Count de Las Cases
Mémorial de Sainte Hélène
London, 1823
MY RESIDENCE WITH THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.
Volume 1, Part 2
page 182 - 208
BATTLE OF MONTENOTTE.
From the arrival of the General-in-Chief at Nice, on the 28th of March, 1796, to the Armistice of Cherasco, the 28th of April following, being one month.
I. Plan of Campaign for entering Italy by turning the Alps.—The King of Sardinia, who, from his military and geographical position, had acquired the title of Porter of the Alps, had, in 1796, fortresses at the openings of all the passes leading into Piedmont. If it had been wished to penetrate into Italy by forcing the Alps, it would have been necessary to gain possession of these fortresses. Now the roads did not allow the carriage of a battering-train ; besides, the mountains are covered with snow during three quarters of the year, which leaves but little time for besieging these places. A plan was, therefore, formed for turning all the Alps, and for entering Italy precisely at the point where these high mountains terminate, and where the Apennines begin.
The Saint-Gothard is the most elevated pass of the Alps. From thence all the others gradually decrease in height. Thus the Saint-Gothard is higher than the Brenner ; the latter higher than the mountains of Cadore ; the mountains of Cadore than the Col de Tarvis and the mountains of Carniola. On the other side, the Saint-Gothard is higher than the Simplon ; the Simplon higher than the Saint-Bernard, which is higher than Mount Cenis ; and Mount Cenis higher than the Col di Tende. From the latter point the Alps continually decrease in height, and at length terminate at the mountains of Saint-Jaques, near Savona, where the Apennines begin. Then the chain of the Apennines rises again, and proceeds constantly increasing in an inverse direction ; so that the Bocchetta, the neighbouring hills, those which separate Liguria from the states of Parma, Tuscany, the Modenese, and the Bolognese, keep always rising. The valley of Madonna, of Savona, and the hills of Saint-Jaques and Montenotte, are therefore, the lowest points both of the Alps and Apennines ; the spot at which the former finish, and the latter commence.
Savona, a seaport and fortified town, was placed in such a manner, as to serve both for a magazine and point of appui. From that town to Madonna the road is a firm hard road, three miles long ; and from Madonna to Carcari, it is four or five miles more. The latter space might be rendered practicable for artillery in a few days. At Carcari are carriage roads, which lead into the interior of Piedmont and Montferrat.
This was the only point by which Italy could be entered without passing mountains : the elevations of the ground are there so inconsiderable, that at a subsequent period, during the Imperial reign, a canal was projected, which was to have connected the Adriatic with the Mediterranean, by the assistance of the Po, and of a branch of the Bormida, which has its source in the heights near Savona.
In penetrating into Italy by the sources of the Bormida, some hopes might be entertained of separating and intersecting the Sardinian and Austrian armies ; because from that position Lombardy and Piedmont were both menaced. It was as practicable to march on Milan as on Turin. The Piedmontese were interested in covering Turin, and the Austrians in defending Milan.
II. State of the two Armies.—The enemy’s army was commanded by General Beaulieu, a distinguished officer, who had gained reputation in the campaigns of the North. This army was well provided with all that was calculated to render it formidable. The French army, on the contrary, was in want of every thing, and its Government was unable to supply it. The army of the Allies was composed of Austrians, Sardinians, and Neapolitans ; they already amounted to three times the number of the French army, and were to be increased successively by the forces of the Pope, by reinforcements from Naples, and by the troops of Modena and Parma.
This army was divided into two grand corps : the effective army of Austria, composed of four divisions, of a strong artillery, and a numerous cavalry, increased by a Neapolitan division, forming a total of 60,000 men under arms. The effective army of Sardinia, composed of three Piedmontese divisions, and an Austrian division of 4000 cavalry, was commanded by the Austrian General Colli, who was himself under the command of General Beaulieu. The rest of the Sardinian forces garrisoned the fortresses, or defended the passes opposite the French army of the Alps ; they were commanded by the Duke of Aosta.
