to be dissatisfied with him ;  but which, he concluded, must still more dread the idea of falling into the power of Austria and Prussia.  Napoleon conceived that the same arguments were not inapplicable even to Prussia ;  which, he presumed, could not wish entirely to destroy a counterpoise that was necessary to her independence and her very existence.  Napoleon made full allowance for the hatred of his enemies, and for the dissatisfaction and malevolence which, perhaps, existed among his allies ;  but he could not suppose that either wished for his destruction, since he felt himself to be so necessary to all ;  and he acted accordingly.

Such was Napoleon’s ruling idea throughout the whole of this important period.  It was the key of his whole conduct to the very last hour, and even to the moment of his fall.  It must be carefully borne in mind, for it serves to explain many things, perhaps all—his hostile attitude, his haughty language, his refusal to conclude arrangements, his determination to continue the contest, &c. If he should be successful, he thought he could then make honourable sacrifices, and a glorious peace ;  while the illusion of his superiority would remain undiminished.  If, on the contrary, he should experience reverses, it would still be time enough to make concessions ;  and he concluded that the interest of the Austrians, and all true Germans, must secure to him the support of their arms, or their diplomacy ;  for he supposed they were convinced, as he himself was, that his power had henceforth become indispensable to the structure, repose, security, and existence of Europe.  But that of which he entertained doubts proved most prosperous :  victory continued faithful to him ;  his first successes were admirable, and almost incredible.  On the other hand, that which he believed to be infallible was precisely that which failed :— his natural allies betrayed him, and hastened his downfall.

In support of what I have just alleged, and with the view of throwing light on the Emperor’s remarks above quoted, I shall here insert a brief recapitulation of the events of that fatal campaign.  In France, at the time, we were made acquainted only with its results ;  the bulletins gave us but little information, and we received no foreign publications.  Besides, the period is now distant, and so many important events have since occurred to occupy public attention, that these details may be partly forgotten by those who once knew them.  They are here arranged in chronological order.

I extract this recapitulation from a work written by M. de Montveran, which was published in 1820.  The author has bestowed great care on the collection of official and authentic documents ;  and he has availed himself of the information furnished by preceding writers.  I am therefore of opinion that this work is unquestionably the best that has been written on the subject.  M. de Montveran is far from being favourable to Napoleon ;  however, it is but just to admit, that he maintains a tone of impartiality which does credit to his character, while, at the same time, it enhances the merit of his work.

EVENTS.— “On the 2d of May, Napoleon opened the campaign of Saxony by the victory of Lutzen, a most surprising event, and one which reflects immortal honour on the conquerors.  A newly embodied army, without cavalry, marched to face the veteran bands of Russia and Prussia ;  but the genius of the Chief, and the valour of the young troops whom he commanded, made amends for all.  The French had no cavalry ;  but bodies of infantry advanced in squares, flanked by an immense mass of artillery, presenting the appearance of so many moving fortresses.  Eighty-four thousand infantry, consisting of French troops, or troops of the Confederation, with only 4000 cavalry, beat 107,000 Russians or Prussians, with more than 20,000 cavalry.  Alexander and the King of Prussia witnessed the conflict in person.  Their celebrated guards could not maintain their ground against our young conscripts.  The enemy lost 18,000 men ;  our loss amounted to 12,000, and our want of cavalry prevented us from reaping the usual fruit of our conquests.  However, the moral result of the victory was immense.  The enthusiasm of our troops resumed its ascendancy, and the Emperor recovered the full influence of opinion.  The Allies retreated before him without venturing the chances of another battle.^[2]

“ On the 9th, Napoleon entered Dresden as a conqueror, conducting back to his capital the King of Saxony, who, from the consciousness of his own interests, as well as the wish to remain faithful to his engagements, had retired on the approach of the Allies, whose proposals he had constantly rejected.

“ On the 21st and 22d, Napoleon again triumphed at Wurchen and Bautzen.  The Allies had chosen their ground, which the brilliant campaigns of Frederick had rendered classic.  They had intrenched themselves, and they thought their position impregnable :  but every thing yielded to the grand views and well-conducted plans of the French general, who, at the very commencement of the conflict, declared himself to be certain of the victory.

“ The Allies lost 18,000 or 20,000 men.  They were unable to retain their position, and they retired in disorder.  The Emperor pursued them.  He had already passed through Lusatia, crossed Silesia, and had reached the Oder, when the Allies demanded an armistice to treat for peace ;  and Napoleon, thinking the favourable moment had arrived, granted it.

“ On the 4th of June, the armistice of Pleissvitz was entered into.  This event had the most decisive influence in producing our misfortunes ;  it was the fatal knot to which were attached all the chances and destinies of the campaign.

“ Should the Emperor have granted this armistice, or have followed up his advantages ?  This was, at the moment, a problem which time, and the events that have proved so fatal to us, solved when too late.  The Emperor, crowned with victory, halted before his fallen enemies, to whom he could now make concessions without compromising his dignity ;  his sacrifices could be regarded only as moderation.  Austria, hitherto uncertain as to what course she should pursue, struck with our success, rejoined us.  Napoleon now reasonably hoped to see the ratification of a peace which he wished for, and he would not let slip so favourable an opportunity, to incur the risk of a check that might have lost all, and which was the more likely to take place since his army had marched forward in haste and in the utmost disorder, and his rear was uncovered and crossed by the enemy.  He conceived that the armistice, at all events, afforded him an opportunity of concentrating and organizing his forces, and opening his communications with France, by which means he would be enabled to receive immense reinforcements, and to create a corps of cavalry.”

