Count de Las Cases
Memorial de Sainte Hélène
London, 1823
MY RESIDENCE WITH THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.
Volume 2, Part 3
page 173 - 195
BATTLE OF RIVOLI.
From the offensive operations of Provera, on the 1st of January 1797, to the surrender of Mantua, on the 1st of February following, a space of one month, (See the map.)
I. State of Italy.—Venice was making new levies of Sclavonians ; new battalions of them arrived daily on the Lagunes ; the various parties were on the alert in all the cities of the Venetian territory. The citadels of Verona and Brescia were in the possession of the French troops. Some troubles which happened at Bergamo, made it evidently necessary to occupy the citadel there, of which General Baraguey d’Hilliers took possession accordingly. The negotiations with Rome were kept on, but did not proceed : experience had proved that nothing could be done with that court but by threats and the presence of force. The General-in-chief announced at Milan his departure for Rome. He dispatched General Lahosse with 4000 Italians for Bologna ; directed a body of 3000 French on the same city, and gave notice to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, that his troops would traverse the states of that Prince in their way to Perugia ; he actually set out himself, and went to Bologna. Manfredini went thither to meet him, for the purpose of taking care of his master’s interest ; and returned with the conviction that the French general was marching on Rome. For this once the court was not the dupe of all these appearances, but remained unmoved. It was perfectly acquainted with all the plans adopted at Vienna, and had hopes of their success. When, however, it found that the French general was at Bologna, the Secretary of State was astonished ; but the Austrian Minister kept up his courage, by convincing him that nothing could be more favourable to their views than to draw the French general far into the interior of Italy, and that even should it be necessary to quit Rome, it would be a fortunate event, as it would more effectually secure the defeat of the French on the Adige.
II. Situation of the Austrian army.—Alvinzi daily received considerable reinforcements. The Paduan, the Trevisan, and all the Bassanese countries were covered with Austrian troops. Two months had elapsed since the battle of Arcole ; Austria had profited by this interval, to bring into Friuli the divisions drawn from the banks of the Rhine, where the French armies were inactive and in complete winter quarters. One general impulse had been given to the whole Austrian monarchy. Several battalions of excellent marks men were raised in the Tyrol ; it was an easy matter to persuade them that it was necessary to defend their territory, and to assist in the reconquest of Italy, so essential to the prosperity of the Tyrol. The successes of Austria, in Germany, during the last campaign, and her reverses in Italy, had roused public spirit. The great cities offered battalions of volunteers ; Vienna furnished four : thus was a reinforcement of ten or twelve thousand volunteers raised. The battalions of Vienna received from the Empress colours embroidered with her own hands. They lost them, but defended them honourably. The army of Austria was composed of eight divisions of unequal strength, of several brigades of cavalry incorporated with these divisions ; and of two divisions of cavalry. His army was estimated at more than 80,000 fighting men.
III. Situation of the French army.—The French army had been reinforced, since the battle of Arcole, by two regiments of infantry drawn from the coasts of Provence, of which the 57th was part, and by a regiment of cavalry. This made up about five or six thousand men ; and repaired the losses sustained at Arcole, and in the blockade of Mantua. Joubert, with a strong division, occupied Montebaldo, Rivoli, and Busselengo. Rey, with a division of less force, was in reserve at Dezenzano. Massena was at Verona, with a vanguard at St. Michel. Augereau at Legnago, with a vanguard at Bevilaqua. Serrurier was blockading Mantua. Corona was covered with intrenchments. The castles of Verona and of Legnago were in good condition, as well as Peschiera and Pizzeghettone. The citadels of Brescia and Bergamo, the fort of Fuente, the citadel of Ferrara, and fort Urbino, were occupied. A naval armament on the Lake of Garda secured us the possession of that Lake. Armed barks placed on Lake Maggiore and the Lake of Como, kept up a strict police thereon.