The French army was composed of four effective divisions under Generals Massena, Augereau, Laharpe, and Serrurier. Each of these divisions could, one with another, muster from 6 to 7000 men under arms. The cavalry, amounting to 3000, was in the most miserable condition, though it had been a long time on the Rhone to recruit itself ; but it had wanted for provisions.—The arsenals of Antibes and Nice were well furnished ; but means of transport were wanting : all the draught horses had perished for want. The penury of the French finances was so great that all the efforts of the Government could only furnish 2000 louis in specie to the military chest of the army for the opening of the campaign ; there was, therefore, nothing to be expected from France. Henceforth no resources were to be hoped for, except from victory. It was only in the plains of Italy that means of conveyance could be organized, the artillery furnished with teams, the soldiers clothed, and the cavalry mounted. All this would be gained by forcing the passage of Italy. The French had, indeed, at most but 30,000 men ; whilst more than 90,000 were opposed to them. If these two armies had had to contend with each other in a general engagement, no doubt the inferiority of the French army in point of numbers, artillery, and cavalry, would have ensured its easy overthrow ; but as it was situated, it was enabled to supply the want of numbers by the rapidity of its marches ; the deficiency of artillery by the nature of its manoeuvres ; its inferiority in cavalry by the nature of its positions.—The character of our troops was excellent : all the men had served in the other campaigns of Italy, or in those of the Pyrenees.
III. Napoleon arrives at Nice.—Napoleon arrived at Nice between the 26th and 29th of March. The picture of the army which Scherer laid before him, was still worse than he bad been able to form any idea of. The supply of bread was very uncertain ; distributions of meat had long ceased ; for means of conveyance there were only mules, and not above 200 of these could be reckoned upon ; it was impossible to think of transporting above twelve pieces of cannon ; the position of the army grew worse every day. Not an instant was to be lost : the army could no longer subsist where it was ; it was necessary either to advance or recede.
The French General gave orders to put the army in motion. He wished to surprise the enemy in the very opening of the campaign, and dazzle and confound them by brilliant and decisive advantages.
The head-quarters had never quitted Nice since the beginning of the war ; they were ordered to be transferred to Albenga. All the civil lists had long considered their posts as fixed, and concerned themselves much more about their own comforts, than the wants of the army. The French General reviewed the troops, and said to them, “ ”
Speeches like this, from a young General of twenty-five, in whom great confidence was already placed, on account of the brilliant operations of Toulon, Saorgio, and Savona, directed by him in the course of the preceding years, were received with the most lively acclamations.
For the purpose of turning the Alps, and entering Italy by the Col di Cadibona, it was necessary to assemble the whole army on its extreme right ; which would have been a dangerous operation, if the snow had not then covered the debouches of the Alps. The transition from the defensive to the offensive order, is one of the most delicate operations in war. Serrurier was placed at Garezzio with his division, to observe the camps which Colli had at Ceva ; Massena and Augereau were placed in reserve at Loano, Finale, and as far as Savona. Laharpe marched to menace Genoa ; his van-guard, commanded by Gervoni, occupied Voltri. At the same instant the General-in-chief caused the passage of the Bocchetta and the keys of Gavi to be demanded of the Senate of Genoa. Great apprehensions prevailed in Genoa ; the councils placed themselves in permanence.
IV. Battle of Montenotte, 11th of April.—Beaulieu, alarmed, hastened with all possible speed from Milan to the succour of Genoa. He removed his head-quarters to Novi, divided his army into three corps ; the right, under Colli, composed of Piedmontese, had its head-quarters at Ceva ; it was intrusted with the defence of the Stura and Tanaro. The centre, under the command of Dargentau, marched on Montenotte, to intersect the French army by falling on its left flank, and cutting it at Savona on the road of the Cornice. Beaulieu, in person, with his left, covered Genoa, and marched on Voltri. At the first glance these dispositions seemed skilful : but on more profound investigation of the circumstances of the country, it will be seen that Beaulieu divided his force by these means, because all direct communication between his centre and his left became impracticable, except behind the mountains ; whilst the French army, on the contrary, was placed in such a manner that it could join in a few hours, and fall in a mass on either of the corps of the enemy ; and when one of them should be totally defeated, the other must necessarily retreat.
