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I.  Marshal Wurmser quits the command of the army of Germany, and takes that of the Austrian army of Italy.—The army of Italy had opened the campaign in the month of April.  June had arrived, and the armies of the North, of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, were still inactive.  These great and excellent armies, containing more than 200,000 men, constituting the principal forces of the republic, were quietly doing garrison duty in Holland, on the Meuse and Rhine, and in Alsace.

When the arrival of the French on the Adige, and the blockade of Mantua became known, the court of Austria gave up the plan of offensive operations in Alsace, and on the Lower Rhine, which it had projected ;  and ordered Marshal Wurmser, who had been destined for these operations, to come back with all possible expedition, for the purpose of conducting affairs in Italy, and to bring thither 30,000 of his best troops ;  which added to the reinforcements sent from every part of the monarchy, would make up an army of near 100,000 men.

The French army of Italy had accomplished its task in destroying the army opposed to it.  If the armies of the North had done as much, the contest would have been over.

Reports of the preparations making by the house of Austria were heard, however, throughout Italy.  All the confidential intelligence of the diplomatic agents, all the letters of the enemies of France, were filled with particulars of the immense means which were about to be brought into action, and of the certainty that before the end of August, the Emperor of Germany would be master of Milan, and would have driven the French out of Italy.

II.  Situation of the army of Italy.—From the end of June the French General had been attentively considering all these preparations, and was greatly alarmed at them.  He made the Directory sensible that it was impossible for 30,000 French to sustain alone, the efforts of the whole power of Austria.  He demanded either that reinforcements should be sent to him from the armies of the Rhine, or that those armies themselves should begin the campaign without delay.  He reminded them of the positive promise which he had received on leaving Paris, that these armies should commence operations on the 15th of April ;  he complained that two months had elapsed without their having stirred.

Wurmser marched from the Rhine with his reinforcements, towards the beginning of June ;  and, towards the end of the same month, the armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, at length opened the campaign.  But their diversion was no longer serviceable to the army of Italy, Wurmser having already reached it.  The French General joined all his forces on the Adige and the Chiesa ;  he left no troops in the Legations, or in Tuscany, except one battalion of depôt in the citadel of Ferrara, and two at Leghorn.  He reduced as much as possible the garrisons of Coni, Tortona, and Alessandria ;  he collected and brought within his own disposal, all the disposable resources of the army.  The siege of Mantua began to produce sickness ;  and notwithstanding all the care that could be taken to expose as few men as possible before that unwholesome place, our losses became very considerable.

The General-in-chief could not assemble more than 30,000 effective men under arms.  It was with this army that he was shortly to oppose the principal army of the house of Austria.

The correspondence of the different countries of Italy with the Tyrol, was very active ;  in that province were collected all the hostile forces :  it was easy to perceive the daily increasing evil influence of all these preparations on the popular mind.  The partizans of the French trembled ;  those of Austria, on the contrary, assumed a proud and threatening tone.  But all were astonished, that a power like France should leave an army, which had deserved so well of its country, without succour or support.  These remarks found their way to the soldiery, by means of their habitual communications with the inhabitants of the country.

At the end of July, General Soret’s headquarters were at Salo ;  he was ordered to cover the debouche of the Chiesa, where a great road passes that leads from Trent to Brescia.  Massena was at Bussolengo, causing Corona and Montebaldo to be occupied by Joubert’s brigade, and encamping with the rest of his division on the level of Rivoli.  Dallemagne’s brigade was posted at Verona ;  Augereau’s division occupied Porto Legnago and the Lower Adige.  General Guillaume commanded at Peschiera, where six galleys under the command of Captain Lallemand of the navy, secured the Lake of Garda.  Lastly, Serrurier was pressing the siege of Mantua, and Kilmaine commanded the cavalry of the army.