IV. Plan of operations adopted by the Court of Vienna. Wurmser had debouched in three columns ; his right by the road of the Chiusa, beyond the Lake of Garda, his centre by Montebaldo, between the Lake of Garda and the Adige ; his left by the left bank of the Adige. Some months afterwards Alvinzi had attacked in two columns ; the one operating in the Tyrol, the other on the Piave, the Brenta, and the Adige. But the battles of Lonato, Castiglione, and Arcole, had defeated those two plans of campaign. The Court of Vienna adopted, this time, a new plan, which was connected with the operations of Rome. It was determined that the Austrian army should make two grand attacks ; the first by Montebaldo, as Wurmser had done ; the second on the Adige by the plains of the Paduan country. That the two corps which were to execute these attacks should have nothing in common between them ; that they should march independently of each other, so that if one should succeed, the first object would be gained, and the blockade of Mantua raised. The principal corps was to debouch by the Tyrol, and if it should defeat the French army, it would arrive under the walls of Mantua, and there effect its junction with the second corps acting on the Adige. If, on the contrary, the principal attack should be defeated, and the second corps should succeed, the siege of Mantua would equally be raised, and the place re-provisioned. This army would then march to the Seraglio, and establish its communications with Rome. Marshal Wurmser would take the command of the army which was in Romania. The great number of generals, officers, and dismounted cavalry, who would be found at Mantua, would serve to discipline the Pope’s army, and make a diversion which would oblige the French General to have also two armies, one on the left, the other on the right bank of the Po.
A very intelligent secret agent sent from Vienna, was seized by a French sentinel, as he was clearing the last post of the French army before Mantua. He was forced to give up his dispatches, which he had swallowed, inclosed in a little ball of sealing wax. This dispatch was a little letter written in a very minute hand, signed by the Emperor Francis. It was to inform Wurmser that he would speedily be extricated. At all events it ordered him not to surrender himself prisoner ; but rather to evacuate the place and pass the Po, which he could do as he was master of the Seraglio ; and to proceed to the states of the Pope, where he was to take the command of that potentate’s army. The Emperor of Austria supposed, as may be seen, that Wurmser was master of the Seraglio ; he was, however, ill informed.
V. Action of St. Michel.—In execution of the plan adopted by the Court of Vienna, Provera had the command of the army intended to act on the Adige, to pass that river, and advance on Mantua. The volunteer battalions of Vienna composed part of the army, which consisted of three divisions, containing 25,000 men. In the beginning of January, Provera removed his headquarters to Padua. On the 12th he marched with two divisions, on Montagna, where the vanguard of Augereau, commanded by the brave General Duphot was stationed. At the same instant the third Austrian division, which had taken up a position in the heights of Caldiero, marched on St. Michel to attack Massena’s vanguard, whose head-quarters were at Verona ; this was a false attack. General Duphot being attacked at daybreak by the vanguard of Provera, composed of the volunteers of Vienna, easily checked and repulsed them. But about noon, the whole Austrian army having deployed, Duphot retreated, and repassed the Adige at Legnago. The division which formed Provera’s right, and which attacked St. Michel, was the weakest. General Massena marched from Verona to the aid of his vanguard. The Austrian division was broken, dispersed, and pursued with great slaughter beyond the Alpon.
At this juncture the French General arrived post from Bologna. He had received intelligence from his Venetian agents, of the movement of the Austrian army on Padua. He had made the Italian troops encamp on the frontier of the Transpadan country, to oppose the Pope ; ordered the 2,000 French from Bologna to march on Ferrara, where they had passed the Po at Pontedi-Lagoscuro, and joined the army on the Adige. He passed the Po in person at Borgo-forte, repaired to the head-quarters at Roverbella, and reached Verona in the heat of the action of St. Michel. He instantly ordered Massena to withdraw, in the night all his troops upon Verona.
The enemy appeared to be in operation, and it was necessary to keep all the troops disposable in order to march to whatever quarter the true attack should be made on. In the course of the night news arrived from the head-quarters at Legnago, that the whole Austrian army was in movement on the Lower Adige ; that the grand staff of the enemy was already there, as well as two pontoon trains. The report of General Duphot, a confidential officer, left no doubt with respect to the numerous forces deployed before him ; he reckoned them at 20,000 men, and supposed them to form the enemy’s first line. The opinion that the enemy were operating on the Lower Adige, was confirmed by the intelligence of what had passed at Corona. Joubert sent word that during the whole of the 12th he had been attacked by the enemy, whom he had withstood ; and that the Austrian division had been repulsed in all its attacks.