General Dargentau, commanding the centre of the enemy’s army, encamped at Lower Montenotte, on the 9th of April. On the 10th, he marched on Monte-Legino, to debouch by Madonna. Colonel Rampon, who had been ordered to keep the three redoubts of Monte-Legino, having received intelligence of the march of the enemy, pushed forward a strong reconnoitring party to meet them. This party was driven back, from noon till two o’clock, when it entered the redoubts again. Dargentau attempted to carry them by an instantaneous assault ; he was repulsed in three successive attacks, and gave up the scheme. As his troops were fatigued, he took up a position, and put off turning these redoubts, in order to reduce them, until the morrow. Beaulieu, on his side, debouched on the 9th, on Genoa.
On the 10th, Laharpe was engaged all day with Beaulieu’s van-guard before Voltri, disputing the passes with him, and keeping him in check. But in the evening of the 10th, he fell back on Savona ; and on the 11th, at daybreak, he found himself with his whole division in the rear of Rampon and the redoubts of Monte-Legino. In the same night of the 10th, the General-in-chief marched with the divisions of Massena and Augereau by the Col di Cadibona, and debouched behind Montenotte. At daybreak, Dargentau, surrounded on all sides, was attacked in front by Rampon and Laharpe, and in rear and flank by the General-in-chief. Dargentau was completely routed ; his whole corps was cut to pieces, at the same time that Beaulieu arrived before Voltri, where he now found no enemy. He did not hear of the defeat at Montenotte, and the entrance of the French into Piedmont, till the 12th. He was then obliged to make his troops fall back, and repass the bad roads into which the disposition of his plan had thrown him. The consequence was, that three days afterwards, at the battle of Millesimo, only part of his troops could come up in time.
V. Battle of Millesimo, 14th of April.—On the 12th, the head-quarters of the French army were at Carcari : the defeated army had retired ; the Piedmontese on Millesimo, and the Austrians on Dego. These two positions were connected by a Piedmontese division, which was ordered to occupy the heights of Biestro. At Millesimo, the Piedmontese were on both sides of the road which covers Piedmont ; they were joined by Colli with all the force he had been able to bring up from the right. At Dego the Austrians occupied the position which defends the Acqui road, the direct way into the Milanese : they were successively joined by all the troops Beaulieu could bring back from Voltri ; they were in a good position for receiving all the reinforcements that might be sent to them from Lombardy. Thus the two great debouches of Piedmont and the Milanese were covered : the enemy flattered themselves that they should have time to establish and intrench themselves there. However advantageous the battle of Montenotte had been for us, the enemy had found means to repair their losses, through the superiority of their numbers : but the next day but one, the 14th, opened to us the two roads of Turin and Milan. Augereau, forming the left of the French army, marched on Millesimo ; Massena, with the centre, directed his march on Dego ; and Laharpe, commanding the right, took his way by the heights of Cairo. The enemy had formed an appui for their right, by causing the hill of Cosseria, which commands the two branches of the Bormida, to be occupied ; but from the 13th, General Augereau, who had not engaged at the battle of Montenotte, pushed the enemy’s right with such impetuosity, that he carried the passes of Millesimo, and surrounded the hill of Cosseria. Provera, with his rear guard, two thousand strong, was cut off. In this desperate situation, General Provera resolved to brave all extremities : he took refuge in an old ruined castle, and there barricadoed himself. From its top he saw the right of the Sardinian army making dispositions for the battle of the following day, by which he hoped to be extricated. All Colli’s troops, from the camp of Ceva, were expected to arrive in the course of the night. The French, therefore, felt it of the greatest importance to gain possession of the castle of Cosseria in the course of the day ; but this post was very strong, and their attack failed. The next day the two armies engaged. Massena and Laharpe carried Dego, after an obstinate conflict. Menars and Joubert carried the heights of Biestro. All Colli’s attacks to extricate Provera were unsuccessful ; he was defeated, and hotly pursued ; Provera was then compelled to lay down his arms. The enemy, briskly followed up into the passes of Spigno, left there part of his artillery, with many colours and prisoners. The separation of the two armies of Austria and Sardinia was, thence forward, complete. Beaulieu removed his headquarters to Acqui, on the Milanese road, and Colli returned to Ceva, to prevent the junction of Serrurier, and cover Turin.
VI. Battle of Dego, August 15.—In the mean time, a division of Austrian grenadiers, who had been directed from Voltri by Sassello, arrived at three in the morning at Dego. The position was no longer occupied but by advanced posts. These grenadiers, therefore, easily carried the village, and created great alarm at the French head-quarters, where they could not comprehend how the enemy could be at Dego, while we had advanced posts on the Acqui road. After two hours hard fighting, Dego was retaken, and almost the whole of the enemy’s division were made prisoners.
