Las Cases, Memorial de Sainte Hélène, volume 2, part 3

Count de Las Cases
Memorial de Sainte Hélène
London, 1823
MY RESIDENCE WITH THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

Volume 2, Part 3
page 147 - 172

BATTLE OF ARCOLE.

Of the offensive operations of Alvinzi, from the 2d of November, 1796, to the entire expulsion of his army on the 21st of November following, a space of nineteen days. (See the map.)

I. Marshal Alvinzi takes the command of the new Austrian army ; his force.—The French armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, had been beaten in Germany ; they had repassed the Rhine. These advantages consoled the court of Vienna for its losses in Italy. They gave them an opportunity of humbling the pride of the French in this quarter. The Austrian Government therefore gave orders to form an army, disengage Mantua, deliver Wurmser, and avenge the disgrace its armies had sustained in this country. Four divisions of infantry and one of cavalry were accordingly assembled in Friuli, and two in the Tyrol, making together 60,000 men. These troops were composed of strong detachments from the victorious armies of Germany ; of skeleton regiments of Wurmser’s army recruited, and of an extraordinary levy of 15,000 croats. The chief command was given to Marshal Alvinzi, and the Tyrolese partizan corps, of about 18,000 men, was entrusted to General Davidowich. The Senate of Venice secretly seconded the Austrians ; being convinced that the success of the French cause would be the ruin of its aristocracy. That Government daily saw the disposition of its continental subjects grow worse towards it, and heard them call aloud for a revolution. The Court of Rome had taken off the mask ; and finding itself compromised since Wurmser’s defeat, it now looked for safety only in the success of Austria. It fulfilled none of the conditions of the armistice of Bologna ; it perceived with terror that the French General was temporizing, and that by feigned moderation and prolonged negotiations, he was postponing the moment of punishment. The Court of Rome was also inspirited, by the Austrian victories in Germany ; and being exactly informed of the small number of the French, and the great proportion of sick in their army, it was exerting all its physical means in levying troops, and its moral means in persuading the minds of the people, by means of the convents and priests, of the weakness of the French, and the irresistible force of the Austrians.

II. Good condition of the French army ; the opinion of the people of Italy favourable to its success.—The French General had long cherished the hope of receiving new reinforcements. He had forcibly represented to the Directory either that the armies of the North must repass the Rhine, or that 50,000 men must be sent to his assistance. Promises were made him which were never realized ; and all the succours that were sent him amounted only to four regiments detached from la Vendée ; the disposition of which province was improved. These regiments consisting of about 8,000 men, arrived at different times in the course of two months. They were of great assistance ; they made up for the losses experienced in the preceding months, and kept up the effective army to its usual number of 30,000 combatants. The letters from the Tyrol, Friuli, Venice, and Rome, constantly spoke of the great preparations making against the French ; but on this occasion the more declared disposition of the people and other circumstances, put quite a different face on the affairs of Italy. It was no longer as before Lonato and Castiglione. The prodigies performed by the French, and the numerous defeats sustained by the Austrians, had changed the direction of public opinion. On the former occasion three fourths of the Italians thought it impossible for the French to preserve their conquest : but now three fourths of the same people believed it would never be in the power of the Austrians to wrest it from them. Care was taken that the arrival of the four regiments from France should make a great noise. Their movements were made by battalions, which formed twelve columns. Every endeavour was employed to make the inhabitants and part of the army believe that the reinforcement consisted of twelve regiments. It was believed that provisions were scarce in Mantua, and that this place would infallibly be reduced before the Austrian army could recommence the contest, so that our troops heard the preparations of Austria talked of, without any diminution of their confidence. They seemed certain of victory. The army was well fed, paid, and clothed ; its artillery was numerous and well horsed ; its cavalry weak in point of number, indeed, but wanting for nothing, and in the best possible condition.

The population of all the countries occupied by our army, made at present, common cause with us. Their most earnest prayers were poured forth for our success. The disposition of the countries beyond the Po was such that they might even suffice to keep in check the levies which the Cardinal Secretary of State at Rome called the Pope’s army. That miserable court, destitute of genius, courage, talents, and good faith, was in no respect formidable.