III.  Wurmser’s plan of Campaign.—Wurmser had the choice of two plans ;  either to pass the Brenta, and to debouch by Vicenza and Padua on the Adige :  by which route he would have avoided the mountains, but would have found himself separated from Mantua by the Adige, and obliged to force the passage of that river in the face of the French army :  or to debouch between the Adige and the Lake of Garda, take possession of Montebaldo and the level of Rivoli ;  bring up his artillery and baggage by the road which runs parallel with the left bank of the Adige :  his army would then have cleared the mountains and the Adige, and would have no obstacle remaining in the way of its arrival at Mantua.  But his artillery and cavalry would not be able to join his infantry until he should take the level of Rivoli.  Thus he might find himself attacked, and obliged to fight a decisive battle, before he could be joined by his artillery and cavalry.

Wurmser, however, disregarded this objection, and adopted the plan last described.  When informed of the taking of the intrenched camp of Mantua, and the hazardous situation of the fortress itself, he hastened his movements by eight or ten days.  He divided his army into three corps.  The first, and most considerable, forming his centre, debouched by Montebaldo, and occupied all the country between the Adige and the Lake of Garda :  it was composed of four divisions containing 40,000 men.  The second, forming his left, composed of a division of infantry of 10 or 12,000 men, with all the artillery, cavalry, and baggage, took the road leading from Roveredo to Verona, passing along the left bank of the Adige, and was to join the army by passing the Adige either at the level of Rivoli, or over the bridges at Verona.  The third corps, composing his right, and consisting of three divisions, containing from 30 to 35,000 men, directed its course to the left bank of the lake of Garda, followed the course of the Chiesa, coasting the Lake of Idro ;  by marching in this direction this corps was to turn the Mincio, cut off one of the great roads of the French army to Milan, and turn the whole siege of Mantua.  This plan was, on the part of the enemy, the result of an extreme confidence in their own force, and expected successes.  They were so certain of defeating us, that they were already contriving how to cut us off from all means of retreat.  Thus Wurmser was, in perspective, surrounding the whole French army by anticipation :  conceiving that army to be so completely chained down to the defence of Mantua, that to surround that fixed point, was to surround the army, which he regarded as inseparable from the siege.

IV.  Wurmser debouches by Montebaldo, by the road from Roveredo to Verona, and by that of the Chiesa, on the 29th of July.—At the end of July the head-quarters of the French army were removed to Brescia.  On the 28th, at ten in the evening, the French general set out from Brescia to visit his advanced posts.  Having reached Peschiera at daybreak on the 29th, he there learned that Corona and Montebaldo were attacked by considerable forces.  At eight o’clock in the morning he arrived at Verona.  At two o’clock in the afternoon the enemy’s light troops appeared on the tops of the mountains which divide Verona from the Tyrol, and engaged with our troops.  The General-in-chief retired during the whole of the evening, and fixed his headquarters at Castelnuovo, between the Adige and the Mincio, where he was better able to receive the reports of the whole line.

In the course of the night, he learned that Joubert, having been attacked at Corona by a whole army, had resisted during the whole day ;  but had subsequently fallen back on the level of Rivoli, which was occupied by Massena in great strength ;  that numerous lines of fires covered all the mountains between the lake of Garda and the Adige ;  that on the heights of Verona the fires gave reason to believe that towards the evening the enemy’s troops had increased in that quarter ;  that on the side of Montebello, Vicenza, Bassano, and Lignano, there were neither movements nor enemy ;  but that on the side of Brescia three hostile divisions had debouched by the valley of the Chiesa.  One covered the heights of Saint Osetto, appearing to be directed on Brescia ;  another had taken up a position at Gavardo, and seemed directed on Ponte-Marco and Lonato ;  the third had made for Salo, where the contest had already begun.

A little after, he was informed that the Saint Osetto division of the enemy had already advanced its van to Brescia, where it had met with no resistance, since only 300 convalescents had been left there to guard the hospitals.  Thus the communication of the army with Milan, by Brescia, being interrupted, we could now communicate with that city only by way of Cremona.