In these affairs, we lost General Banel at Millesimo, and General de Causse at Dego. These two officers were distinguished by the most brilliant valour ; they both came from the army of the Eastern Pyrenees, and it was remarkable that the officers who came from that army evinced the most extraordinary impetuosity and courage. It was at the village of Dego that Napoleon first distinguished a chief of battalion, whom he made a colonel ; this was Lannes, who afterwards was a Marshal of the Empire, and Duke of Montebello, and displayed talents of the first order. He will henceforth be seen to take the principal part in all military events.
The French General now directed his operations against Colli and the King of Sardinia, and contented himself with keeping the Austrians in check. Laharpe was placed in observation near Dego, to secure our rear, and keep Beaulieu in check, who, being greatly weakened, was now chiefly occupied in rallying and re-organizing the wreck of his army. Laharpe’s division being compelled to remain several days in this position, suffered greatly from the scarcity of provisions, owing to the want of means of conveyance, and the wasted condition of the country from the presence of so many troops ; this circumstance produced some irregularities. Serrurier learning at Garassio the results of the battles of Montenotte and Millesimo, put his troops in motion, occupied the height of San Giovanni, and entered Ceva the same day that Augereau arrived on the heights of Montezemoto. On the 17th, after some slight affairs, Colli evacuated the intrenched camp of Ceva, and retired behind the Cursaglia. The same day the General-in-chief removed his head-quarters to Ceva. The enemy had left there all their artillery, which they had not had time to carry off, and had contented themselves with leaving a garrison in the castle. The arrival of the army on the heights of Montezemoto was a sublime spectacle. The immense and fertile plains of Piedmont lay before them. The Po, the Tanaro, and a multitude of other rivers, meandered in the distance ; in the horizon, a white girdle of snow and ice, of a stupendous height, surrounded these rich valleys—this promised land. Those gigantic barriers, which seemed the limits of another world, which nature had delighted in rendering thus formidable, and to which art had contributed all its resources, had fallen, as if by enchantment. “ Hannibal forced the Alps,” said the French General, surveying those mountains, “ but we have turned them :” a happy expression, which conveyed, in two words, the idea and the results of the campaign. The army passed the Tanaro ; for the first time it was now absolutely in the plains, and the cavalry could now be of some utility to us. General Steingel, who commanded it, passed the Cursaglia, at Lezegno, and scoured the plain. The headquarters were fixed at the castle of Lezegno, on the right of the Cursaglia, near the point at which it falls into the Tanaro.
VII. Action of Saint-Michel ; Battle of Mondovi, 20th and 22d April.—General Serrurier united his forces at Saint-Michel. On the 20th he passed the bridge of Saint-Michel, at the same time that Massena passed the Tanaro to attack the Piedmontese. But Colli, aware of the danger of his position, abandoned the confluence of the two rivers, and marched in person to take up a position at Montoir. By a fortuitous circumstance, he arrived with his forces exactly before Saint-Michel, as General Serrurier was debouching from the bridge. He halted, opposed a superior force to him, and forced him to fall back. Serrurier would nevertheless have maintained himself in Saint-Michel, had not one of his light infantry regiments taken to pillage. The French General debouched on the 22d by the bridge of Torre, and directed his March on Mondovi. Colli had already raised some redoubts there, and established a position ; his left at Devico, and his centre at La Bicoque. The same day, Serrurier carried the redoubt of La Bicoque, and decided the battle, which took the name of Mondovi. This town and all its magazines fell into the hands of the conqueror. General Steingel, who had advanced too far into the plain, with a thousand horse, was attacked by a body of Piedmontese of twice that number. He made all the dispositions that could be expected from a consummate general, and was effecting his retreat towards the main body when he was mortally wounded by a pike in a charge. General Murat, at the head of the cavalry repulsed the Piedmontese, and pursued them during several hours. General Steingel, a native of Alsace, was an excellent officer of hussars. He had served under Dumourier in the campaigns of the North ; and was expert, intelligent, and active : he combined the qualities of youth with those of mature age, and was a true general of advanced posts. Two or three days before his death, he was the first man that entered Lezegno. The French General arrived there a few hours afterwards, and found that every thing had been provided and attended to. The defiles and fords had all been reconnoitred ; guides had been secured ; the curate and postmaster had been examined ; communications established with several of the inhabitants ; spies despatched in various directions ; the letters at the post-office seized, and those which could furnish any military information, translated and analyzed ; all proper measures taken for forming magazines of provisions for the troops. Unfortunately Steingel was near-sighted, a material defect in his profession, and which contributed to his death. After the battle of Mondovi, the General-in-chief marched on Cherasco ; Serrurier advanced on Fossano ; and Augereau on Alba.