Unfortunately, in spite of all the Emperor’s calculations, this fatal armistice proved advantageous only to our enemies :  it was maintained for nearly three months, and it served only to bring about their triumph and our destruction.  Austria, who was still our ally, by a deception, which history will justly characterize, availed herself of that title to oppose us with the greater advantage.  Requiring delay, she obtained it.  The Russians, who were waiting for reinforcements, received them ;  the Prussians doubled their numbers ;  the English subsidies arrived, and the Swedish army rejoined.  Secret associations were put in full activity ;  a general insurrection of the whole German population was excited ;  while, at the same time, the defection of the Cabinets of the Rhenish Confederation, and the corruption of the Allied officers, were successfully effected.  Treason also began to creep into the superior ranks.  General Jomini, the Chief of the Staff of one of our army corps, went over to the enemy with all the information he had been able to collect respecting the plans of the campaign, &c.

The result sufficiently proved to the Emperor all the errors of the armistice, and convinced him that he would have done better had he obstinately pressed forward ;  for had he continued successful, the Allies, alarmed at finding themselves deprived of the aid of Austria, with whom they could no longer have maintained intelligence, cut off from the Prince of Sweden, who would have remained behind, seeing the fortresses of the Oder unblockaded, and the war carried back to Poland, to the gates of Dantzick, amidst a people ready to rise in a mass—the Allies, I say, would infallibly have concluded a treaty.  If, on the other hand, we had sustained a reverse, the consequences could not have been more fatal than those which were actually experienced.  The wise calculations of the Emperor ruined him :  that which he might have regarded as inconsiderateness and temerity would probably have saved him.

Congress of Prague on the 29th of July.— “ After two months of difficulties and obstacles, the Congress opened under the mediation of Austria ;  if, indeed, the term Congress can be properly applied to an assembly in which no deliberations took place, and of which one party had determined beforehand that none should be held.

“ The mediator and the adversaries were equally our enemies :  all concurred in their hostility to us, and they had already decided on the war.  Why then did they wait ?  Because Austria still possessed a shade of modesty, and she wished, in the debates, to gain a pretence for declaring war against us.  Prussia and Russia, on their part, thought it necessary to preserve their credit in Europe by this false manifestation of their desire and their efforts to preserve peace.  All were merely affixing the seal to their Machiavellic system.

“ To them the real Congress was not the assembly at Prague ;  it had already taken place two months before.  Time has since thrown into our hands the authentic records of the intrigues, machinations, and even treaties, in which they were engaged during that interval.  It is now evident that the armistice was resorted to by pretended friends and avowed enemies, only for the sake of artfully cementing the union that was to effect the overthrow of Napoleon, and creating the triumvirate which was destined to oppress Europe while it pretended to deliver her.

“ Austria had, from interested motives, long delayed the opening of the Congress of Prague.  Resolved to repair her losses at any price, she did not hesitate to sacrifice her honour, the better to ensure her success.  She masked her perfidy under the disguise of friendship.  Declaring herself our ally, and eagerly complimenting us on every new triumph, she insisted, with an air of the warmest interest, on being our mediatress, when she had already entered into an agreement to make common cause with our enemies.  Her propositions were accepted.  But she wished to gain time for her preparations ;  and thus every day fresh obstacles were started, while the utmost tardiness was evinced in settling them.

“ Austria at first offered her services as a mediatress, but, changing her tone in proportion as her warlike preparations advanced, she soon signified her wish to become an arbitress, at the same time intimating that she expected great advantages in return for the services she might render.  At length, after an armistice of two months, when Austria thought herself perfectly prepared, and when every thing was agreed upon among the coalesced powers, they opened the Congress, not to treat of peace, and to establish amicable relations, but to develope their real sentiments, and to insult us unreservedly.  The Russians, in particular, behaved with unusual ill grace.  They were no longer the Russians who anxiously solicited an armistice after the routs of Lutzen, Wurchen, and Bautzen.  They now looked upon themselves as the dictators of Europe, which, indeed, they have since really become, by the spirit of their diplomacy, the blindness of their allies, their geographical situation, and finally by the force of things.  But whom did Alexander select as his minister to this Congress ?  Precisely one who, by personal circumstances, was, according to the laws of France, unqualified for such a post ;— one who was by birth a Frenchman.  Certainly it would have been difficult to offer a more personal and direct insult.  Napoleon felt it ;  but he concealed his resentment.

“ Under such circumstances much could not be expected from the Congress :  during the few days of its sitting, our enemies merely drew up a series of notes more or less acrimonious, while the conduct of Austria was marked by the most odious partiality.

“ On the 10th of August, only two days after the first meeting of the negotiators, the Russians and Prussians haughtily withdrew ;  and on the 2th, Austria, that faithful ally, that obsequious and devoted friend, who had shewn herself so eager to become our mediatress and arbitress, suddenly laid aside those titles to declare war against us, allowing no interval save that required for the signature of the manifesto, which she had been for two months secretly concerting with her new allies, and which will ever be a record of her shame and degradation, since it acknowledges the sacrifice of an Archduchess, to the necessity of crouching before a detested ally.  History will decide on these acts.  However, to the honour of the throne and of morality, there is reason to believe that most of these transactions, and in particular the real course of affairs, was unknown to the Emperor Francis, who is reputed to be the most gentle, upright, moral, and pious of princes.  It has been affirmed that many of these acts were determined on, without his knowledge, and that others were represented to him under a totally false colouring.  The whole of these disgraceful proceedings must be attributed to British gold, to the finesse of Russian diplomacy, and to the passions of the Austrian aristocracy, excited by the English faction which at that time ruled Europe.