Light horsemen belonging to the enemy appeared on all the roads leading from Brescia to Milan, Cremona, and Mantua, announcing every where that an army of 80,000 men had debouched by Brescia, whilst another of 100,000 men was debouching by Verona.

Napoleon also learned that the division of the enemy directed on Salo had come to action with Soret ;  who, having gained intelligence of the other two divisions which were advancing towards Brescia and Lonato, had been apprehensive of being cut off from Brescia and the army ;  and had thought it expedient to fall back on the heights of Dezenzano, in order to keep up his communications ;  that he had left General Guyeux at Salo, with 1500 men in an ancient castle, a kind of fortress, secure from any sudden assault ; that the enemy’s division of Gavardo had advanced some light-horse on Ponte-San-Marco ;  but that they had been held in check by a company of light-infantry posted there.

V.  Grand and prompt resolution taken by the French General.—Action of Salo.—Action of Lonato, .31st of July.—Wurmser’s plan of attack was now discovered.  The French army alone opposed to all these forces could do nothing, but opposed to each of them separately it would be on an equality.

The French General instantly formed his determination.  The enemy had taken the lead in moving, which he hoped to preserve ;  the French general resolved to disconcert his plans by taking the lead himself.  Wurmser supposed the French army fixed to the position of Mantua.  Napoleon instantly resolved to make the army moveable, by raising the siege of that place, sacrificing his battering train, and rapidly advancing on one of these corps, with the whole collective strength of his army, in order to return successively to attack each of the other corps.  The right of the Austrian army, which had debouched by the Chiesa and Brescia road, being the most advanced, he advanced against it first.

Serrurier burnt his carriages and his platforms, threw his powder into the water, buried his shot, spiked his guns, and raised the siege of Mantua in the night of the 31st of July.

Augereau marched from Legnago to Borghetto on the Mincio.  Throughout the 30th, Massena defended the heights between the Adige and the lake of Garda.  Dallemagne marched on Lonato.  The General-in-chief ascended the heights in the rear of Dezenzano.  He made Soret march back to Salo, to extricate General Guyeux, who was compromised in the bad position in which Soret had left him.  Nevertheless this General had withstood a whole division of the enemy for forty-eight hours :  five times they had attacked him by assault, and five times he had strewed the avenues with their dead.  Soret came up at the very moment when the enemy were making a last effort ;  he fell on their flanks, defeated them entirely, took some colours, and disengaged Guyeux.

At the same time the Austrian division of Gavardo had marched on Lonato to take up a position on the heights, and endeavour to effect their junction with Wurmser on the Mincio.  The General-in-chief himself led Dallemagne’s brigade against that division.  This brigade performed prodigies of valour ;  the 32d formed part of it.  The enemy was defeated, put to flight, and suffered great loss.

These two divisions of the enemy, beaten by Soret and Dallenagne, rallied at Gavardo.  Soret, fearful of compromising himself, returned and took up an intermediate position between Salt and Dezenzano.

In the mean time Wurmser had caused his artillery and cavalry to pass the bridges of Verona.  Being master of all the country between the Adige and the Lake of Garda, he posted one of his divisions on the heights of Peschiera, to mask that place and keep up his communications.  He directed two others, with part of his cavalry, on Borghetto, to gain possession of the bridge over the Mincio, and to debouch on the Chiesa, in order to place himself in communication with his right.  Lastly, with his two last divisions of infantry and the rest of his cavalry, he marched on Mantua to oblige the French to raise the siege of that place.  Twenty-four hours had elapsed since the French troops had evacuated all their positions before Mantua :  Wurmser found the trenches and batteries there still complete, the guns dismounted and spiked, and the wrecks of carriages, platforms, and stores of all kinds strewed about in every direction.  The precipitancy with which these measures seemed to have been effected must have delighted him extremely ;  all that he saw around him appeared much more like the result of panic terror, than of a deliberate plan.