VI. General Alvinzi occupies Corona, and throws a bridge over the Adige.—The French General ordered Massena’s division to repass the Adige, and to join on the right bank. He thus awaited all day on the 13th, the events which might have occurred on the same day at Legnago, on the Adige, and at Corona. The troops received notice to prepare for a nocturnal march, and to be under arms at ten o’clock at night. The division which was at Dezenzano, marched on the 11th to Castel-Nuovo, where it awaited fresh orders.
The rain fell in torrents. The troops were under arms, but the General-in-chief did not as yet know in what direction he should order them to proceed. At ten o’clock the reports from Montebaldo and the Lower Adige arrived. Joubert wrote that on the 13th, at nine in the morning, the enemy had deployed numerous forces ; that he had fought all day ; that his position was very confined ; that he had been fortunate enough to maintain himself there ; but that at two o’clock in the afternoon, having perceived that he was outflanked on the left, by the march of an Austrian division which proceeded along the Lake of Garda, and seemed to threaten to place itself between Peschiera and him ; and on his right by another division of the enemy which had proceeded along the left bank of the Adige, thrown a bridge over, a league above Rivoli, crossed that river, and was filing along the right bank, passing along the foot of Montebaldo, to carry the level of Rivoli ; he had considered it indispensably necessary to send a brigade to secure the level of Rivoli, the key of the whole position, and that about four o’clock he had himself deemed it requisite to abandon Corona, in order to arrive by daylight at the level of Rivoli, which he should be compelled to evacuate the following morning before nine o’clock. On the Lower Adige the enemy had lined the left bank. We were on the right bank. The enemy’s plan was therefore discovered. It was evident that he was operating with two grand armies on Montebaldo and the Lower Adige. Augereau’s division appeared sufficient to dispute and defend the passage of that river. At Montebaldo there was not a moment to be lost, because the enemy was about to join his cavalry and artillery, by taking possession of the level of Rivoli ; and if he could be attacked before he should gain that important point, he would be obliged to fight without artillery or cavalry. Nor was it doubtful that the principal attack of the enemy was by Montebaldo. All the troops were therefore dispatched to the level of Rivoli, whither the General-in-chief also repaired in person at two o’clock in the morning.
VII. Battle of Rivoli.—The weather had cleared up, and it was a beautiful moonlight. Napoleon ascended several heights, and observed the different lines of the enemy’s fires. They filled the country between the Adige and the Lake of Garda ; the atmosphere was reddened by them. Five corps were easily distinguished, which seemed formed on five divisions, which had commenced their movement the day before. Judging by the fires of the bivouacs, it seemed that there were about 40 or 50,000 men. The French would be at Rivoli by six in the morning, to the number of 22,000 men : this was, indeed, a very great disproportion, but we had the advantage of possessing sixty pieces of cannon and several thousand cavalry. It was evident from the position of the bivouacs of the enemy that they intended to attack us towards nine or ten in the morning. The column of the right, which was the most distant, was intended to surround the level of Rivoli in the rear ; it could not come up before ten o’clock ; the object of the first division of the centre, seemed to be to attack the position of our left. The second, which was on the upper ridge of Montebaldo, near St. Marco, was intended to gain possession of the chapel of St. Marco, to descend by the level of Rivoli, and to open the way to the left column, which had passed along the foot of Montebaldo, and was in bivouac at the edge of the level, along the Adige, at the bottom of the valley. The fifth bivouac appeared to be a division of reserve ; it was far in the rear.
On these data Napoleon formed his plan. He ordered Joubert, who had evacuated the chapel of St. Marco, and who now occupied the level of Rivoli only with a vanguard, to resume an offensive attitude immediately, to regain possession of the chapel, and at the dawn of day, to push the second division of the centre of the enemy as far as possible. A hundred Croats, being informed by a prisoner of the evacuation of St. Marco, had just taken possession of it, when Joubert returned to that chapel at four o’clock in the morning, and once more took up his position in advance.