“ The Congress broke up with mutual feelings of irritation.  The Emperor then expressed his sentiments in official and public documents, in the most forcible language, and in a tone of the highest superiority.  But this he did with the view of creating a favourable impression on the public mind ;  for he remained so far master of himself, that though hastening to take up arms, he nevertheless demanded a renewal of the negotiations, which were resumed at Prague.  He deemed it advisable not to lose the advantages of constant communications :  Austria would be easily detached if we obtained advantages, and she would be easily convinced if we sustained reverses.  Such was the Congress of Prague.

“ It will perhaps be asked whether Napoleon was duped by this Congress, and the circumstances arising out of it.  The answer is, that he was not, or at least not entirely.  If he had not a knowledge of every fact, he was never for a moment mistaken as to the intentions and sentiments that were really entertained.

“ Napoleon, from the moment of his first victory at Lutzen, had authentically proposed a general congress.  This he conceived to be the only means of treating for universal peace, insuring the independence of France and the guarantee of the modern system.  Every other mode of negotiation appeared to him merely a lure ;  and if he seemed to depart from this principle, in accepting the mediation of Austria, and agreeing to the conferences of Prague, it was because, in proportion as time advanced, affairs became more complicated.  The defeat of Vittoria, the evacuation of Spain, and the spirit of the French people, which was declining, had considerably diminished his prosperity.  He could accurately guess the result of the negotiations :  but he wished to gain time in his turn, and to await the course of events.  He was not deceived as to the part which Austria would act ;  and without knowing precisely how far she would carry her deception, he could well discern, from her mysterious conduct and delays, what was likely to be her determination.  At Dresden he had even had personal conversations with the first negotiator of the Austrian government, who had sufficiently indicated the line of conduct he intended to pursue.  The Emperor having remarked that he had after all eight hundred thousand men to oppose the enemy, the negotiator eagerly added, ‘Your Majesty may say twelve hundred thousand ;  for you may, if you please, join our force to your own.’ But what was to be the price of this advantage ?  Nothing less than the restitution of Illyria, the cessions of the Duchy of Warsaw, the frontiers of the Inn, &c.  ‘And after, all,’ said the Emperor, ‘what should I have gained by this ?  Had we made all these concessions, should we not have been humbling ourselves for nothing, and furnishing Austria with the means of making farther demands, and afterwards opposing us with greater advantage ?’ He never relinquished the idea that the true interests of Austria being closely connected with our danger, we should be more certain of regaining her by our misfortunes, than of securing her by our concessions.  Napoleon was therefore deaf to every demand ;  but he had so little doubt of the engagements which Austria had already entered into with our enemies, that he is described as having said, half good-humouredly and half indignantly, to the Austrian negotiator :  ‘Come now, confess :  tell me how much they have paid you for this.’”

How severely did Napoleon suffer on this occasion !  What trials of patience did he not undergo !  And yet he was accused at the time of not wishing for peace !  “How was I perplexed,” said he, “when conversing on this subject, to find myself the only one to judge of the extent of our danger and to adopt means to avert it.  I was harassed on the one hand by the coalesced powers, who threatened our very existence, and on the other by the spirit of my own subjects, who in their blindness, seemed to make common cause with them ;  by our enemies, who were labouring for my destruction, and by the importunities of my people and even my ministers, who urged me to throw myself on the mercy of foreigners.  And I was obliged to maintain a good appearance in this embarrassing situation :  to reply haughtily to some, and sharply to rebuff others who created difficulties in my rear, encouraged the mistaken course of public opinion, instead of seeking to give it a proper direction, and suffered me to be tormented by demands for peace, when they ought to have proved that the only means of obtaining it was to urge me ostensibly to war.

“ However, my determination was fixed.  I awaited the result of events, firmly resolved to enter into no concessions or treaties, which could present only a temporary reparation, and would inevitably have been attended by fatal consequences.  Any middle course must have been dangerous ;  there was no safety except in victory, which would have preserved my power, or in some catastrophe, which would have brought back my allies.”

I beg to call the reader’s attention to this last idea, which I have already noticed on a former occasion.  It will perhaps be thought I attach great importance to it ;  but this is because I feel the necessity of rendering it intelligible.  Though I now enter into it completely, yet it was long before I understood it, and it appeared to me paradoxical and subtle.

“ In what a situation was I placed !” continued the Emperor.  “I saw that France, her destinies, her principles, depended on me alone !” —“Sire !” I ventured to observe, “this was the opinion generally entertained ;  and yet some parties reproached you for it, exclaiming with bitterness, Why would he connect every thing with himself personally ?”— “That was a vulgar accusation,” resumed the Emperor warmly.  “My situation was not one of my own choosing, nor did it arise out of any fault of mine ;  it was produced entirely by the nature and force of circumstances—by the conflict of two opposite orders of things.  Would the individuals who held this language, if indeed they were sincere, have preferred to go back to the period preceding Brumaire, when our internal dissolution was complete, foreign invasion certain, and the destruction of France inevitable ?  From the moment when we decided on the concentration of power, which could alone save us ;  when we determined on the unity of doctrines and resources which rendered us a mighty nation, the destinies of France depended solely on the character, the measures, and the principles of him who had been invested with this accidental dictatorship :  from that moment the public interest, the State, was myself.  These words, which I addressed to men who were capable of understanding them, were strongly censured by the narrow-minded and ill-disposed ;  but the enemy felt the full force of them, and therefore his first object was to effect my overthrow.  The same outcry was raised against other words which I uttered in the sincerity of my heart :  when I said that France stood more in need of me than I stood in need of her, this solid truth was declared to be merely excess of vanity.  But, my dear Las Cases, you now see that I can relinquish every thing ;  and as to what I endure here, my suffering cannot be long.  My life is limited ;  but the existence of France....!”