Massena, after having held the enemy in check throughout the 30th, passed the Mincio, at Peschiera, in the night, and continued his march on Brescia.  The Austrian division which appeared before Peschiera, found the right bank of the Mincio lined with skirmishers furnished by the garrison, and by a rear-guard left by Massena, which had orders to dispute the passage of the Mincio, and to rally at Lonato when the passage should be forced.

Augereau, in marching on Brescia, had passed the Mincio at Borghetto.  He had cut down the bridge, and likewise left a rear-guard to line the river, with orders to rally at Castiglione when it should be forced.

The general in chief marched all the night of the 31st July, with Augereau’s and Massena’s divisions on Brescia, where they arrived at ten o’clock in the morning.  The division of the enemy at Brescia, learning that the whole of the French army was debouching upon them by all the roads, took good care not to wait for it, and fell back precipitately.  When the Austrians entered Brescia, they found all our sick and convalescents there ;  but their stay was so short, and their departure so hasty, that they had not time to reconnoitre or dispose of their prisoners.

General Lespinois and Adjutant-general Herbin, with several battalions each, were sent in pursuit of the enemy towards Saint Osetto, and the debouches of the Chiesa.

The two divisions of Augereau and Massena returned, by a rapid countermarch, on the side of the Mincio, whence they had proceeded, to support their rear-guard.

VI.  Battle of Lonato, August 3.—On the 2d of August, Augereau whose division formed the right, occupied Monte-chiaro ;  Massena’s division, forming the centre, was encamped at Ponte-Marco, connected with that of Soret, which, forming the left, occupied an eminence between Salo and Dezenzano, facing to the rear, in order to check the whole of the enemy’s right.

In the mean time the rear-guard which Augereau and Massena had left on the Mincio, had retired before the divisions of the enemy which had passed that river.  That of Augereau, which had orders to join at Castiglione, quitted its post too soon, and returned in disorder to join its corps.

Napoleon, dissatisfied with General Valette, who commanded it, cashiered him before the troops, for not having evinced more firmness on this occasion.  As for General Pigeon, who commanded Massena’s rear-guard, he returned in good order on Lonato, according to his instructions, and there established himself.

The enemy, taking advantage of General Valette’s error, took possession of Castiglione on the 2d, and intrenched themselves there.

On the 3d the battle of Lonato took place ;  on the part of the enemy, Wurmser’s two divisions from Borghetto, and one brigade of the division which had remained at Peschiera, were engaged, forming a total of about 30,000 men.  The French had from 20 to 23,000, and their success was not doubtful.  Wurmser, with the two divisions of infantry, and the cavalry which he had taken to Mantua, could not be present at this action.

At the dawn of day the enemy advanced on Lonato, which place they attacked briskly ;  by this point they intended to form their junction with their right, respecting which they now began to entertain apprehensions.  Massena’s vanguard was overthrown, the enemy took Lonato.  The general in chief, who was at Ponte-Marco, marched in person to retake Lonato.  The Austrian general’s line having been extended too far, still with the intention of gaining on his right in order to open his communications with Salo, was penetrated, Lonato taken at the charge, and the enemy’s line intersected.  Part of their force fell back on the Mincio, the remainder on Salo ;  but the latter were met by General Soret in front, and had General Hilaire in rear.  Turned on every side, they were obliged to lay down arms.

Although we sustained an attack in the centre, we were the assailants on the right.  As soon as it was day, Augereau attacked the enemy who covered Castiglione, and broke them, after an obstinate engagement, in which the valour of the troops made up for their deficiency in numbers.  The enemy suffered great loss ;  Castiglione was taken from them, and they retired on Mantua, whence their first reinforcements came, but not until the action was over.  We lost many brave men in this desperate affair :  the army regretted, in particular, General Beyrand and Colonel Pourailler, very distinguished officers.

VIII.  Surrender of three divisions of the enenny’s right, and part of their centre.—The three divisions of the right of the enemy’s army received intelligence of the battle of Lonato during the night ;  they already heard the cannon, and they became extremely disheartened.  Their junction with the principal corps of the army was now become impossible.  They had, moreover, seen several French divisions near them, which they supposed to be still manoeuvring against them.  The French army seemed to them innumerable ;  they beheld it in every direction.