III. Action of the Brenta.—Vaubois evacuates the Tyrol in disorder. At the beginning of November, the head quarters of the Austrian army were at Conegliano, and numerous posts were distributed on the left bank of the Piave. In the Tyrol, corps opposed to each of ours were formed on the line of the Avisio ; the enemy appeared in force in all directions. Alvinzi’s scheme was perfectly evident ; he would not attack by the Tyrol, like Wurmser ; he was fearful of engaging in the mountains. He ascribed the success of Lonato and Castiolione to the superior intelligence and dexterity of the French soldier. He therefore resolved to make his principal attack by the plain, and to reach the Adige by the Veronese, Vicentine, and Paduan. On the 2d of November, this general threw two bridges over the Piave, and advanced on Bassano with from 49 to 50,000 men. Massena, posted in observation, kept back all his columns, forced him to deploy all his forces, gained several days, and fell back on Vicenza, where he was joined by the French General, who brought Augereau’s division with him, as well as a brigade from Mantua, and had immediately from 20 to 22,000 men at his disposal. Napoleon’s plan was to defeat Alvinzi, and then to proceed on Trent, by a movement inverse to that which he had made shortly before, and to take in rear the army which was operating in the Tyrol. Alvinzi, who had passed the Brenta ; was attacked on the 5th, and overthrown. All his divisions were repulsed beyond that river.

But Vaubois, who had been engaged with th enemy ever since the 2d of November, had not been able to maintain himself, either at Trent, or in any intermediate position. His division, no longer disputing the ground, was retiring in a disorderly manner on Verona. Every thing seemed to give reason to apprehend, that the position of Corona and Montebaldo would be insufficient to stop the enemy’s progress. The siege of Mantua was thought to be in danger. The General-in-chief was therefore obliged to retrograde on Verona, and to reach it in time to rally Vaubois, and secure the positions of Montebaldo and Rivoli. He reviewed Vaubois’ division on the level of Rivoli. “ Soldiers,” he said to them, in a severe tone, “ I am not satisfied with you. You have shown neither discipline nor constancy. You have yielded on the first reverse. No position was sufficient for you to rally at. There were some in your retreat which were impregnable. Soldiers of the 85th and 39th, you are no longer French soldiers. Give me those colours, and let me have written on them, ‘ They belong no more to the army of Italy ! ’ ” A gloomy silence prevailed throughout the ranks, and these old soldiers were seen, in the emotion of the moment, to derange their arms whilst they wiped away their tears. The General-in-chief was obliged to say a few consolatory words to them. “ General,” they cried, “ place us in the vanguard, and you shall see whether we belong to the army of Italy ! ” In fact, these regiments, which were the most severely blamed, were placed in the vanguard, and there covered themselves with glory.

IV. Battle of Caldiero, 12th November.—Alvinzi’s operations were already crowned with the completest success : he was now master of the whole of the Tyrol, and of all the country between the Brenta and the Adige ; but the most difficult task yet remained to be performed : this was, to force the passage of the Adige in the face of the French army. The road from Verona to Vicenza runs by the side of the Adige for three leagues, and never leaves the direction of the river, except at Villa Nuova, where it turns perpendicularly to the left, in the direction of Vicenza : at Villa-Nuova, the little stream of the Alpon crosses the high road, and, after passing through Arcole, enters the Adige between Ronco and Albaredo. To the left of Villa-Nuova are heights, which present very fine positions, known by the name of Caldiero. By occupying these positions, a part of the Adige is kept, Verona is covered, and an opportunity is preserved of falling on the rear of the enemy, should he direct his course to the lower Adige.

The French general had scarcely secured the defence of Montebaldo, and restored confidence to Vaubois’ troops, when he resolved to occupy Caldiero, as affording more chances for defence, and more energy to his attitude. He debouched on the 11th from Verona, with Verdier’s brigade at the head of his columns, overthrew the enemy’s vanguard, and speedily reached the foot of Caldiero. But Alvinzi himself had occupied this position, which is equally good against Verona.