The firing commenced with a regiment of Croats. On the approach of day, Joubert attacked the division in front of him, and drove it from height to height, in the upper ridge of Montebaldo, which commands the valley of the Adige. The first Austrian division of the centre then hastened its march, and a little before nine o’clock reached the heights on the left of the level of Rivoli. It had no artillery. The 14th and the 85th who guarded this level had each a battery. The 14th, who occupied the right, repulsed the attacks of the enemy ; the 85th was outfronted and broken. But the French General hastened to Massena’s division, which having marched all night, was taking a little rest, led them against the enemy, and in less than half an hour the first Austrian division of the centre was beaten and routed. It was then half after ten o’clock. The Austrian division of the left, composed of 3000 infantry, 5 or 6000 cavalry, all the wagons, and the heavy baggage of the army, was at the bottom of the valley ; and hearing the firing near the level, and perceiving that Joubert, who was a league in advance, had now no force at the chapel of St. Marco, detached some battalions of light troops to ascend and occupy it, and to take Joubert in the rear. When these battalions were half way up, the enemy ventured to debouch with twelve pieces of cannon, two or three battalions of infantry, and 1000 cavalry. This operation was difficult ; it was an absolute escalade. Joubert having perceived it, sent three battalions, in double quick time, who reached the chapel before the enemy, and precipitated them to the bottom of the valley. A battery of fifteen pieces placed on the level of Rivoli, showered case-shot on that part of the column of the left which had begun to debouch. Colonel Leclerc charged by platoons with 300 horse. Lasalle chief of squadron, was at the head of the first platoon, and by his intrepidity decided the success of the charge. The enemy were overthrown in the ravine ; all that had debouched, were taken, infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
At eleven o’clock the column of the right of the Austrian army arrived at the position marked out for it, where it met with our division of reserve from Dezenzano. The enemy stationed one brigade for the purpose of keeping our division in check. Their other brigade, 4000 strong, took post on the eminence, on the two sides of the road, from Verona to the level of Rivoli. They had no artillery ; they thought they had turned the French army, but it was too late. Scarcely had they climbed the height, when they witnessed the rout of the three Austrian divisions of the centre and left. From twelve to fifteen pieces of the reserve of artillery were turned against them. After a brisk cannonade they were attacked, surrounded, and all taken prisoners. The second brigade which was more in the rear, in position against the reserve from Dezenzano, began its retreat. It was hotly pursued, a great number of the soldiers who composed it were killed or taken. It was one o’clock in the afternoon ; the enemy were retreating from all points, and closely pursued.
Joubert advanced with such rapidity, that at one moment we thought the whole of Alvinzi’s army was taken. Joubert reached the steps, the enemy’s only retreat ; but Alvinzi, sensible of his danger, marched with his troops of reserve, checked Joubert, and even made him give some ground. The battle was won. We had taken some cannon, colours, and a great number of prisoners ; two of our detachments who were coming to join the army, fell in with the division which had cut us off from the Verona road. A report was immediately spread in the rear, that the French army was surrounded and lost.
During this battle the General-in-chief was several times surrounded by the enemy. He had several horses killed and wounded. Chabot occupied Verona with a handful of troops ; but the Caldiero division had suffered so much on the 12th at St. Michel, that it had not been able to molest him. It merely kept its position.
VIII. Passage of the Adige by Provera.—He marches on Mantua.—On the 14th Provera constructed a bridge at Anghiari ; and on the 15th, at daybreak, he passed the Adige and commenced his march on Mantua. Augereau advanced on the enemy’s bridge, made prisoners of fifteen hundred men whom Provera had left to guard it, and gained possession of the bridge during the 15th ; but Provera had gained a march upon him. Mantua was endangered.
It is difficult to prevent an enemy who has several pontoon trains, from passing a river, when the object of the army which defends the passage is to cover a siege. The General must have taken his measures for reaching an intermediate position between the bank which he defends, and the place which he covers, before the enemy. The French General had given orders accordingly. As soon as the enemy should have passed, the division was to proceed to the Molinella, reach it before the enemy, and after covering the fortress, march against them. This principle and these instructions were forgotten, and Mantua was thereby placed in jeopardy.