Then, resuming his former idea, he said :

The circumstances in which we were placed were extraordinary and totally new ;  it would be vain to seek for any parallel to them.  I was myself the key-stone of an edifice totally new, and raised on a slight foundation !  Its stability depended on each of my battles !  Had I been conquered at Marengo, France would have encountered all the disasters of 1814 and 1815, without those prodigies of glory which succeeded, and which will be immortal.  It was the same at Austerlitz and Jena, and again at Eylau and elsewhere.  The vulgar failed not to blame my ambition as the cause of all these wars.  But they were not of my choosing ;  they were produced by the nature and force of events ;  they arose out of that conflict between the past and the future—that constant and permanent coalition of our enemies, which obliged us to subdue under pain of being subdued.”

But to return to the negotiations of 1813.  On a reference to the documents and manifestos published at the time by the two parties, whether because we can now peruse them with more impartiality, or because our eyes have been opened by the conduct of those who triumphed, it is impossible to avoid feeling astonished at the two-fold error which led the Germans to rise so furiously against him from whose yoke they pretended to free themselves, and in favour of those whom they might believe to be their regenerators !

Renewal of hostilities—Battle of Dresden—26th and 27th of August.— “The hostile powers again presented themselves on the field of battle.  The French, with a force of 300,000, of which 40,000 were cavalry, occupied the heart of Saxony, on the left bank of the Elbe ;  and the Allies, with 500,000 men, of whom 100,000 were cavalry, threatened them in three different directions, from Berlin, Silesia, and Bohemia, on Dresden.  This prodigious disproportion of numbers had no effect on Napoleon ;  he concentrated his forces, and boldly assumed the offensive.  Having fortified the line of the Elbe, which had now become his point d’appui, and, protecting his extreme right by the mountains of Bohemia, he directed one of his masses on Berlin against Bernadotte, who commanded an army of Prussians and Swedes, while another marched upon Silesia, against Blucher, who commanded a corps composed of Prussians and Russians, and a third was stationed at Dresden, as the key of the position, to observe the great Austrian and Russian army in Bohemia.  Finally, a fourth mass was placed as a reserve, at Zittau, with the three-fold object :— 1st, to penetrate into Bohemia, in case we should gain advantages over Blucher ;  2d, to keep the great body of the allied force confined in Bohemia, through the fear of being attacked on their rear, should they attempt to debouch by the banks of the Elbe ;  3d, to assist, if necessary, in assailing Blucher, or in the defence of Dresden ;  in case that city should be attacked.

“ The Emperor, who had already made a rapid movement against Blucher, was keeping him in action before him, when he was suddenly called away for the defence of Dresden, where 65,000 French troops found themselves opposed to 180,000 of the allied forces.  Prince Schwartzenberg, the General-in-chief, had on the 26th made a faint attack upon Dresden, instead of making a precipitate and decided assault ;  which, it was affirmed, was the intention of the deserter Jomini, who so well understood the real state of things.  Napoleon came up with the rapidity of lightning ;  and he combined a force of 100,000 French troops to oppose the 180,000 allies.  The affair was not for a moment doubtful ;  and to his sagacity and penetration the whole success must be attributed.  The enemy was overwhelmed :  he lost 40,000 men, and was for some time threatened with total destruction.  The Emperor Alexander was present at the battle, and Moreau was killed by one of the first balls that were fired by our imperial guard, only a short time after he had spoken with the Russian Emperor.”^[3]

The happy chance, so anxiously looked for by Napoleon, which was expected to re-establish our affairs, to procure peace, and to save France, had at length arrived !  Accordingly, on the ensuing day, Austria despatched an agent to the Emperor with amicable propositions.  But such is the uncertainty of human destiny !  From that moment, by an unexampled fatality, Napoleon had to encounter a chain of disasters.  At every point, except that at which he was himself present, we sustained reverses.  Our army in Silesia lost 25,000 men in opposing Blucher ;  the force which attacked Berlin was defeated by the Prince of Sweden with great loss ;  and finally, nearly the whole of Vandamme’s corps, which, after the victory of Dresden, was sent into Bohemia with the view of assailing the enemy’s rear, and accomplishing his destruction, being abandoned to itself, and the temerity of its chief, was cut to pieces by that part of the Allied army which was precipitately falling back.  This fatal disaster and the safety of the Austrians, was occasioned by a sudden indisposition of Napoleon, who, for a moment, was supposed to have been poisoned.  His presence no longer excited the ardour of the different corps in maintaining the pursuit ;  indecision and dejection ensued ;  Vandamme’s force was destroyed, and all the fruit of the splendid victory of Dresden was lost !

After these repeated checks the spell was broken ;  the spirit of the French troops became depressed, while that of the Allies was the more highly excited.  The hostile forces were now to be estimated only by their numerical value ;  and a catastrophe seemed to be at hand.  Napoleon, in despair, exerted vain efforts ;  he hastened to every threatened point, and was immediately called away by some new disaster.  Wherever he appeared, the Allies retreated before him ;  and they advanced again as soon as his back was turned.  Meanwhile all the enemy’s masses were constantly gaining ground ;  they had effected communications with each other, and they now formed a semi-circle, which was gradually closing round the French, who were now driven back upon the Elbe, and threatened completely to surround them.  On the other hand, our rear, which was uncovered, was assailed by detached parties.  The kingdom of Westphalia was in open insurrection ;  our convoys were intercepted, and we could no longer maintain free communications with France.

It was in this state of things that the negotiators of Prague submitted to the Emperor the result of their new conferences.  In addition to numerous restitutions required from Napoleon and his allies, two propositions were made :  1st, the surrender of all the influence and acquisitions of France in Italy ;  2d, the resignation of the French influence and acquisitions in Germany.  Napoleon was to take his choice of one of these two divisions of power ;  but the other was to be consigned to the allies, to be entirely at their disposal, without any interference on his part.  Neither friends nor enemies entertained a doubt but that Napoleon would eagerly accept these proposals.  “For,” said those about him, “if you choose Italy, you remain at the gates of Vienna, and the Allies will soon dispute among themselves respecting the division of Germany.  If, on the contrary, you prefer the surrender of Italy, you will thereby secure the friendship of Austria, to whose share it will fall, and you will remain in the heart of Germany.  In either case you will soon reappear in the character of a mediator, or a ruler.”  Napoleon, however, was not of this opinion :  he rejected the propositions, and persisted in following up his own ideas.