On the 12th, at day-break, his whole army was seen on these heights, which he had covered with formidable batteries. When the ground had been reconnoitred, Massena was to attack the heights, and force the enemy’s right : the carrying of this height, which the enemy did not keep in a skilful manner, would decide the battle. General Launay marched with his demi-brigade, and took the eminence, but could not maintain himself there, and was taken prisoner. In the meantime the rain was falling in torrents ; the road soon became impracticable for our artillery, whilst we were crushed by that of the enemy. To climb the heights in the face of an enemy posted on them, was too disadvantageous an undertaking. The attack was countermanded ; and we contented ourselves with maintaining the battle throughout the day. As the rain lasted all that day and the next, the French General determined on returning to the camp at Verona.

The losses in this affair had been equal ; the enemy, nevertheless, ascribed the victory to themselves, and with reason. Their advanced posts approached St. Michel, and the situation of the French became truly critical.

V. Discontent, and various sentiments of the French army.—Vaubois, who had been defeated in the Tyrol, had suffered considerable loss : he had not at this time more than 6000 men. The other two divisions, after having fought valiantly on the Brenta, had been forced to retreat on Verona, having failed in their operations on Caldiero. The consciousness of the enemy’s strength was the predominant sentiment throughout the army. Vaubois’ soldiers, in order to justify their retreat in the Tyrol, said, they had fought there one to three. Even the soldiers who had remained in Napoleon’s sight thought the enemy too numerous. The two divisions, after their losses, could not muster more than 13,000 men under arms. The enemy had also sustained losses, it is true, but he had had the advantage : he had acquired a consciousness of superiority ; he had been able to reckon at his ease the small number of the French. Accordingly, he had no longer any doubt of the deliverance of Mantua, or of the conquest of Italy. He had collected a great number of ladders, and caused many more to be made, for the purpose of storming Verona. At Mantua, the garrison had recovered itself, made frequent sorties, which incessantly harassed the besiegers, and the troops were too weak to restrain so strong a garrison. We daily heard of some new reinforcement obtained by the enemy, whilst we could hope for none. At the same time the agents of Austria, Venice, and the Pope, took care to trumpet forth the successes obtained by Alvinzi, and his superiority over us. We were no longer in a condition to act on the offensive in any direction : on one side was the position of Caldiero, which we had been unable to carry : on the other, the passes of the Tyrol, which had just been the scene of Vaubois’ defeat. But had we occupied positions allowing of any attempt against him, it would have been precluded by our inferiority in point of numbers. Every thing forbade offensive operations for the present : it was therefore necessary to allow the enemy to take the lead, and to await coolly such operations as they might think fit to attempt. The weather was extremely bad ; the rain fell in torrents, and every movement was made in the mud. The affairs of Caldiero and the Tyrol had sensibly affected the resolution of the army. The soldiers still retained, indeed, a sense of their superiority over the enemy, in case of equality of numbers ; but they did not think themselves able to withstand them with such great numerical disparity. Many brave men had been wounded twice or thrice in different battles since they entered Italy. Discontent and irritation began to prevail amongst them.

“ We cannot, alone,” said they, “ perform the work of all. Alvinzi’s army here, is that before which the armies of the Rhine and of the Sambre and Meuse retreated ; and they remain inactive at this moment. Why should we do their duty ? We receive no succours ; if we are beaten, we must regain the Alps by a dishonourable flight ; if, on the contrary, we conquer, what will our new victory produce ? Another army like Alvinzi’s will be opposed to us, as Alvinzi himself succeeded Wurmser ; and in this ever unequal struggle we must needs be destroyed at last.”

Napoleon caused the following reply to be made. “ We have only one more effort to make, and Italy is ours. Alvinzi’s force is undoubtedly more numerous than ours ; but half his troops are mere recruits. When once he is defeated, Mantua must fall ; we shall remain masters of Italy ; our labours will be terminated, for not only the possession of Italy, but a general peace depend on the taking of Mantua. You wish to retire to the Alps, you are no longer able to do so. From the hard and fatiguing life you led on those barren rocks, it was quite easy to come to win the luxuries of Lombardy ; but after the charming flowery bivouacs of Italy, you would not be able to endure the severities and privations of those bleak mountains ; you would not now support the snows and frosts of the Alps without a murmur. Reinforcements have reached us ; we still expect more ; many are on the road. Let those who are unwilling to fight, and who are rich enough already, talk no more about the future. Beat Alvinzi, and I will answer for the rest.”