At three in the afternoon, Napoleon having received intelligence that Provera was constructing a bridge at Anghiari, instantly foresaw what would happen. He left Massena, Murat, and Joubert to pursue Alvinzi on the following day, and immediately set out for the lines before Mantua, with four regiments. He reached Roverbello as Provera arrived before Saint George’s. Hohenzollern, who commanded Provera’s vanguard, appeared on the 16th, at daybreak. He came up to the gate of Saint George’s at the head of a regiment covered with white cloaks. He knew that this gate was not fortified, but covered only with a simple field entrenchment ; and was in hopes of surprising it. Miollis, who commanded there, stationed guards only on the side of the town. He knew that he was covered by a division that was on the Adige, and that the enemy were far off. Hohenzollern’s hussars resembled the 1st French hussars. But an old serjeant of the garrison of Saint George’s, who was cutting wood 200 yards from the place, noticed this cavalry coming up to the town ; he conceived some doubts, which he communicated to one of his comrades. They thought the white cloaks looked too new for those of Berchini’s regiment. These brave men, in this uncertainty, ran into Saint George’s, calling to arms, and shut the barrier. The cavalry set off at full gallop, but it was too late ; they were recognized, and fired upon with grape shot. All the troops were immediately on the ramparts. At noon Provera surrounded the place. The brave Miollis, with 1500 men, defended himself all day.
IX. Battle of La Favorite.—In the mean time Provera communicated with Wurmser, by means of a bark, across the lake. On the 17th at dawn, Wurmser came out with the garrison, and took up a position at La Favorite. At one in the morning Napoleon placed the regiments between La Favorite and Saint George’s, and prevented the garrison of Mantua from joining Provera. Serrurier attacked the garrison of Mantua, at daybreak, with the troops of the blockade. The General-in-chief attacked Provera. It was at that battle that the 67th gained the name of terrible. Alone it rushed upon the Austrian line with the bayonet, and overthrew all that dared to oppose it. At two in the afternoon, the garrison of Mantua having been repulsed, Provera capitulated, and laid down his arms, leaving us many stand of colours, much baggage, several parks, and some pontoon trains. Six thousand prisoners, with several generals, remained in our hands. Of Provera’s 22,000 men, none escaped but the remains of the division which had attacked St. Michel on the 12th, who still remained in their position at Caldiero, and 1500 men whom Provera had left on the left bank of the Adige, to guard his parks and magazines ; all the rest were taken or killed. This was called the battle of La Favorite.
On the 15th, Joubert drove Alvinzi before him all day, and came up to the steps so rapidly, that 6 or 7000 men were cut off. Murat, with one column, directed his march on Corona, and entered the Tyrol. Head-quarters were removed back to Verona. Massena’s division proceeded to Bassano. One of Alvinzi’s divisions attempted to rally on the Brenta, but was defeated and repulsed beyond the Piave. General Augereau marched to Castel-Franco, and from thence to Trevisa. A few encounters took place with his vanguard. All the Austrian troops repassed the Piave. The passes of the Tyrol were universally blocked up with snow ; this was the greatest obstacle Joubert had to surmount ; but the French infantry triumphed over every difficulty. Joubert entered Trent. General Victor was detached on the Avisio, and by the passes of the Brenta, and re-established his communications with Massena, whose head-quarters were at Bassano.
Many prisoners were taken in several trifling actions : numbers of Austrian sick, and abundance of magazines, were found in all directions. The army was now in the same position as after the battles of Roveredo and Bassano, and before that of Arcole ; and Bessieres was sent to carry the new trophies to Paris. The actions of St. Michel, Rivoli, Anghiari, and La Favorite, cost Alvinzi more than two-thirds of his army. Out of his 80,000 men, he did not reconduct more than 25,000 into Austria.
X. Surrender of Mantua.—Henceforth, we were no longer apprehensive with respect to Mantua. The garrison had long been on half-allowance ; all the horses had been eaten. Wurmser was informed of the results of the battle of Rivoli ; there were now no hopes for him. He was summoned to surrender : he answered, proudly, that he had provisions for a year. Nevertheless, a few days after, Klenau, his first aide-de-camp, repaired to Serrurier’s head-quarters. He protested that the garrison still had provisions for three months ; but that as the Marshal did not believe that Austria could relieve the place in time, his conduct would be regulated by the conditions proposed to him. Serrurier answered, that he would go and take the commands of the General-in-chief on this subject.