“ Certainly, said he, such proposals in themselves, and in the natural course of things, are most acceptable ;  but where is the guarantee of their sincerity ?  He saw plainly that the Allies were only endeavouring to lure him into the snare.  They determined henceforth to abide neither by faith nor law.  They did not conceive themselves bound by any law of nations, or any rule of integrity in their conduct towards us.  In opposition to the suggestions of his counsellors, Napoleon said, “If I relinquish Germany, Austria will but contend the more perseveringly until she obtain Italy.  If, on the other hand, I surrender Italy to her, she will, in order to secure the possession of it, endeavour to expel me from Germany.  Thus, one concession granted, will only serve as an inducement for seeking or enforcing new ones.  The first stone of the edifice being removed, the downfall of the whole will inevitably ensue.  I shall be urged on from one concession to another, Until I am driven back to the castle of the Tuileries, whence the French people, enraged at my weakness, and blaming me for their disasters, will doubtless banish me, and perhaps justly, though they may themselves immediately become the prey of foreigners.”

May not this be regarded as the literal prediction of the events which succeeded the insidious declaration of Frankfort, the propositions of Chatillon, &c.?

“ It would be a thousand times better to perish in battle amidst the fury of the enemy’s triumph,” continued the Emperor ;  “for even defeats leave behind them the respect due to adversity, when they are attended by magnanimous perseverance.  I therefore prefer to give battle ;  for if I should be conquered, we still have with us the true political interests of the majority of our enemies.  But, if I should be victorious, I may save all.  I have still chances in my favour—I am far from despairing.”

Intended movement on Berlin.— “In this state of things, the King of Bavaria, the chief of the Confederation of the Rhine, wrote to the Emperor, assuring him, confidentially, that he would continue his alliance for six weeks longer :  ‘This was long enough,’ said Napoleon, ‘to render it very probable that he would no longer find it necessary to abandon us.’ He determined immediately to attempt a great movement, which he had long contemplated, and which plainly indicates the resources of his enterprising mind.  Pressed upon the Elbe, the right bank of which was already lined by the great mass of the Allied force, and nearly turned on his rear, he conceived the bold idea of changing positions with the enemy, place for place.  He determined to penetrate the enemy’s line, forming himself in his rear, and compelling him, in his turn, to transfer his whole force to the left bank of the river.  If, in this situation, he abandoned his communications with France, he would have in his rear the enemy’s territory, a tract of country not yet ravaged by war, and which was capable of maintaining his troops.  He would recover the cities of Berlin, Brandenburgh, and Mecklenburgh, with their immense garrisons, the separation and the loss of which were to be accounted so great a fault after a reverse of fortune, and would have been regarded as resources of genius in case of triumph.  Napoleon now looked forward to a new line of combinations, and a new prospect of future success :  he beheld before him only the errors, the astonishment, and the stupor of his enemies, and the brilliancy of his own enterprise and his hopes.

Battles of Leipsic, (16th, 18th, and 19th, Oct.)— “At first fortune seemed to smile on the Emperor.  But soon a letter from the King of Wurtemberg informed him that the Bavarian army, seduced by the intrigues and the prevailing spirit of the moment, had joined the Austrians, against whom it was intended to be opposed ;  that it was marching on the Rhine to cut off the communication with France ;  and that the King of Wurtemberg was himself under the necessity of yielding to circumstances.  This unexpected event obliged Napoleon to suspend his preparations, and to fall back, in order to secure his retreat.  This complication of false movements proved serviceable to the Allies, who pressed and surrounded us :  a great battle seemed inevitable.  Napoleon assembled his forces in the plains of Leipsic.  His army consisted of 157,000 men, and six hundred pieces of artillery ;  but the Allies possessed 1000 pieces of artillery, and 350,000 men.  During the first day the action was furiously maintained :  the French remained triumphant, and the victory would have been decisive, if one of the corps stationed at Dresden had taken part in the battle, as the Emperor hoped it would.  General Merfeld was made prisoner, but was liberated on parole, with the announcement that the Emperor was at length willing to accept the condition of the renunciation of Germany.  But the Allies, who were encouraged by the arrival of an immense reinforcement, resumed the engagement on the following day ;  and they were now so numerous, that when their troops were exhausted, they were regularly relieved by fresh corps, as on the parade.  The most inconceivable fatality was now combined with inequality of numbers ;  treason broke out in our ranks ;  the Saxons, our allies, deserted us, went over to the enemy, and turned their artillery against us.  Still, however, the presence of mind, energy, and skill of the French general, together with the courage of our troops, made amends for all, and we again remained masters of the field.

“ These two terrible engagements, which history may fairly record as giants’ battles, cost the enemy 150,000 of his best troops, 50,000 of whom lay dead on the field of battle.  Our loss amounted only to 50,000.  Thus the difference of our forces was considerably diminished :  and a third engagement presented itself, with changes much more favourable.  But our ammunition was exhausted ;  our parks contained no more than 16,000 charges ;  we had fired 220,000 during the two preceding days.  We were compelled to make arrangements for our retreat, which commenced during the night, on Leipsic.  At day-break the Allies assailed us ;  they entered Leipsic along with us ;  and an engagement commenced in the streets of the city.  Our rear-guard was defending itself valiantly and without sustaining great loss, when a fatal occurrence ruined all :  the only bridge across the Elster, by which our retreat could be effected, was, by some accident or misunderstanding, blown up.  Thus all our forces on the Leipsic bank of the river were lost, and all on the opposite bank marched in haste and disorder upon Mentz.  At Hanau we were compelled to force a passage through 50,000 Bavarian troops.  Only the wrecks of our army returned to France ;  and, to render the misfortune complete, they brought contagion with them.”

