Count de Las Cases
Memorial de Sainte Hélène
London, 1823
MY RESIDENCE WITH THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.


Volume 1, Part 2
page 209 - 215



FRAGMENTS OF CHAPTER III.



I.  Reasons for remaining on the line of the Ticino.—The armistice being concluded, and the fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Ceva, surrendered to us, it was enquired whether we ought now to pass the Ticino.  It was well understood that the armistice, which had just placed these fortresses in our power, and separated the Piedmontese army from that of Austria, was useful.  But it was asked, whether it would not now be most advantageous to profit by the means already acquired, in order to revolutionize Piedmont and Genoa completely, before advancing any farther.  The Directory had the right of rejecting the proposed negotiations, and of declaring its will, by an ultimatum.  “ Would it not be impolitic,” it was said, “ to go still farther from France, and pass the Ticino without securing our rear ?  The Kings of Sardinia, who have been so useful whilst they fought for us, have been the chief contributors to our reverses, as soon as they have changed their policy.  At this day, the disposition of that monarch leaves not the smallest room for illusion ;  the nobles and the priests govern this court, and are the irreconcileable enemies of the Republic.  If we were to experience a defeat in advancing, what should we not have to dread from their hatred and vengeance ?  Even Genoa ought to be a source of great apprehension to us.  The oligarchical system still reigns there ;  and however numerous our partizans in that quarter may be, they have no influence in political decisions.  The citizens of Genoa may declaim, indeed ;  but that is the extent of their power.  The oligarchists rule ;  they command the troops, and can dispose of 8 or 10,000 peasants, in the valleys of Fontana Bona, and other places, whom they call to their defence in critical emergencies.  Finally, it was asked, where were we to stop ?  Should we pass the Ticino, the Adda, the Oglio, the Mencio, the Adige, the Brenta, the Piave, and the Tagliamento, in order to reach the Isonzo ?  Was it prudent to leave behind us such numerous and unfriendly populations ?  Was not the true way to go fast, that of going wisely ;  making points of support of every country we should pass, by changing the government, and confiding the affairs of the state to persons of the same opinions and interests as ourselves.  If we entered the territories of Venice, should we not oblige that Republic, which could command 50,000 men, to take part with our enemies ? ”

II.  Reasons for taking the line of the Adige.—To the foregoing remarks, it was answered :  The French army ought to follow up its victory.  We ought only to stop on the best line of defence, against the armies which will speedily march against us ;  that line is the Adige.  It covers the valleys of the Po ;  it intercepts middle and lower Italy ;  it covers the blockade and siege of Mantua, and probably that place may be taken before the contest can re-commence.  By proceeding to the Adige, we gain the means of providing for all the expenses of the army, because the weight of that expense is divided amongst a more numerous population ;  that of Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Legations.  It is feared that Venice may declare against us.  The best way of preventing it, is to carry the war, in a few days, into the midst of her states ;  she is not prepared for such an event ;  she has not had time to levy troops, and form resolutions ;  the senate must be prevented from deliberating.  Instead of which, if we remain on the Ticino, the Austrians may force Venice to make common cause with them, or she may herself be induced to do so by the spirit of party.  The King of Sardinia is no longer formidable, his militia is disbanded, the English will cease their subsidies ;  internal affairs are in the worst possible condition in his dominions.  Whatever step the Court may take, the number of the disaffected will increase :  after fever comes debility.  12 or 15,000 is the utmost amount of the forces which this power still retains, and these are disseminated throughout a great number of towns ;  they are scarcely sufficient to maintain internal tranquillity.  Besides, the hatred of Austria towards the King of Sardinia will keep constantly increasing ;  she will complain that, on the loss of a single battle, she was abandoned by her confederate.  She will reproach him with the example of his ancestors, who remained faithful allies even when France was mistress of Turin ;  whilst in this instance he has deserted the joint cause without even the loss of a fortress.  The Court of Sardinia has therefore henceforth much to fear from the Austrians.  There is nothing to be apprehended from the oligarchists of Genoa ;  our best security against them is the immense profit they make by our neutrality.  In propagating the principles of liberty in Piedmont and Genoa, in kindling civil war there, we should be raising the people against the nobles and priests :  we should become responsible for the excesses which always attend such a contest.  On the contrary, we should, when arrived on the Adige, be masters of all the States of the House of Austria in Italy, and of those of the Pope on this side of the Apennines ;  we should be in a situation to proclaim the principles of liberty, as well as to excite Italian patriotism against foreign domination, and the irritation of the people of Bologna and Ferrara against the Papal government.  There would be no occasion to sow division amongst the various classes of citizens :  nobles, citizens, and peasants would all be equally called upon to march unanimously for the restoration of the Italian nation.  The word Italia !  Italia ! proclaimed from Milan to Bologna, would produce a magical effect.  Should it be proclaimed on the Ticino, the Italians would say, “ Why do you not advance ?”