Wurmser had detached a part of his troops from Mantua towards Marcaria, in pursuit of Serrurier.  He was obliged to lose some time in effecting the return of these troops on Castiglione.  On the 4th he was not ready for action.  He employed the whole day in re-assembling his troops, re-organizing those which had fought at Lonato, and supplying his artillery with fresh stores.

When the French general went, about two or three in the afternoon, to reconnoitre his line of battle, he found it formidable ;  it still presented 40,000 fighting men.  He gave orders to intrench at Castiglione, and set out himself for Lonato, in order to superintend, in person, the movement of his troops, which it became of the highest importance to him to collect during the night, about Castiglione.  Throughout the day, Soret and Herbin on one side, and Dallemagne and Saint Hilaire on the other, had followed the march of the three divisions of the enemy’s right, and of those cut off from the centre on the day of the battle of Lonato, pursuing them as closely as possible, and making prisoners at every step.  Whole battalions had laid down arms at Saint-Osetto, others at Gavardo, and others were wandering about in perplexity in the neighbouring vallies.  Four or five thousand of the latter were informed by the peasants that there were not above 1200 French in Lonato ;  they marched thither in hopes of opening a passage towards the Mincio.  It was four o’clock in the afternoon ;  Napoleon, on his side, was entering the town, coming from Castiglione.  A flag of truce was announced to him ;  and whilst the troops were getting under arms, he learned that columns of the enemy were debouching by Ponte San-Marco, that they intended entering Lonato, and had summoned that town to surrender.

We were, however, masters of Salo and Gavardo ;  it was therefore evident that these could only be straggling columns trying to open themselves a passage.  Napoleon ordered his numerous staff to mount their horses ;  he then had the officer who came to parley brought before him, and caused the bandage to be taken from his eyes in the midst of all the bustle of the head quarters of a commander-in-chief.  “ Go tell your General,” said he, “ that I give him eight minutes to lay down arms.  He is in the midst of the French army ;  after the expiration of that time, no hope remains for him.”

These 4 or 5000 men, who had been harassed for three days, wandering in uncertainty, not knowing what was to become of them, in the persuasion that they had been deceived by the peasants, laid down their arms.  This circumstance alone may convey an idea of the disorder and confusion of these Austrian divisions, which, after being beaten at Salo, Lonato, and Gavardo, and pursued in every direction, were already almost disorganized.  All the rest of the fourth, and the whole of the night, were passed in rallying all the colums, and concentrating them at Castiglione.

VIII.  Battle of Castiglione, August 5.—Before day-break on the 5th, the French army, completely united, consisting of 25,000 men, including Serrurier’s division, occupied the height of Castiglione, an excellent position.  General Serrurier, with the division which came from the siege of Mantua, had received orders to march all night, and to fall on the rear of Wurmser’s left at dawn.  His attack was to be the signal for battle.  A great moral success was anticipated from this unexpetted attack ;  and to make it the more sensible the French army made a feint of falling back.

As soon as the first guns fired by the corps of Serrurier (who being ill, General Fiorella commanded for him) were heard, the army advanced briskly on the enemy, falling on troops whose confidence was already shaken, and who no longer possessed their original ardour.  A hillock in the midst of the plain formed a strong appui for the enemy’s left.  Adjutant-general Verdier was ordered to attack it ;  Marmont, Aide-de-camp to the General-in-chief, advanced upon it with twenty pieces of artillery ;  the post was carried.  Massena attacked the right, Augereau the centre, Fiorella took the left in flank ;  we were victorious in every direction, the enemy was completely routed.  Nothing but the excessive fatigue of the French troops could have saved the wreck of Wurmser’s division ;  they fled, in disorder, beyond the Mincio, where Wurmser was in hopes of being able to maintain himself ;  he would there have had the advantage of remaining in communication with Mantua.  But Augereau’s division directed its march on Borghetto, and that of Massena on Peschiera.