Such was the fatal campaign of Saxony, our last national effort, the tomb of our gigantic power, Opposed to the united efforts of all the forces of Europe, and in spite of all the chances that were accumulated against us, the genius of a single man had, in course of this campaign, been four times on the point of restoring our ascendancy, and cementing it by peace :  after the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen, after the battle of Dresden, at the time of the last movement on Berlin, and finally on the plains of Leipsic.

Napoleon failed only by a complication of fatalities and perfidies, of which history furnishes no example.  I here note down only those which occur to me on a retrospective view of the events of this period.

Fatalities.

(A.) Sudden indisposition of Napoleon.

(B.) Unexpected overflow of the Bober.

(C.) Confidential letter from the King of Bavaria.

(D.) Orders not transmitted to the corps at Dresden.

(E.) Deficiency of ammunition after the two battles of Leipsic.

(F.) Explosion of the bridge across the Elster.

Perfidies.

(G.) Machinations and bad faith of Austria, the first and true cause of our disasters.

(H.) Violation of the armistice of Pleisswitz, relative to our blockaded fortresses.

(I.) Desertion of the chief of the staff of the 3d corps.

(K.) Defection of the Bavarian government.

(L.) Treachery of the Saxons.

(M.) Violation of the capitulation of Dresden, &c.

The following are a few lines of explanation :—

(A.) After the victory of Dresden, some one complimented Napoleon on his great success.  “Oh ! this is nothing,” observed he, while his countenance beamed with satisfaction ;  “Vandamme is on their rear, it is there that we must look for the great result.”  The Emperor was proceeding in person to assist in accomplishing this decisive operation, when, unfortunately, after one of his meals he was seized with so violent a retching, that he was supposed to have been poisoned, and it was found necessary to convey him back to Dresden.  Thus the operations were interrupted.  The fatal consequences that ensued are well known.  How trivial was the cause, and how calamitous were the results !

(B.) A sudden overflow of the Bober in Silesia was the principal cause of the disasters of Marshal Macdonald.  His corps, while in full operation, were overtaken by the flood, which impeded their operations, and caused the terrible losses which have been above described.

(C.) About the end of September the King of Bavaria addressed a confidential letter to Napoleon, stating that he would maintain his alliance, with him for six weeks or two months longer ;  and that during that interval he would, obstinately refuse every advantage that might be held out to him.  The Emperor, who was placed in a most critical situation, and who, but for this circumstance, might perhaps, have lent an ear to the propositions that were made to him, now no longer hesitated, but immediately determined on the bold movement which he had contemplated on Berlin.  He conceived that six weeks would be sufficient to change the state of affairs, and remove the fears of his allies.  Unfortunately, military intrigues proved more powerful than the wishes of the King of Bavaria.  Napoleon was forced to suspend his movement, and to give battle at Leipsic with disadvantage.  The consequences have already been seen.

(D.) Napoleon, in making his arrangements for the battles of Leipsic, had relied on a diversion of the army corps which he had left in Dresden.  Their co-operation might have rendered the victory decisive, and have given a new turn to affairs.  But, unfortunately, the enemy’s force was so numerous, and we were so completely surrounded, that the Emperor’s orders could not be transmitted to Dresden.

(F.) After the two terrible engagements at Leipsic, the French were effecting their retreat across the Elster by a single bridge.  An officer who was stationed to guard it, was ordered to blow it up if the enemy should present himself in pursuit of our rear-guard.  Unluckily this officer was by some mistake or other informed that the Emperor wanted him.  He immediately obeyed the summons, and in his absence a corporal of sappers, at the first sight of some detached Russian corps, fired the train and blew up the bridge, thus dooming to perdition that portion of our force which still remained on the Leipsic bank of the river.  The whole of our rear-guard and baggage, two hundred pieces of artillery, and thirty thousand prisoners, (stragglers; wounded and sick,) fell into the hands of the enemy.

On the publication of the bulletins containing this intelligence, a general outcry was raised by the discontented party in Paris.  It was asserted that the whole was a fabrication, and that the Emperor himself had ordered the blowing up of the bridge with the view of ensuring his own safety at the expense of the rest of the army.  It was in vain to refer to the statement of the officer, who confirmed the fact while he attempted to justify himself.  This was declared to be another fabrication or a piece of complaisance on the part of the officer.  Such was the language of the time.^[4]

(G.) The duplicity and bad faith of Austria, the numerous contradictions between her acts and her professions, have already been mentioned.  Unmindful of the generosity of which she had been the object after the battles of Leoben, Austerlitz, and Wagram, she discharged her debt of gratitude according to the rules of policy, and by eagerly seizing the opportunity of repairing her losses at any price.

She ruined us by making us consent to the armistice of Pleisswitz ;  and her conduct was the more odious, as she was determined to make war against us ;  and a few days afterwards, though still our friend and ally, and offering herself as a mediator, she entered into engagements hostile to us.  Her participation in the conventions of Rechembach about the middle of June, and in the conferences of Trachenberg, at the commencement of July, are now well known.  The necessity of maintaining a certain appearance of decorum occasioned these matters to be kept secret for about a month after the commencement of hostilities.  They were at first proposed to Francis merely as eventual and precautionary measures ;  and he was induced to affix his signature to them only by the representations of his ministers, who described Napoleon as the scourge of mankind, and attributed to him the delays in the opening of the Congress, which were in reality occasioned by themselves.  (Montveran, vol. vi. p. 262.)