VIII. Taking of Cherasco, April 25th.—These three columns, on the 25th of April, entered at the same time Cherasco, Fossano, and Alba.—Colli’s head-quarters were at Fossano on the very day that Serrurier dislodged him thence.—Cherasco, at the junction of the Tanaro and Stura, was a strong place, but ill defended and unprovided, because it was not a frontier fortress. The French General considered the possession of this place of great importance. He found some artillery in it, and commenced vigorous efforts for putting it in a state of defence. The van-guard passed the Stura, and advanced beyond the little town of Bra. In the mean time the junction of Serrurier had enabled us to communicate with Nice by Ponte-Dinava ; we received thence reinforcements of artillery, and all that could be got ready. We had taken, in the different engagements, many horses and much artillery : in the plain of Mondovi we levied horses on all sides. A few days after its entrance into Cherasco, the army had sixty guns with their stores ; the cavalry was remounted. The soldiers who had no distributions during the first eight or ten days of this campaign, began to receive them regularly. Pillage and disorder, the constant attendants of rapid movements, now ceased ; discipline was restored, and the appearance of the army improved daily amidst the abundance and resources presented by this fine country. Its losses were repaired. The rapidity of the movements, the impetuosity of the troops, and, above all, the art of opposing them to the enemy, at least upon an equality, and often with advantage, in point of numbers, with the constant tide of success, had preserved the men greatly ; besides, soldiers arrived by all the debouches, from all the depôts and all the hospitals, at the report of the victorious career and abundant supply of the army. Wines of every kind were found in Piedmont those of Montferrat resembled the wines in France. Previously to this period the misery of the French had exceeded all description. The officers had for several years received only eight francs per month, and the staff was wholly on foot. Marshal Berthier preserved amongst his papers an order of the day, issued at Albenga, granting to each general a gratification of three louis.
IX. Armistice of Cherasco, April 28.—The army was now only ten leagues from Turin.
The Court of Sardinia no longer knew what resolution to adopt ; its army was discouraged, and partly destroyed. The Austrian army, reduced to less than half its original numbers, seemed to think of nothing but covering Milan. The minds of the people of Piedmont were much agitated, and the Court was far from possessing the confidence of the public. It placed itself at the discretion of the French General, and solicited an armistice ; to which the latter acceded. Many people would have preferred that the army should have marched and taken Turin. But Turin is a fortified city ; if it had been determined to close the gates against us, they could not have been forced without such a train of artillery as we did not possess. The King had still a great number of fortresses, and notwithstanding the victories which had just been gained, the least check, the slightest caprice of fortune, might overturn every thing. The two hostile armies, notwithstanding their numerous reverses, were still equal to the French army ; they had a considerable artillery, and a cavalry which had not suffered. In the French army, in spite of all its success, a degree of astonishment prevailed ; the greatness of the enterprise struck every one ; the possibility of success, with such slender means, was a subject of doubt. The least ambiguous occurrence would have been seized on by many persons disposed to exaggeration. Some officers, and even generals, conceived that we ought not to dare to think of conquering Italy with so little artillery, scarcely any cavalry, and so feeble an army, which disease and the distance from home would weaken every day. Some traces of these sentiments of the army may be found in the following proclamation of the General-in-chief, which he addressed to his soldiers at Cherasco.