Napoleon repaired to Roverbello : Serrurier caused Klenau to be called in. The French general remained unknown, wrapped in his mantle. The conversation began between Serrurier and Klenau. The latter made use of the common arguments, and enlarged on the extensive means which Wurmser still commanded, and the great quantity of provisions which he had in his magazines of reserve. The French General went to the table, and spent about half an hour, during which the discussion with Serrurier continued, in writing his decisions in the margin of Wurmser’s proposals. When he had done writing, he said to Klenau,—“ If Wurmser had but provisions for eighteen or twenty days, he would not deserve an honourable capitulation. Here are the terms I grant him,” added he, returning the paper to Serrurier : “ you will find there, in particular, that he is to be personally at liberty, because I honour his great age, and his merits, and because I do not wish him to become the victim of the machinations of his enemies at Vienna. If he opens the gates to-morrow, he shall have the terms I have just written : if he delays a fortnight, a month, or even two, he shall still be allowed the same conditions. He may now, therefore, hold out to his last bit of bread. I shall set out, directly, to pass the Po, and march on Rome. You know my intentions, go and communicate them to your General.”
Klenau, who at first comprehended nothing of this address, soon guessed with whom he had to do. He examined the decisions, the perusal of which filled him with gratitude and admiration at conduct so generous and unhoped for. Dissimulation was no longer necessary, and he confessed that he had not provisions for more than three days. Wurmser sent an invitation to the French General, as he was to cross the Po, to pass it at Mantua, which would have saved him much distance and difficulty. But all arrangements for the journey were already made. Wurmser wrote to him to express his gratitude, and a few days afterwards sent an aide-de-camp to him at Bologna, to inform him of a plot to poison him, which was to be executed in Romania, and gave him the necessary information to preserve himself ; this communication was useful. General Serrurier, therefore, presided over all the details of the surrender of Mantua, and saw the old Marshal and all the staff of his army file off before him. Napoleon was by that time in Romania. The indifference with which he declined the flattering spectacle of a Marshal of great reputation, Generalissimo of the Austrian forces, at the head of his staff, delivering up his sword, excited great astonishment throughout Europe.
Note by the Editor, written under dictation.—1st, Alvinzi, whatever may be said in the different reports, had 80,000 men, including Provera’s troops. The forces of the Tyrol amounted to above 50,000 men. Provera had 25,000, of whom 7000 fought at St. Michel, and 18,000, forming two divisions, marched on Mantua. Of these 18,000 men, 3000 remained in his rear, 10,000 advanced to St. George’s, and 5000 remained behind on the Molinella, to repel the movement of Augereau, who was following : these were all taken. If only 7000 prisoners were found in Provera’s column, it was because he had engaged twice, at Anghiari and Saint George’s, besides fighting the battle of La Favorite, in which affairs he lost many men ; and because many of the Austrian soldiers, who went into the hospitals, are not included in the number of the prisoners. The reports notice only 23,000 prisoners ; but the truth is, the French took more than 30,000 ; generally speaking the army did not take good care of its prisoners, but let a great number escape. The cabinet of Vienna had organized establishments in Switzerland, and on the roads, to facilitate their desertion. It may be estimated that a fourth of the prisoners escaped on their way to the central head-quarters ; and another fourth on their way to France, where not more than half the prisoners taken arrived. Many were also crowded together in the hospitals.
2dly, If, according to the official report, Bessieres only presented seventy-one stand of colours to the Directory, it was because thirteen remained behind, owing to some of the mistakes which are usual in the movements of a grand staff. They will be found amongst those which Augereau subsequently presented, after the taking of Mantua.
3dly, Of the sixty stand of colours which Augereau presented to the Directory, thirteen were remains of the trophies of Rivoli and La Favorite, which Bessieres ought to have presented. The other forty-seven were found in Mantua ; and prove how numerous were the regimental establishments of Wurmser’s army shut up in that place.
Augereau was chosen to carry these colours, in recompense for the services he had rendered the army, particularly at the battle of Castiglione. It would, nevertheless, have been more natural to have sent them by Massena, who had very superior claims. But the General-in-chief had much more dependence on the latter, with a view to the campaign in Germany, and did not choose to part with him. Some people thought that Napoleon, perceiving that there were persons who endeavoured to raise the reputation of General Augereau to an extravagant pitch, was glad to send him to Paris, in order to give every one an opportunity of forming a just estimate of the character and talents of this officer, who could not fail to suffer by the examination. Others, on the contrary, were of opinion that the object of the General-in-chief was to fix the attention of Parison one of his lieutenants : Augereau was a Parisian.