III.  Topography of Italy.—The great northern plains of Italy, comprised between the Alps which divide them from France, Switzerland, and Germany, the Apennines which divide them from Genoa and Tuscany, and the Adriatic, compose the valley of the Po, the valleys which extend to the Adriatic north of the Po, and the valleys which extend to the Adriatic south of the Po.  These valleys are not subdivided by any hills ;  so that communications might be opened between all the rivers if necessary.  They constitute one of the most fertile, grandest, richest plains in the world, covered with opulent cities and a population of 8, or 10,000,000.  This immense plain comprises Piedmont, Lombardy, Parma, Placentia, Modena, Bologna, Ferrara, Romania, and the Venetian countries.

IV.  Valley of the Po.—The Po rises in Mount Viso, and receives, successively, on its left, at Turin, the Doire, which descends from Mount Genevre ;  a little lower at Chivasso, the Dorea-Baltea, which comes from the Great Saint-Bernard ;  between Casal and Valenza, the Sesia ;  at Pavia, the Ticino, which descends from Lake Maggiore, and the heights of the Simplon ;  near Borgo-Forte, the Oglio, from the Lake Iseo ;  near Governolo, the Mencio, from the Lake of Garda.  The Po receives on its right bank all the streams which rise in the Apennines ;  the Tanaro below Valenza and Alessandria ;  the Scrivia, below Tortona and Castel-Nuovo ;  the Trebbia, above Placentia ;  the Taro above Casal Maggiore ;  the Crostollo, near Guastalla ;  the Secchia, near Saint-Benedetto ;  the Panaro and the Reno in the vicinity of Ferrara ;  and finally falls into the Adriatic thirty miles beyond Ferrara, by several mouths.  This river may almost be considered as a kind of sea, on account of the great number of streams it receives in all directions.  It is raised above the soil, and embanked by dykes, so that the finest countries of Italy are, like Holland, gained by art from the dominion of the waters.  There is little or no cause for solicitude respecting the course of the tributary rivers of the left bank ;  nature there takes its course without causing any inconvenience :  thus the Dorea-Baltea, the Ticino, and the Adda, enter the Po without occasioning any damage.  It is otherwise with the tributary streams of the right bank.  Below the Tanaro all the rivers are subject to great disorders, and give rise to difficult questions in hydraulics.  It is necessary to raise the dykes every year, because the countries through which they pass, particularly Parma, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara, suffer heavy inundations.  It is owing to this perpetual recurrence of natural difficulties, that the Italians have become so skilful in hydraulic science.  The engineers of that country have carried this branch of our knowledge farther than it has been pursued in any other.

The tributary streams on the opposite side of the Po also differ in this respect ;  that those of the left bank are almost always navigable, and scarcely ever fordable ;  whilst those on the right bank are never navigable, and are almost always fordable.  The former are rivers ;  the latter are only torrents.


N.B.  Here finishes this part of the chapter.—I am the more inclined to regret my not having the whole of it, because the remaining part contains a methodical enumeration of all the means of defence which Italy possesses against Austria.  This piece the Emperor himself did not hesitate to consider very fine, and entitled to become of classical authority to military men ;  as long, said be, as the forms and physical details of the Peninsula remain unaltered.  It will, however, infallibly be found in the complete work of the Campaigns of Italy.