These words, repeated throughout the army by every one possessed of generous sentiments, raised the spirits of the troops, and inspired them with feelings of a contrary kind. Thus, by turns, the army was at one time disheartened and desirous to retreat ; at another, it was filled with enthusiasm, and talked only of fighting.

When it became known at Brescia, Bergamo, Milan, Cremona, Lodi, Pavia, and Bologna, that the French army had sustained a check, the wounded and sick, not yet half cured, left the hospitals and came to join the ranks, with their wounds still bleeding. This affecting sight produced the most lively emotion throughout the troops.

VI. Nocturnal march of the Army on Ronco, where it passes the Adige on a bridge of boats.—At length, on the 14th of November ; at dusk, the army encamped at Verona, got under arms. The columns began their march in the deepest silence ; they crossed the city, and formed on the right bank. The hour of setting out, the direction taken (which was that of a retreat,) the silence preserved contrary to the constant custom of giving notice, by the order of the day, that preparations were making to engage, and the state of affairs, all combined to place it beyond doubt that we were retreating. This first movement in retreat, it was thought, which necessarily involves the raising of the siege of Mantua, forebodes the loss of all Italy. Those of the inhabitants who founded all their expectations of a better fate on our victories, watched with alarm and grief the movements of that army in which all their hopes were placed.

The army, however, instead of following the Peschiera road, suddenly turns to the left, and marches along the Adige : it arrives before day at Ronco. Andreossy was completing a bridge over the river ; and when the first rays of the sun appeared, the army was astonished to find itself, simply by facing to the left, on the opposite bank. The officers and soldiers, who, when in pursuit of Wurmser had traversed this part of the country, now began to guess the general’s intention. They perceived that as he could not carry Caldiero, he was turning it : and that being unable, with 12,000 men, to make any impression on 45,000 in the plain, he was drawing them into mere causeways, amongst vast morasses, where numbers would no longer avail any thing, but where the courage of the heads of the columns would be every thing. The hope of victory then reanimated every heart, and every one engaged to surpass his former deeds in support of so fine and so daring a plan.

Kilmaine was left at Verona, with 1500 soldiers of all kinds ; the gates were strictly closed, and all communications severely prohibited. The enemy was perfectly ignorant of our movement.

The bridge of Ronco was thrown across to the right of the Alpon, about a quarter of a league from its mouth. Had it been made to the left bank on the Albaredo side, the army would have passed into a plain ; whereas the object was to enter morasses where numbers would be ineffectual. Besides, it was to be apprehended that Alvinzi, if informed of our movements, would march suddenly on Verona, and take possession of it ; which would have obliged the corps of Rivoli to retire to Peschiera, and would have compromised that of Ronco. It was therefore requisite to cross to the right bank of the Alpon, so as to fall on the rear of the enemy if they should attack Verona, and thereby support that place by the left bank, which could not have been done if the bridge had been thrown across to the left bank of the Alpon, because the enemy could have lined the right bank of that river, and, thus protected, have carried Verona. These two reasons had determined the placing of the bridge. Now three roads branched from Ronco, where the bridge had been made, all of which were surrounded with morasses. The first leads to Verona, up the Adige ; the second to Villa-Nuova, passing by Arcole, here there is a bridge a league and a half from the Adige, over the little stream of the Alpon ; the third runs down the side of the Adige to Albaredo.