General Guillaume, commandant of the latter place, who had been left there with only 400 men, had walled up the gates, the better to defend himself.  It would have required forty-eight hours to disencumber them.  The soldiers were obliged to leap upon the ramparts in order to reach the enemy.  The Austrian troops which occupied Peschiera were fresh.  They long maintained the action against the 18th of the line ;  but they were at last broken, and lost eighteen pieces of cannon and many prisoners.

The General-in-chief marched with Serrurier’s division on Verona.  He reached that place in the night of the 7th.  Wurmser had caused the gates to be shut, wishing to gain the night for carrying off his baggage ;  but the gates were battered down by cannon, and the city entered.  The Austrians lost many men there.  Augereau’s division, finding some obstacles to its passage at Borghetto, returned to pass the river at Peschiera.

Wurmser, having lost all hopes of maintaining the line of the Mincio, endeavoured to preserve the important positions of Montebaldo, and Roca d’Anfo.  General Saint Hilaire marched on Roca d’Anfo, attacked the enemy in the valley of Lodron, and took many prisoners from him.  Riva was taken, and Wurmser compelled to burn his flotilla.  Massena marched on Montebaldo, and retook Corona.  Augereau re-ascended the left bank of the Adige, following the ridges of the mountains, and reached Ala.  The enemy suffered considerable losses in the skirmishes by which his retreat was accompanied.  His troops were entirely discouraged.

After the loss of two such battles as those of Lonato and Castiglione, Wurmser must have known that he could not dispute the positions which the French might wish to occupy to secure the line of the Adige.  He retreated to Roveredo and Trente.  The French army itself stood in need of repose.  Wurmser’s forces, after all his defeats, were still equal to ours ;  but with this difference, that one battalion of the army of Italy was now enough to put four of the enemy’s to flight ;  and that cannon, prisoners, and military stores, were picked up on all sides.

Wurmser had, it is true, re-victualled the garrison of Mantua ;  but out of the whole of his fine army he now brought back not more than from 40 to 45,000 men, including his cavalry.  Besides, nothing could equal the discouragement and demoralization of this fine army, since its reverses, except the extreme confidence with which it had been inspired at the opening of the campaign.

Wurmser’s plan, which might have succeeded under other circumstances, or against another man than his antagonist, was, nevertheless calculated to fail as it did ;  and although, at the first glance, the defeat of that fine and numerous army, in so few days, seems attributable only to the talents of the French General, who continually invented new manoeuvres, on the spur of the occasion, against a general plan previously concerted, it must be owned that this plan was formed on erroneous foundations.  It was an error to make corps which had no communication amongst themselves, act separately in the face of a centralised army, whose communications were easy.  The right could only communicate with the centre by way of Roveredo and Lodron.  It was again a second error, to subdivide the corps of the right, and to assign different objects to these different divisions.  That which, was at Brescia found no force opposed to it, and that which reached Lonato had to contend with troops which the day before were at Verona before the Austrians left, now opposed by no enemy in front.  There were very good troops in the Austrian army, but there were also some very indifferent ;  those which came with Wurmser from the Rhine were excellent, and animated with the hope of victory ;  but all the establishments of Beaulieu’s old army, which had been defeated in so many actions, carried discouragement with them.  One of Wurmser’s dispositions, which turned out most disastrous, was that of composing the greater part of his right of Hungarians, awkward troops, who, when once routed, were unable to extricate themselves from the mountains ;  and, on account of their language, could not make themselves understood.