The conferences for the suspension of hostilities took place at head-quarters, at the house of Sulmatoirs, then maitre-d’hotel to the King, and afterwards the Emperor’s prefect of the palace. Latour, the Piedmontese General, and Colonel Lacoste, bearing powers from the King, came to Cherasco. Count Latour, an old soldier, who was lieutenant-general in the service of the King of Sardinia, was extremely hostile to all new ideas, of little information, and a common capacity, Colonel Lacoste, a man in the prime of life, expressed himself with facility, possessed much wit, and made a favourable impression. The conditions were, that the King should abandon the coalition, and send a plenipotentiary to Paris to treat for a definitive peace ; that in the mean time there should be an armistice ; that until the conclusion of peace, or the breaking off of the negotiations, Ceva, Coni, and either Tortona, or Alessandria, should be forthwith surrendered to the French army, with all their artillery and magazines ; that the French army should continue to occupy all the ground which was at that moment in its possession ; that the military roads in all directions should permit the free communication of the army with France, and of France with the army ; that Valenza should immediately be evacuated by the Neapolitans, and placed in the hands of the French General, until he should have effected the passage of the Po. Finally, that the militia of the country should be disbanded, and that the regular troops should be dispersed in the fortresses, in such a manner as to give no umbrage to the French.
Henceforth, the Austrians, left to themselves, could be pursued into the very heart of Lombardy. All the troops of the army of the Alps and the neighbourhood of Lyons, were now become disposable, and would join the army. Our line of communication with Paris would be shortened by one half ; finally, we now had points of appui, and grand depôts of artillery, to form our be sieging trains, and even to besiege Turin, if the Directory should not conclude peace.
X. Aide-de-camp Colonel Murat crosses Piedmont, and carries to Paris the news of the successes of the army.—General Murat, first, aide-de-camp to the General-in-chief, was despatched to Paris with twenty-one stand of colours and the copy of the armistice. Napoleon had taken this officer into his service on the 13th of Vendemiaire ; he was then a major of the 21st chasseurs. He afterwards married the Emperor’s sister, became a Marshal of the Empire, High Admiral, Grand Duke of Berg, and King of Naples. He performed a grand part in all the military operations of the times ; he always displayed great courage and, particularly, a singular hardihood, in cavalry movements. The province of Alba, which the French crossed, was of all Piedmont the country most adverse to the royal authority, and that which contained the greatest proportion of revolutionary germs ; some troubles had already broken forth there, and others subsequently burst out. If, instead of negotiating, Napoleon had chosen to continue the war with the King of Sardinia, it is in that country that he would have found the greatest assistance, and the greatest disposition to insurrection. Thus, in fifteen days, the principal point of the plan of the campaign was secured ; the greatest results were obtained ; the Piedmontese fortresses of the Alps were in our power ; the coalition was deprived of an ally who had an army of 50,000 men, and who was still more important on account of his situation. The national legislature had five times decreed that the army had deserved well of the country in the sittings of the 21st, 24th, 25th, and 26th of April.
According to the conditions of the armistice of Cherasco, the King of Sardinia sent Count Revel to Paris to treat for the definitive peace. It was concluded and signed on the 15th of May. By this treaty the fortress of Alessandria remained permanently with the French army. Suza, Labrunette, and the Exilles were demolished. The Alps became open, and the King remained at the disposal of the Republic, having no fortified place but Turin and fort Bard.
Note of the Editor.—We mention here, once for all, that differences will necessarily be found between the official reports and these chapters. They arise from the precipitancy with which the reports were drawn up, from the wish of the General-in-chief to disguise his plans, the necessity of deceiving the enemy with respect to his real strength, &c. For instance, it is said in the report that Beaulieu attacked in person at Montenotte. It was thought so at the time. Farther on it is said, that the attack on Voltri was made by only 10,000 Austrians ; but they had in the rear two columns of the same strength, which were to engage on the following day, Beaulieu having judged that on this point he should have to oppose the whole of the French army. It is also said, that Montenotte was attacked by only 15,000 men, because 10,000 men of this corps remained in the rear, and kept up the communication with the right at Ceva. It was against these troops that Massena, debouching at break of day by Cadibona, fired the first cannon.
If there is nothing said respecting the plans of the General-in-chief, or of his negotiations with Genoa, it is because the report published is only an extract from the official correspondence ; and because, moreover, as we have already observed, it was part of the General-in-chief’s plans to keep the enemy ignorant of his projects, and his mode of warfare.
This may suffice to explain, hereafter, any differences that may be observed. We repeat that the present observation is to be understood as applying once for all.