VII. Battle of Arcole, 1st day, 15th of November.—Three columns directed their march by these three roads. That on the left re-ascended the Adige as far as the extremity of the morasses ; thence the communication with Verona was unimpeded. This point was one of the utmost importance ; by securing it, all apprehensions of seeing Verona attacked by the enemy were removed, because the French would have been in their rear. The column of the right took the road to Albaredo, and occupied it as far as the Alpon. That of the centre advanced on Arcole, where our skirmishers reached the bridge without being perceived. It was five o’clock in the morning, and the enemy knew nothing of our proceedings. The first shots were fired on the bridge of Arcole, where two battalions of Croats, with two pieces of cannon, were in bivouac as a corps of observation, to guard the rear of the army, where were all the parks, and to watch the parties which the garrison of Legnago might detach into the plain. That place was only three leagues off ; the enemy had been so negligent as not to advance any posts to the Adige ; they looked on this space as impracticable marshes. The interval from Arcole to the Adige was not guarded ; the enemy had contented themselves with sending some patrols of hussars, who thrice a day rode over the dykes, and reconnoitred the Adige. The road from Ronco to Arcole meets the Alpon at two miles from Ronco, and then re-ascends the right bank of that little stream for a mile, up to the bridge, which turns perpendicularly to the right, and enters the village of Arcole. Some Croats were bivouacked, with their right supported on the village, and their left towards the mouth of the rivulet. This bivouac had in front the dyke, from which it was separated only by the rivulet ; by firing in front they took the column, the head of which was advancing on Arcole, in flank. It was necessary to fall back hastily to that point of the road, the side of which was no longer exposed to the left bank. Alvinzi was informed that some firing had taken place at the bridge of Arcole, but he paid little attention to the circumstance. However, at day-break, the movement of the French could be distinguished from Caldiero and the neighbouring steeples. Already the reconnoitring parties of hussars, which every morning rode along the banks of the Adige, to ascertain the events of the night, were received with a fire of musketry on all the dykes, and pursued by the French cavalry. Alvinzi then received from all quarters certain intelligence that the French had passed the Adige, and were in force on all the dykes. It seemed to him folly to suppose that a whole army could thus have been thrown into impracticable morasses. He rather thought it must be a detachment placed there to harrass him, whilst he should be attacked in force from the side of Verona. But his reconnoitring parties on the Verona side, having brought him intelligence that all was quiet there, Alvinzi thought it necessary to repulse these French troops beyond the : Adige, for the security of his rear. He ordered one division to advance by the dyke of Arcole, and another towards the dyke, which runs parallel with the Adige, with orders to fall furiously on all they should meet, and drive them all into the river. Accordingly, towards nine o’clock, these two divisions made a brisk attack. Massena, who was entrusted with the left dyke, having allowed the enemy to advance, charged them furiously, broke them, caused them considerable loss, and took a great number of prisoners. The same thing was done on the dyke of Arcole they waited until the Austrians had turned the elbow of the bridge ; they then charged and routed them, and took many prisoners. It became of the utmost importance to gain possession of Arcole, because that was the point from whence to debouch on the rear of the enemy, before they could be formed. But this bridge of Arcole, by its situation, resisted all our attacks. Napoleon, in person, tried a last effort ; he seized a standard, rushed towards the bridge, and fixed it there. The column he led had half cleared, the bridge, when the flank fire caused their attack to fail. The grenadiers of the head of the column, abandoned by the rear, hesitate, they are induced to retire, but they will not abandon their general ; they seize him by his arms, his hair, and his clothes, and drag him along with them, in their flight, amidst the dead, the dying, the fire, and smoke. The General-in-chief is thrown into a marsh, where he sinks up to the middle ; he is in the midst of the enemy ; but the French perceive that their general is not amongst them. A cry is heard of “ Soldiers, forward, to rescue the general ! ” These brave men instantly turn, and rush upon the enemy ; they drive them beyond the bridge, and Napoleon is saved. That was a day of military self-devotion. General Lannes had hastened from Milan ; he had been wounded at Governolo ; he was still suffering ; yet he threw himself between the enemy and Napoleon, covering him with his body, and received three wounds, resolved never to quit him. Muiron, Aide-de-camp to the General-in-chief, was killed whilst covering his General.—Affecting and heroic death !—Belliard and Vignoles were wounded whilst rallying the troops and urging them forward. The brave General Robert, was killed there.

A bridge was now thrown over at the mouth of the Alpon, in order to take Arcole in rear, but, in the mean time, Alvinzi, informed of the true state of affairs, and excessively alarmed with respect to the danger of his situation, had abandoned Caldiero, destroyed his batteries, and made all his parks, baggage, and reserves, repass the Alpon. From the top of the steeple of Ronco, the French saw with regret the escape of their expected prey ; and it was then that, from the precipitate movements of the enemy, the extent and consequences of the French General’s plan became apparent. Every one saw what might have been the results of so profound and bold a conception : the enemy’s army narrowly escaped destruction. General Guyeux could not march on Arcole, by the left bank of the Alpon, until four o’clock. The village was carried without striking a blow ; but this success was then useless ; it was six hours too late ; the enemy had established themselves in a natural position. Arcole was now merely an intermediate post between the fronts of the two armies. In the morning this village had been in the rear of the enemy.