But in spite of the conduct of Austria, Napoleon still cherished the hope of seeing her resume her alliance with him ;  not that, he could calculate on any misunderstanding between her and the other coalesced powers, but because he supposed her to be sufficiently clear-sighted with respect to her own interests.  This idea never forsook him until the moment of signing his abdication.^[5]

(H.) The fortresses occupied by French troops in those places which were in the possession of the Allied forces, were to have a clear circuit of one league, and to receive supplies of provisions every five days ;  but this article was not honestly fulfilled.

When the armistice was prolonged, the French commissaries demanded that officers of their army should be sent to the commanders :  of the fortresses ;  but the Russian General-in-chief objected to this, and circumstances were such that we were obliged to give up the point.  (Montveran, vol. vi. p. 270.)

(I.) The chief of the staff of the 3d corps, a Swiss by birth, but educated in our ranks, went over to the enemy a few days before the renewal of hostilities, taking with him all the information he could collect.  For this service the Emperor of Russia rewarded him with particular favour and made him one of his aides-de-camp.  It has been said that this officer, who was possessed of great talent, had reason to complain of some injustice ;  but can any thing palliate such an act, or remove the disgrace attending it ?

(K.) Part of Napoleon’s plan of campaign was that the Bavarian army, stationed on the Danube, should act in concert with the army of Italy stationed in Illyria, and that their combined efforts should be directed upon Vienna.  The important effect which these measures must have produced on the fate of the campaign may be easily conceived.  But the chief of the Bavarian army, under some pretence or other, but in reality because he had entered into an understanding with the enemy, remained constantly inactive, and thus paralyzed the efforts of the Vice King, who had to oppose the great bulk of the Austrian force.  It has already been stated that the open defection of the Bavarians at the most critical moment of the campaign, mainly contributed to bring about our disasters.

(L.) But nothing equalled the infamous and disgraceful treachery of the Saxons, who, though they were then serving in our ranks and were our companions in danger and glory, suddenly turned to fight against us.  Whatever might be the fatal effects of their desertion, the disgrace attached to themselves is greater than all the mischief they occasioned to us.

The conduct of Napoleon during this period, when he was described as a monster of deception and bad faith, presents, on the contrary, an example of singular magnanimity.

He had added a corps of Saxons to his Imperial guard ;  but, on the desertion of their countrymen, he ranged them round their sovereign, whom he left at Leipsic,^[6] releasing him from all his engagements.  There were also some Bavarians in his army, and he wrote to their chief, informing him that Bavaria having disloyally declared war against him, this circumstance would authorize him in disarming and detaining prisoners all the Bavarians in his service ;  but that such a measure would destroy the confidence which Napoleon wished that the troops under his orders should repose in him.  He therefore ordered them to be supplied with provisions, and dismissed.^[7]

(M.) I have before me the notes of a distinguished officer relative to the capitulation of Dresden.  Estimating the number of troops which we had left behind us in the fortresses from which we were separated, he concludes that they must have amounted altogether to 177,000.  The Emperor had but 157,000 men at Leipsic.  How different, therefore, might have been our fate, had those masses, or even a portion of them, been at his disposal in this decisive event.  But this unfortunate dispersion was occasioned by extraordinary circumstances, and was not the result of any regular system.  The following particulars, relative to the violation of the capitulation of Dresden, are literally quoted from the notes above alluded to :—

“ Above all, it is necessary to understand, that it was determined in the plan of the coalition against France, of which Prince Schwartzenberg had the credit, that according as offers were made for the capitulation of each of our numerous garrisons, the conditions should be fairly and honourably granted, but without any intention of fulfilling them.  This point being established, the reason of the refusal of the capitulation signed at Dresden by Marshal Saint-Cyr, and Generals Tolstoy and Klenau, was, that Prince Schwartzenberg could not ratify it, because the Count de Lobau, Napoleon’s aide-de-camp, who was shut up in Dresden with the Marshal, had protested against the capitulation.  Some time after, the capitulation of Dantzick, which was signed with General Rapp, was declined, under the odiously false pretence, that the garrison of Dresden, in spite of the conditions of its capitulation, had entered into service immediately on its arrival at Strasburg, and that, in consequence, the capitulation of Dantzick could not be approved without incurring the risk of similar inconveniences.

“ The following is an additional proof of the bad faith of the Allies.  The garrison of Dresden, which was composed of two army corps, forming altogether 45,000 men, capitulated on the 11th of November.^[8]

“ According to the terms of the capitulation, the French were to evacuate the fortress in six columns and in six successive days, and were to repair to Strasburgh.

“ This capitulation was fulfilled, so far at least as regarded our evacuation of the fortress and its occupation by the enemy ;  but our sixth column had scarcely made a day’s march from the town when it was announced that the capitulation was declined and rejected by the General-in-chief, Prince Schwartzenberg, by an order of the 19th of November.

“ When Marshal Saint-Cyr remonstrated against this conduct, it was proposed, by way of compensation for the injustice, that he should be permitted to re-enter Dresden with his troops, and be again placed in possession of all the means of defence which he had had before the capitulation :  this was merely a piece of irony.

“ In vain did the Marshal negotiate for the literal fulfilment of the articles agreed upon by Count Klenau, who had possessed full powers for so doing ;  the unfortunate garrison, broken up and dispersed, was under the necessity of repairing to the different cantonments that were assigned to it in Bohemia, instead of pursuing its march towards the Rhine.

“ The Marshal, indignant at this flagrant breach of faith, despatched a superior officer to communicate the circumstance to Napoleon ;  but the Allies retarded his progress under various pretences, and he did not reach Paris until the 18th of December.  Subsequent events had by this time rendered the evil past all remedy.”