IX.  Second Siege of Mantua.—The first few days succeeding the raising of the blockade of Mantua were employed by the garrison in destroying the works of the besiegers, and in getting in the pieces of artillery and the stores which they found.  But the speedy defeat of Wurmser soon brought the French back before the place.  The loss of the battering train left them no hopes of being able to besiege it.  That train, formed with great pains out of pieces taken from different fortresses in Italy, was almost wholly lost.  Besides the weather was growing too bad ;  the opening of the trenches, and the duty in them, would have been too dangerous for the troops at the moment when the malignity of the climate was about to commence its ravages.  The French General, therefore, not having at hand a train which would have ensured his taking Mantua in six weeks, would not think of forming a second, which would not have been ready until the moment when new events might have again exposed him to a similar loss, by obliging him to raise the siege a second time.  He therefore contented himself with a simple blockade.  General Sahuget was entrusted with it ;  he attacked Governolo, and General Dallemagne Borgo-Forte ;  they took those places, as well as the whole of the Seraglio, drove the enemy into the place, and increased the strictness of the blockade to the utmost.  The number of redoubts and fortifications round the place was assiduously increased, in order to employ as few troops as possible ;  for the number of the besiegers decreased daily through the ravages of fever ;  and it was foreseen with terror that these ravages would increase in the autumn.  It is true that the garrison was subjected to the same evils and the same diminution.

X.  Conduct of the different people of Italy during this crisis.—In the mean time the situation of Italy, during the few days which had just elapsed, had been an absolute revelation.  All the passions had shown themselves in open day ;  every one threw off the mask.  The enemy’s party showed itself at Cremona, at Casal-Major, and some sparks appeared at Pavia.  In general Lombardy showed a good spirit ;  at Milan, particularly, the whole populace showed great constancy and much fortitude :  they gained our confidence, and deserved the arms which they incessantly and earnestly asked for.  The French general accordingly wrote to them, in the height of his satisfaction :  “ When the French army beat a retreat, when the partisans of Austria and the enemies of liberty considered it lost beyond redemption, when you yourselves could not possibly suspect that this retreat was only a stratagem, you shewed your attachment to France, and your love of liberty ;  you displayed a zeal and firmness by which you have deserved the esteem of the French army, and will merit the protection of the French republic.”

“ Your people continually become more worthy of liberty, acquiring increased energy daily.  No doubt they will one day appear with glory on the theatre of the world.  Accept the assurance of my satisfaction, and of the sincere wishes of the French people to see you free and happy.”

The inhabitants of Bologna, Ferrara, Reggio and Modena, showed themselves truly interested in our cause.  Parma remained faithful to its armistice ;  but the regency of Modena acted in open hostility to us.  At Rome the French were insulted in the streets ;  their expulsion from Italy was proclaimed.  The fulfilment of those conditions of the armistice which had not yet been performed was suspended.  The General in chief might have punished such conduct ;  but other considerations carried him elsewhere, and obliged him to postpone the chastisement, if the negotiations should not produce repentance.  Cardinal Mattei, Archbishop of Ferrara, shewed his joy at the raising of the siege of Mantua.  He called on the populace to rise against the French.  He took possession of the citadel of Ferrara, and there hoisted the Pope’s colours.  The Pope also sent a legate thither, whereby he violated the armistice.  After the battle of Castiglione, the French General had Mattei arrested and taken to Brescia.  The Cardinal, confused, answered only by this single word, PECCAVI, which disarmed Napoleon, who contented himself with putting him, for three months, in a seminary at Brescia.  This Cardinal was afterwards the Pope’s plenipotentiary at Tolentino.  He was of a princely Roman family ;  a man of narrow mind, and limited talents ;  but who was supposed to be sincerely devout.  He was minutely scrupulous in all the observances of religion.  After the death of Pope Pius VI.  the Court of Vienna made great exertions in the conclave at Venice to get him elected Pope, but did not succeed.  Chiaramonti, Bishop of Incola, gained the election, and took the name of Pius VII.

N.B.  of the Editor, written under dictation.  The Report mentions only 20,000 men brought from the Rhine by Wurmser.  The chapter says 30,000, and is right.  The inequality of strength between the two armies was always so great that the French General, in his reports, frequently thought it necessary to diminish the number of the enemy, lest he should discourage his own army.  This explains the numerical differences which sometimes occur between the work and the official documents.

* All the words in Italics are corrections made in the original manuscript by Napoleon’s own hand.