The results of this day were, however, highly important : Caldiero was evacuated, and Verona was no longer in danger. Two of Alvinzi’s divisions had been defeated with considerable loss. Numerous columns of prisoners, and a great number of trophies defiled through the camp, filling the soldiers and officers with enthusiasm ; and every one resumed confidence, and exulted in victory.

VIII. Second day, 16th of November.—In the mean time Davidowich, with his corps from the Tyrol, had attacked the heights of Rivoli the preceding day. He had forced Vaubois from thence, and obliged him to retreat on Castel-Nuovo. The enemy’s light horse already appeared at the gates of Verona. Kilmaine, disengaged from Alvinzi, and relieved from all apprehensions with respect to the left bank, by the evacuation of Caldiero, had directed all his attention to the right bank ; but it was to be feared, that if the enemy should march rapidly on Castel-Nuovo, they might overthrow Vaubois, reach Mantua, surprise the besieging army, join the garrison, and cut off the retreat of the head-quarters, and of the army which was at Ronco. It was therefore necessary to be ready, at day-break, to support Vaubois, protect Mantua and its communications, and beat Davidowich, if he had advanced during the day. For the success of this plan it was necessary to calculate the hours. The General resolved, therefore, being uncertain of what had passed in the course of the day, to suppose that Vaubois had been completely unfortunate. He caused Arcole, which had cost so much blood, to be evacuated, and the whole army to fall back on the right bank of the Adige, leaving on the left bank only one brigade and a few pieces of cannon. In this position he ordered the troops to refresh themselves, whilst waiting for intelligence of what might have passed on Vaubois’s side during this day. If the enemy had marched on Castel-Nuovo, it would have been necessary to break up the bridge over the Adige, to withdraw from before Alvinzi, and to be, at ten o’clock, in the rear of Vaubois at Castel-Nuovo, and overthrow the enemy on Rivoli. Bivouacs with fires lighted had been left at Arcole, as well as strong piquets, in order that Alvinzi might perceive nothing. At four in the morning the drums beat to arms, in order to prepare for marching. But at the same moment, it was ascertained that Vaubois was still in position half-way between Rivoli and Castel-Nuovo, and that he declared he would answer for holding out all day. Davidowich was the same General who had commanded one of the divisions which Wurmser had caused to debouch by the Chiusa ; he remembered the results of those operations, and was not forward to compromise himself. Towards three o’clock in the morning, however, Alvinzi, having received intelligence of the retrograde march of the French, had Arcole occupied immediately, and at dawn directed two columns on the dykes of the Adige and of Arcole, to march against us. The firing began at 200 toises from our bridge ; the troops repassed it in charging time, fell on the enemy, broke them, and pursued them briskly to the debouchés of the morasses, which were filled with their dead. Some colours, cannon, and prisoners, were the trophies of this victory, in which two divisions more of Alvinzi’s force were defeated.

Towards evening the French General, through the same motives and combinations, made the same movement as the preceding day. He concentrated all his troops on the right bank of the Adige, leaving only a vanguard on the left bank.

IX. Third day, 17th of November.—In the mean time Alvinzi, led into an error by a spy, who assured him that the French General had repassed the Adige, and marched on Mantua, leaving only a rear-guard at Ronco, debouched at daybreak, with the intention of carrying the bridge of Ronco. An instant before day, it was ascertained that nothing had taken place on Vaubois’s side, and that Davidowich had made no movement. The French returned to the other side of the Adige. The head of our columns fell in with two more of Alvinzi’s divisions half-way up the dykes. An obstinate engagement was fought ; our troops alternately advanced, and fell back. For one moment, the enemy’s balls reached the bridge. The 75th having been broken, the General-in-chief placed the 32d in ambuscade, lying on their faces in a little wood of willows, along the dyke of Arcole. This demi-brigade rose, fired a volley, charged bayonets, and overthrew into the marsh a dense column of the enemy, consisting of 3000 Croats, who all perished there. Massena, on the left, experienced some vicissitudes ; but he marched at the head of his division, with his hat suspended on his sword, by way of a standard, and made a horrible carnage of the division opposed to him.