After the series of deceptions and perfidies which I have here disclosed, and which the Allies had established as a system, it is not surprising that Napoleon should have placed no reliance on the famous declaration of Frankfort, and that he should have felt indignant at the blindness of our Legislative Body, the committee of which, either from evil designs or mistaken views, completed the ruin of affairs.  Napoleon assured me that he was several times on the point of summoning the members of this committee before him, in order to consult with them confidentially and sincerely on the real state of things, and the imminent danger with which we were threatened.  Sometimes he thought he should undoubtedly bring them back to a right sense of their duty ;  sometimes, on the contrary, he feared that obstinacy of opinion, or mischievous intention, might have involved the affair in controversy, which, considering the spirit of the moment, would have weakened our resources, and hastened our dissolution.

The Emperor frequently adverted to this critical point in the destinies of France ;  but I have hitherto refrained from entering upon the detail of a subject which presents nothing either agreeable or consolatory.

1 A noble Venetian lady of great beauty, whose adventures form a truly romantic and dramatic history.  She eloped from her father’s house to follow a young Florentine pedlar, and was reduced to the greatest wretchedness.  She subsequently became Grand Duchess of Tuscany, and she closed her career by coolly poisoning herself at table, in a fit of vexation at seeing the Grand Duke, her husband, partake of a poisoned dish, which she had prepared for her brother-in-law, Cardinal de Medicis, who, on his part, obstinately abstained from tasting it.

2 At the victory of Lutzen the Emperor sustained a severe loss by the death of the brave and loyal Marshal Bessières, Duke of Istria, who was so sincerely devoted to Napoleon.  The King of Saxony raised a monument to his memory on the very spot where he received his death-blow.  By a singular approximation of glory, the monument is similar to that of Gustavus Adolphus, and is erected not far distant from it.  It consists of a simple stone surrounded by poplars.  This is not the only instance in which foreigners have rendered that homage to the memory of brave Frenchmen, which their own countrymen have neglected.

3 The death of the celebrated Moreau, while fighting under the Russian banner, and opposed to a French army, was and will ever continue to be a source of affliction to his sincerest friends and warmest partizans.

4 When I visited London in 1814, public attention was occupied by the recent events of the Continent, and the battle of Leipsic was the general topic of conversation.  It was related that, at the moment of the defeat, Napoleon’s presence of mind completely forsook him.  He wandered about the city, and lost his way in a private street.  Though on horseback, faintness obliged him to support himself against a wall, and in this situation he inquired his way of an old woman, and asked her for a glass of water.  The explosion of the bridge was not forgotten, and the story was related precisely as at Paris.  These details, which were echoed in the drawing-rooms, and circulated about the streets, were credited among the higher ranks as well as by the vulgar.  Prints, representing the different events of the battle, were exhibited in the shop-windows.  The subject of one of these engravings was the above described incident in the street of Leipsic.  Such a multitude of absurdities was circulated, that people of common sense had no resource but to shrug up their shoulders and patiently endure all that they heard.

5 This supposition was not altogether ill-founded ;  for it still remains doubtful whether the consent of Austria to the dethronement of the Emperor, was constrained or voluntary.  By one of those fatalities which attended the close of Napoleon’s career, a momentary success separated the Austrians and the Russians ;  and the order for marching upon Paris, as well as the famous declaration proscribing Napoleon and his family, proceeded solely from Alexander.  When Francis presented himself, he had no alternative but to give his assent to measures which were already determined on ;  but many circumstances induce the belief that he did so with great repugnance and dissatisfaction.

6 The venerable and faithful King of Saxony followed his ally Napoleon, at whose head-quarters he established himself.  The coalesced powers, on their entrance into Leipsic, seized the person of the King, and announced their design of disposing of his states.  His misfortunes are known throughout Europe ;  they excited a deep interest in every generous heart.

7 Amidst the general disloyalty, the conduct of the King of Wurtemberg presents an honourable exception.  That prince, though already at war with us, broke his brigade of cavalry, and the corps of his infantry, who went over to the enemy, and at the same time withdrew the decoration of his Order from their officers.

8 The determination to surrender had been far from unanimous in the garrison.  Opinions were divided on this point.  Some were for returning to France by means of a capitulation, which course was adopted ;  others were in favour of an enterprise of a much bolder nature.  This was nothing less than to quit Dresden with the chosen troops of the garrison, to descend the Elbe by successively raising the blockades of Torgau, where there were 28,000 men ;  of Wittemberg, where there were 5000 ;  of Magdeburg, where there were 20,000, and to arrive at Hamburg where there were 32,000.  The army thus assembled together, which would have amounted to 60 or 80,000 men, was to repair to France, forming a passage through the enemy’s ranks, or compelling him to retrograde by manoeuvring on his rear ;  while the levies in mass that might have advanced to assail our veteran bands would have been paralyzed.  And even had this plan failed, the issue was not likely to be more fatal than the capitulation.  This opinion was warmly advocated by the Count de Lobau, Generals Teste, Monton-Duvernet, and others.  The design was grand, worthy of our glory, and quite in harmony with our past acts.  It was the Emperor’s intention to carry it into effect, and for this purpose he issued orders, which, however, did not reach the place of their destination.  The despair occasioned by the thought of surrendering was such, that a portion of the troops urged the officer who was at the head of the opposing party to take the command upon himself.  Respect for discipline at length prevailed over enthusiasm ;  but the officer above alluded to expressed himself in the most violent way in the council.  It is said, that in his indignation he exclaimed to the General-in-chief :— “The Emperor will tell me, that, with the pistol in my hand, I ought to have taken the command upon myself.”