After midnight the French General concluded that the decisive moment was arrived. For if Vaubois had been beaten during this day by Davidowich, he would be obliged to march the following day, to the assistance of that general and of Mantua. Alvinzi would then immediately advance on Verona, he would reap the honour and advantages of victory ; the great success obtained during the last three days would be thrown away. Napoleon had the prisoners carefully counted ; recapitulated the losses of the enemy ; concluded that their strength had been diminished during these three days by a loss of 20,000 men ; that their numbers in battle would therefore be little more than a third above our own. He gave orders to leave the marshes—and to attack the enemy in the plain.

The circumstances of these three days had so entirely changed the spirit of the two armies, that we were secure of the victory. The army passed the bridge thrown over at the mouth of the Alpon. Elliot, Aide-de-camp to the General-in-chief, being ordered to construct a second, was killed there. At two o’clock in the morning, the French army was in line of battle, its left at Arcole, and its right in the direction of Porto-Lignano ; it had the enemy in front, whose right was supported on the Alpon, and whose left had some morasses for an appui. The enemy had positions on both sides of the road of Montebello. Adjutant Lorcet had set out from Lignano with 6 or 700 men, four pieces of cannon, and 200 horses, to turn the marshes on which the left of the enemy was supported. Towards three o’clock, at the moment when this detachment of the garrison of Lignano marched against the enemy, when the cannonade was brisk throughout the line, and the skirmishers were hotly engaged, the French general ordered Colonel Hercule to proceed with fifty of the corps of guides, and four or five trumpets, through the reeds, and to charge the extremity of the enemy’s left, at the same moment as the garrison of Lignano should begin to cannonade it in the rear ; which he executed in an intelligent manner, and thereby contributed greatly to the success of the day. The enemy were overthrown on all sides, their line was broken ; they lost many prisoners. Alvinzi had placed 7 or 8000 men in Echelon in his rear, to secure his retreat, and escort his parks, whereby his line of battle was reduced to equal strength with ours. He was vigorously chased all the rest of the evening. He continued his retreat on Vicenza throughout the night : our cavalry pursued him beyond Montebello.

When Napoleon arrived at Villa-Nuova, he stopped to receive reports of the pursuit of the enemy, and the conduct of their rear-guard. He entered the convent of St. Boniface, the church of which had served as an hospital. There he found 4 or 500 wounded men, most of them dead ; the stench of putrefaction exhaled from the place ; he drew back with horror. He heard himself called by his name ; two unfortunate French soldiers, wounded, had for three days been left amongst the dead, without anything to eat ; their wounds had not been dressed, they despaired of their own lives ; but they were recalled to existence by the sight of their general ; every assistance was speedily rendered to them.

The French general visited the heights of Caldiero, and resumed his march towards Verona. When half way there, he met an Austrian staff officer sent by Davidowich to Alvinzi. This young man thought himself in the midst of his friends. According to his dispatches, there had been no communication between the two armies for three days. Davidowich was ignorant of all that had happened.

X. The French army re-enters Verona in triumph by the right bank.—Napoleon entered triumphantly into Verona by the right bank, three days after having left that city in a mysterious manner by the Milan gate. It would be difficult to conceive the astonishment and enthusiasm of the inhabitants ; our most declared enemies could not remain indifferent, and added their applause to that of our friends. The French general crossed to the right bank of the Adige, and advanced on Davidowich who was still at Rivoli. That general was driven from post to post, and hotly pursued as far as Roveredo. It is calculated that out of Alvinzi’s 60 or 70,000 men, he lost in these affairs from 30 to 35,000 ; and these were the best of his troops.

But these great results were not obtained without losses, and the army stood, more than ever, in need of rest. The French general did not think fit to re-enter the Tyrol, and extend his forces as far as Trent. He contented himself with having Montebello, Corona, and the passes of the Chiusa and Adige occupied. Alvinzi rallied at Bassano, and Davidowich at Trent. It was however to be expected that Mantua would soon be obtained, before the Austrian general could receive a new army. The frequent sorties of Wurmser to obtain a few provisions, the great number of lean deserters who came in, and had been a month kept on half rations, the destitute state of his hospitals and the great number of his sick were all calculated to excite hopes of a speedy surrender.